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FOREWORD
I’m pleased to introduce The Chinese People’s Liberation Army of 2025 which is the 2014 edition of an
ongoing series on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
co-published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI),
the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), and the
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). This
volume builds on previous volumes and identifies potential trajectories for PLA force modernization and
mission focus, and how these potential changes could
impact external actors.
This volume is of special relevance today in light
of the profound changes occurring within the PLA. I
have spent a considerable amount of my professional
career in the Western Pacific and, during that time,
I’ve seen first-hand the rapid expansion of the size
and capability of the PLA as it pursues a long-term,
comprehensive military modernization program in
support of China’s more assertive regional strategy.
China’s desire to develop a military commensurate
with its diverse interests and economic power is both
legitimate and understandable. However, China’s
coercive approach to security is problematic and of
increasing concern to the region. The challenge for
USPACOM, and the reason why this volume is timely
and important, is to understand how China will employ this growing military capability in support of its
interests.
The scholarship presented in this edition addresses the uncertainty surrounding the potential direction
of the PLA by examining three distinct focus areas:
Domestic, External, and Technological Drivers of PLA
Modernization; Alternative Futures for the PLA; and
Implications for the Region, World, and U.S.-China
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Relations. The analysis provides an insightful perspective into the factors shaping and propelling the
PLA’s modernization, its potential future orientation
ranging from internally-focused to globally-focused,
and how the PLA’s choices may impact China’s relations with its neighbors and the world.
NBR and SSI have, once again, provided an outstanding contribution to the growing body of research
and analysis on the PLA. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army of 2025 is a timely and important volume that will increase our understanding of the PLA
at a time in history that requires a well-informed approach to the expanding role of China.

		
		
		
		

HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Admiral, USN
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
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OVERVIEW
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Roy Kamphausen
R. Lincoln Hines
The 2014 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
conference occurred during a time of flaring regional
tensions in the East and South China Seas, increasing
military modernization by China and its neighbors,
and a potentially changing Chinese approach to its
regional security environment. In light of these continuing developments, the topic of this conference
and this volume—The Chinese People’s Liberation Army
in 2025—is both timely and prescient. China’s increasing military capabilities are creating complex shifts
in regional security calculations. To understand the
trends in China’s military modernization and its implications for regional and global security, conference
participants assessed: 1) the various domestic, international, and technological drivers of China’s military
modernization; 2) potential trajectories for PLA modernization; 3) and the implications of PLA modernization for the Asia-Pacific, the international order, and
U.S.-China relations.
The bulk of this volume presents the papers that
resulted from the 2014 Conference. This chapter discusses key contemporary developments that are pertinent to the topic of this volume. These developments
include China’s President Xi Jinping’s relationship
with the PLA, China’s changing approach to regional
security challenges, and developments in the AsiaPacific and international security environments. After
reviewing these developments, this chapter discusses
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the methodological framework for this volume, and
provides a chapter-by-chapter summary of each of
the papers included in this volume. This chapter concludes with a discussion of key themes that emerge
from this analysis.
XI JINPING AND THE PLA
China’s President Xi Jinping has quickly consolidated power during his first 2 years in office, despite
both internal and external challenges to his leadership.
Economically, Xi has stated that the market should
play the “decisive” role in China’s economy to support his so-called “China Dream,” but still sees an important role for the state as an economic actor. Xi has
also moved quickly to make reforms in domestic policy areas, such as banking and social policy (one-child
policy and the hukou (户口) system). Xi also became
Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)
at the same time as he became General Secretary of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November
2012, unlike his predecessor, Hu Jintao, whose assumption of the CMC chairmanship was delayed for
2 years. Likewise, Xi has taken charge of the two new
structures brought into being by the Fall 2013 Third
Plenum of the 18th Party Congress: the National Security Commission and the Central Leading Group for
Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms (CLGCDR).
But it is Xi’s relentless implementation of a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that is perhaps the strongest indicator of his consolidation of power. Staking
the Chinese Communist Party’s future—as well as his
own personal survival—on the campaign’s success, Xi
has provided top-level support for an anti-corruption
campaign that has ensnared high-ranking civilian and
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military officials and potential rivals, such as Bo Xilai
(薄熙来) and Zhou Yongkang (周永康). This anti-corruption campaign has also targeted top leaders of the
PLA. Most recently, former CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Caihou (徐才厚) was expelled from the CCP
and charged by prosecutors with accepting bribes in
exchange for promotions. Xu is the highest-ranking
PLA officer to be charged in court, and his retired
status afforded no protection against prosecution,
as had previously been the norm in Chinese politics.
(Although Zhou Yongkang, a more senior but also already-retired Politburo Standing Committee Member,
has also now been expelled by the Party and charged
by prosecutors.) Whereas some observers have judged
that taking on a “big tiger” of the PLA was part of an
effort to gain control of the PLA, it seems more likely
that Xi took his anti-corruption campaign to the top
ranks of the PLA precisely because he had consolidated sufficient power to do so.
Xi’s record of military service, albeit limited, and
his status as a “princeling” or offspring of a top leader
(His father, Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋), was a first generation CCP leader who served in several Party and
People’s Republic of China (PRC) government roles,
ultimately ending up as the Party Secretary and Governor of Guangdong Province) are often offered as
evidence Xi has a special relationship with the PLA.
But these facts, important as they may be, are not
sufficient to explain how Xi was able to take charge
so rapidly. Additional rationales are also required;
perhaps Xi has taken charge of a PLA that already
wants to be led in the direction he seems inclined to
be heading. For instance, it certainly appears that at
least some sectors of the PLA seem anxious to try out
the newer enhanced capabilities now resident in the
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PLA. Because these new capabilities create new and
different policy options, they might be of interest to
the leadership, which might be inclined to see their
use. A second instance in which Xi’s goals might be in
consonance with broader PLA desires concerns anticorruption efforts. There are frequent reports of PLA
officer discontent with rampant corruption, as well as
a desire to more rapidly professionalize, despite official enjoinders that the PLA will always remain a
“Party Army.” Xi may be tapping into that impulse to
some extent.
There remain some concerns, however, as to exactly how much control over the PLA Xi actually has.
During his trip to India and visit with India’s Prime
Minister (PM) Narendra Modi in September 2014,
there was a simultaneous incursion by PLA troops into
the Ladakh region along the Line of Control (LOC),
reportedly resulting in PM Modi taking Xi to task for
the action. Following the trip, Xi reportedly demanded “absolute loyalty” from top-ranking PLA leadership and stated that PLA forces could “improve their
combat readiness and sharpen their ability to win a
regional war in the age of information technology.” A
potential second example occurred some months later.
In November 2014, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) rolled
out the new J-31 stealth aircraft, reportedly with some
specifications very similar to the U.S. Air Force’s F-35,
precisely during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing, which was attended
by U.S. President Barack Obama.
In light of these developments, it is important for
policymakers to focus on the evolving civil-military
relationship, and especially Xi Jinping’s interaction
with the PLA. As Chairman of the CMC, Xi will continue the PLA’s refocus from being a ground force
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centric military to a more balanced joint force with
much stronger naval and air force capabilities. He will
also oversee implementation of the Third Plenum’s
guidance on institutional and structural reform of the
PLA, some which have obvious regional security implications. Xi almost certainly wants to have a more
effective PLA, but not at the cost of raising regional
security concerns.
CHANGING CHINESE APPROACHES TO THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
These reforms within the PLA take place as China
seems intent to more assertively pursue its interests
and claims in disputed maritime domains. Despite
long-standing efforts to mitigate regional perceptions
of a “China threat,” Chinese actions in the East and
South China Seas have alarmed both China’s neighbors and the United States, as in the last several years
China has become increasingly more assertive in staking its territorial claims in its near periphery. Increasingly alarmed by Chinese actions, regional actors have
protested on the one hand and sought more active intervention by the United States on the other.
However, the PRC’s pursuit of its aims in its “near
abroad” have neither broached American “redlines”
nor have they escalated confrontations to the point
where military conflict seems likely. This approach—
often referred to as a “salami slicing” approach—to attaining Chinese national security objectives has taken
place in the gray area between normal peacetime and
military conflict, albeit with the looming specter of an
increasingly more capable Chinese military.
China’s declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which covered the airspace over the
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Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, prompted an
equally assertive American response including a flight
of B-52 bombers through the ADIZ and a presidential
statement that the Senkaku Islands were covered under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, since
they are under the administrative control of Japan.
China also placed an oil rig near the disputed Paracel
Islands in May 2014, an oddly timed act considering
that the PRC and Vietnam had agreed to discussions
about joint development in mid-2013. The Philippines,
on the other hand, has attempted to settle its dispute
with China through international arbitration—a legal
effort in which China refuses to participate.
China’s gradual or creeping assertiveness begs
the question: what is driving China’s new assertiveness? Certainly new capabilities and domestic pressure on the CCP to act like a great power (especially
since a more restrained approach to conflicting claims
in maritime dimensions has often been met with active occupation and/or reinforcement efforts by other
claimants) are part of the story. Furthermore, more
domestic actors—including state-owned enterprises,
provincial and city governments, think tanks, netizens, among others—are engaged in the foreign policy process than previously, often arguing for different
sorts of assertiveness. With these various pressures on
Chinese foreign policy, it is important to ask: has there
been a change in PRC strategy? Two key developments in 2013-14 suggest that subtle shift is underway.
In October 2013, the PRC convened a conference on
peripheral foreign policy, and Xi Jinping gave a major
speech emphasizing the importance of regional relations. While great power relations were still judged
to be important, a relative shift in importance toward
regional security actors seemed clear.
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Then President Xi Jinping gave a keynote speech
at the 4th Summit of the Conference on Interaction
and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in
May 2014 CICA Summit in Shanghai. In the speech,
Xi argued vigorously for a system in which Asian nations take responsibility for Asia’s issues, emphasizing that regional security challenges should be solved
by Asian nations themselves. While in later speeches,
State Councilor Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪) notably stated
that all countries contributions were welcome in the
building of a regional security order, the “Asia for
Asians” theme is likely to be repeated. These rhetorical changes suggest that China is refocusing on Asia
as a principal objective of PRC security policy.
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS
China’s broad-based military modernization program and evolving posture toward the Asia-Pacific
regional security environment take place within the
context of a changing international security context.
The stability of the international security system has
relied, to a great extent, on the security that U.S. power has often provided to not only maintain its security
commitments to allies and security partners, but to
also discourage actions that threaten the norms that
underpin the international system. However, though
the United States remains an indispensable power, its
monopoly on power, and thus to some extent the stability of the international system, is being challenged
at the margins.
The years 2013-14 were turbulent internationally.
Prominent challenges to the global order and the U.S.
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capacity to sustain it have arisen in Eastern Europe
and the Middle East. In Eastern Europe, Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea represented a flagrant disregard for international norms
against territorial annexation, and altered regional
security calculations and energy security dynamics.
Large parts of the Middle East remain unstable, as
Syria’s ongoing civil war has reached its third year.
The extremist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL), has expanded its area of controlled territory and influence, and has executed American citizens. In light of these developments, the U.S. military
has reengaged in Iraq and is now conducting airstrikes
inside Syria. This is all occurring as the U.S. military
experiencing severe spending cuts that constrain U.S.
power projection and military response capabilities.
U.S. budget cuts and emerging crises thus call into
question the U.S. capacity to sustain its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific, even holding Chinese
activity constant. When an evolving set of capabilities
and new apparent focus on the Asia-Pacific region
by the PRC are added into the mix, dramatic changes
seem possible. The key to determining the sustainability of this system will be determining, in this context, China’s capacity for challenging the international
system and regional components of this system.
The future-orientation of China’s military will
depend heavily on factors such as the leadership of
President Xi Jinping, the consequences of China’s actions in its near region, and continuing developments
affecting the regional and global international order.
As China continues its rise on world stage, the intentions and the strength of the PLA will become increasingly consequential for the regional and global security. Though it is not possible to predict China’s future
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intentions or capabilities, it is possible to begin thinking about which areas are most likely to drive PLA
modernization, possible vectors for PLA modernization, and how regional and global security might look
for the PLA in a variety of future scenarios.
OVERVIEW
This volume and the conference that preceded it
are deeply indebted to Mr. Lonnie Henley for crafting
the conference précis that was provided to authors in
the research and writing stage. The précis is essential
reading for understanding the background of this effort and for the common frame of reference it provided
to chapter authors, and has been included in Chapter
2 in this volume. In the précis, Henley notes the relative lack of clarity from PLA sources as to what PLA
modernization objectives are through 2020, much less
further into the future, complicating efforts to understand future trajectories. He makes clear, however,
that the PLA’s main strategic direction continues to
be to prepare for a conflict with Taiwan and to deal
with U.S. intervention in such a scenario. In developing three potential future scenarios, Henley first lists
important variables that shape the futures, including
Taiwan’s status, U.S. military capabilities in the AsiaPacific, and internal Chinese stability, among others.
He further notes two important constants: China’s
view of its own history and a deep aversion to political fragmentation of the Chinese state. Henley asserts
that some factors are “non-drivers,” otherwise important factors that nonetheless will not have much
impact on military modernization. Somewhat controversially, Henley includes that the fate of the CCP is
a “non-driver” in that it does not rule out, or in, any
particular future.
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After considering these factors, Henley concludes
that three potential futures for the PLA might be usefully explored. The first future is of a PLA that is regionally focused. The second future sees the PLA as
having global expeditionary capabilities. The final future is of a PLA that is significantly weakened in reach
and scope. Henley states the many permutations that
could exist, but argues that these futures cover sufficient breadth to be useful to chapter authors. It is important to note that Phillip Saunders provided a very
helpful set of assumptions about the future which
participants urged be included in the précis, to which
Henley readily agreed.
The remainder of the volume is dedicated to “looking over the horizon” at these alternative futures for
the Chinese military in 2025. Chapters 3 to 5 examine
the various and likely domestic, external, and technological drivers of China’s military modernization.
Chapters 6 to 8 discuss the potential alternative futures
that could result from the interaction of the aforementioned drivers—a regionally focused PLA, a global expeditionary PLA, and a weakened PLA. Chapters 9 to
11 explore the implications of these alternative vectors
of PLA modernization for East Asian regional dynamics, U.S.-China relations, and the global system.
Domestic, External, and Technological Drivers of
PLA Modernization.
China’s military modernization is and will continue to be driven by a number of variables. The authors
in Chapters 3 to 5 assess the most plausible of these
drivers. These three inputs can broadly be described
as domestic, international, and technological drivers. It is important to note that none of these drivers
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should be viewed as occurring in isolation from one
another. Instead, these variables should be viewed as
dynamic and interconnected.
In Chapter 3, Joseph Fewsmith explores the main
domestic drivers of PLA modernization. Fewsmith
discusses the various domestic drivers that have led
China to alter its policy of “avoiding the limelight
and keeping a low profile” (taoguang yanghui 韬光养
晦) introduced by Deng Xiaoping to an approach of
“proactively getting some things done” (积极地有所作
为) practiced since 2009, when Hu Jintao was in office.
Though Fewsmith contends that part of this increasing assertiveness is a natural outgrowth of China’s
growing economic and military clout, he argues that
the timing of China’s policy actions suggests that the
drivers of China’s recent assertive foreign policy are
largely domestic.
Fewsmith assesses several domestic factors influencing China’s security calculus. These factors include
domestic social stability, the role of nationalism, concerns over legitimacy issues, a sense of crisis among
the CCP, and the leadership of Xi Jinping and China’s
new generation of leaders. China’s local cadres are
often incentivized to pursue interests contrary to the
people over whom they govern; consequently, China
has seen an uptick in the number of “mass incidents.”
In addition to these challenges, Fewsmith examines
China’s growing nationalism and the implications
this could have for elite decisionmaking. A further
source of domestic pressure discussed by Fewsmith
is the increasing discontent among Chinese intellectuals regarding the pace of political reform in China,
which have created a “sense of crisis” among China’s
political elites.
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According to Fewsmith, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been quickly consolidating power and has
adopted a more assertive foreign policy. This more
assertive foreign policy serves to facilitate centralization, as opposition to these efforts can be framed as
unpatriotic. Yet, how durable are these factors driving
China’s assertive foreign policy? Fewsmith contends
that, although these trends may reinforce China’s assertive posture in the near future, China will be challenged by several socio-economic problems (e.g., an
aging population) that may necessitate the Chinese
policymakers refocus their attention inward. Fewsmith concludes that these domestic inputs might
drive a more regionally oriented force, however these
factors would be unlikely to sustain the type of effort
required to develop a global expeditionary force.
In addition to these internal drivers, PLA modernization will also be driven by a number of interconnected external variables. In Chapter 4, Eric Heginbotham and Jacob Heim analyze how regional actors,
U.S.-China relations, and China’s growing overseas
interests are likely to affect China’s perceived national
security interests and the weapons systems that it
seeks to procure.
To establish an operational context for parsing the
impact of different scenarios on Chinese military requirements, the authors begin with a discussion of East
Asian geography and the types of forces China would
need to act at three distances from its borders: the immediate periphery (defined as within 1,000 kilometers
[km] of China); the broader region (roughly 1,000 to
3,000-km); or areas outside region. Heginbotham and
Heim also suggest that, although Chinese force development was optimized for operations in the country’s
immediate periphery through the early-2000s, it has,
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for the last decade, placed greater emphasis on adapting its military for broader regional contingencies.
The authors look at how relations with regional
and global actors and China’s expanding overseas interests could serve to reinforce current trends toward
limited power projection and broader regional capabilities. They also discuss current trends that deviate
from that trajectory—either toward a force optimized
to operate in China’s immediate periphery, a global
expeditionary force, or a weakened PLA.
According to Heginbotham and Heim, there are
a limited range of specific circumstances that could
lead the PLA to refocus its military to its immediate
periphery. A strong United States with a more adversarial relationship with China could potentially
threaten China, spurring Beijing to focus more on
short-range capabilities designed for defensive purposes in China’s immediate periphery. Similarly, the
authors contend that if China views a conflict with
Taiwan as likely or if Taiwan appears to be pursuing de jure independence, the PLA may refocus on
the periphery.
There are several scenarios that could drive China
to accelerate the development of capabilities relevant
to wider regional scenarios. Heginbotham and Heim
contend this could occur if PRC-Republic of China
(ROC) relations remain stable, but China’s relationships with other regional neighbors worsen. A military conflict with one or more regional states or attacks
on Chinese citizens in these states would provide particularly strong motivation. Heginbotham and Heim
also contend that military-industrial cooperation and
the formation of meaningful strategic partnerships
with regional states could also provide incentives for
China to develop certain types of regional military
capabilities.
15

Chapter 4 also discusses scenarios that could make
the PLA a more global expeditionary force. A more
benign regional environment could provide a more
permissive environment for diverting PLA resources
to the development of extra-regional expeditionary capabilities. This could occur if China were able
to resolve or, more likely, shelve its regional territorial disputes, or if its relations with the United States
significantly improved. Threats to overseas Chinese
citizens or investments in distant regions could spark
domestic political demands for China to develop the
forces necessary to protect its interests in those areas.
China could also form deeper military-industrial ties
with states beyond Asia and might then have added
incentives for developing the military capacity to
sustain those ties.
Finally, Heginbotham and Heim discuss the various external factors that could result in a weakened
PLA. Though the authors note that internal factors
are more likely to produce this outcome than external ones, they explore various external drivers that
could weaken the PLA. If the PLA were to engage in
a protracted and unsuccessful military conflict, public
support for military modernization could diminish or
resources could be drained more directly by the conflict itself. Diminished access to technology and components from Russia could affect the Chinese ability to
produce or maintain certain types of systems. Or support from an outside power for domestic insurgency
or terrorism could plausibly contribute to weakening the PLA’s ability to fight conventional wars by
diverting resources and attention toward domestic
counterinsurgency.
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In addition to these external drivers, in Chapter
5, Richard Bitzinger and Michael Raska examine the
technological drivers of the PLA’s military modernization. Bitzinger and Raska explore the PLA’s approach to and capacity for innovation, and how these
technological factors would serve a weakened, regionally oriented, or a global expeditionary PLA. Overall,
this chapter examines China’s approach to military
modernization, initiatives aimed at reforming China’s
defense industry, and evaluates these efforts.
Bitzinger and Raska first review literature on the
role of innovation in military affairs, defining the parameters by which they evaluate the PLA’s innovative
capacity. From these parameters, the authors assess
the PLA’s capabilities for making “disruptive” innovations, and the PLA’s capacity for making more incremental innovations. According to the authors, China has been trying to “catch up” with Western powers
in terms of defense for the past 150 years with varied
levels of success. In the mid-1990s, China instituted reforms to make its defense industry more efficient and
responsive to its customer base. As part of its reform
efforts, China has attempted to unify, standardize,
and legalize its weapons procurement process. China
is also making efforts to leverage civil military and
dual-use technologies better.
Although China’s military innovation lagged behind that of Western powers, China’s “latecomer
advantage” has enabled it to skip various phases of
development. As a latecomer, the PLA has been able
to identify and absorb key foreign civil and military
technologies. China’s military has benefitted from
dramatically expanding defense budgets and increased funding for research and development. China
has been working on 16 mega projects, with three
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classified projects. Bitzinger and Raska discuss the
likely candidates for these three classified projects: 1)
the Shenguang (Divine Light) laser program; 2) the
Second Generation Beidou-2 Satellite System; and, 3)
a hypersonic vehicle technology project.
Overall, Bitzinger and Raska contend that China’s
military has benefitted from investing heavily in military modernization, yet the PLA technological modernization still faces several obstacles in terms of innovation. The PLA’s indigenous innovative capabilities
remain limited and the PLA’s technological innovation is still being outpaced by foreign competitors.
Furthermore, few Chinese companies have the knowledge, experience, or capacity required for high-level
production.
Bitzinger and Raska conclude that China’s military
might have the capacity for gaining niche asymmetric advantages that may increase its capability as a
regionally oriented force, because regionally oriented
forces, such as so-called anti-access/area-denial (A2/
AD) capabilities may only require incremental innovations. However, Bitzinger and Raska contend that
China’s current defense industry does not appear set
to have the capacity for the type of disruptive innovations necessary for developing a robust global expeditionary force. As for a weakened PLA, the authors
contend that China could continue its process of incremental innovations and would likely focus more on
developing its defensive capabilities.
Alternative Futures for the PLA.
The aforementioned domestic, external, and technological drivers will produce a wide range of possible alternative futures for the future composition
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and orientation of the PLA. Authors in Chapters 6 to
8 considered three plausible and distinct, though not
necessarily mutually exclusive, futures for the PLA:
1) a regionally focused PLA; 2) a global expeditionary
PLA; and, 3) a weakened PLA.
In Chapter 6, Bernard Cole discusses the potential
makeup of a PLA focused on regional issues. According to Cole, in such a scenario, Taiwan would still remain a top contingency, but that the PLA’s most immediate maritime concern would be establishing sea
control in “near seas” or “three seas.”
Cole discusses the various changes that might occur in the PLA’s orientation and structure to become
a regionally oriented force. To meet regional challenges, the PLA’s personnel and budget prioritization
would likely shift away from the PLA and move toward the PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLAAF. As the
ballistic missile capabilities of these forces continue
to increase, the responsibility for controlling China’s
nuclear forces will likely be divided among the Second Artillery Force (SAF), the PLAN, and PLAAF,
with the SAF playing the leading role. Furthermore,
Cole contends that the PLA will also likely continue
efforts at reforming its personnel management and
Professional Military Education (PME). Much of the
PLA’s reforms will hinge upon the PLA’s ability to rid
the PLA of corrupt promotion practices and develop a
professional, career non-commissioned officer corps.
According to Cole, a regionally oriented China
would likely have greater power projection capabilities, such as improved amphibious assault capabilities.
With these growing capabilities, the PLA will likely
increase the frequency of interregional port calls, and
increase its involvement in nontraditional missions,
such as counterpiracy and Humanitarian and Disaster
Relief (HADR) operations.
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The PLA could also become a force with a more
global reach. In Chapter 7, Oriana Skylar Mastro explores the potential makeup of a global expeditionary
PLA. According to Mastro, the PLA will have to overcome significant hurdles and make several changes to
its doctrinal, strategic, and force posture to become a
global expeditionary force.
Specifically, Mastro posits a series of changes China would need to make to its doctrine, strategic guidelines, and operational concepts to be able to conduct
global expeditionary operations on a limited scale.
The PLA would likely move beyond its current doctrinal formulation of “local war under informationized conditions,” and seek to develop greater power
projection capabilities to carry out “win-win operations.” The PLA would also reprioritize certain operational concepts, emphasizing joint island landing
campaigns and strategic air raids, thus leveraging the
PLA’s asymmetric advantages. Furthermore, Mastro
contends that the PLA would likely seek to form more
institutionalized strategic partnerships necessary for
expeditionary concepts.
According to Mastro, the PLA would need to develop the relevant air, naval, and ground forces required to ensure that the PLA could not be denied air
and sea space access in areas far from Chinese territory. Additionally, China will need to make significant
technological progress in terms of space, cyber, and
electronic warfare capabilities. Throughout Chapter
6, Mastro discusses the types of developments in air,
sea, and ground power, as well as changes to organization, training, and logistics that the PLA will need to
support global expeditionary forces.
From these observations, Mastro discusses what
a global expeditionary PLA could mean for China’s
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propensity to use force, as well as regional and global
stability. If China gains global capabilities it may alter its grand strategy and move beyond its current
regional aims. This could be a positive development
if a global PLA becomes enmeshed in the global order and contributes more to global public goods. On
the other hand, a global PLA could also interfere in
areas around the world where the United States may
prefer China to adopt a more “hands-off” approach.
Even if China’s focus remains regional as it becomes
more active globally, newfound capabilities could
create a backlash among regional powers and the
United States, resulting in regional instability or even
armed conflict.
After examining the potential makeup of a regionally focused, as well as a global expeditionary PLA,
in Chapter 8, Erin Richter and Daniel Gearin discuss
the potential makeup of a weakened PLA. Richter and
Gearin explore some of the variables that could lead
to a weakened PLA, and how these could reorient
China’s security concerns, and the new challenges this
would present for China.
According to Richter and Gearin, there are several
factors that could potentially result in a weakened
PLA, but the most probable cause would be domestic—either from social instability or an economic
downturn. In the case of social instability or a sharp
economic decline, the PLA would likely have to divert resources away from PLA modernization and reallocate these resources toward internal security and
self-defense.
A weakened PLA will have to be more selective
in how it invests its resources. Richter and Gearin
contend that though the PLA would like to have a reformed organizational structure and a more modern
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order of battle, a weakened PLA would have to refocus its training and make unplanned force reductions.
The PLA would also have to slow the development
and production of new combat systems and extend
maintenance cycles. As a result, the PLA would have
declined troop proficiency and combat readiness. The
PLA would likely be able to carry out limited defensive military operations in its immediate periphery,
but would be unable to meet challenges outside its
immediate periphery. Richter and Gearin assess how
these changes would affect various branches of the
PLA, such as the PLA, PLAN, PLAAF, and the Second Artillery Force. Overall, a weakened PLA could
have broader implications for regional security. A
weak PLA could potentially encourage China’s neighbors to exploit China’s weakness. On the other hand,
the PLA could also potentially seek to resolve territorial disputes before its military capabilities further
deteriorate.
Implications for the Region, World,
and U.S.-China Relations.
There are various potential trajectories for the
PLA’s modernization. Whether the PLA is significantly weakened, anchored regionally, or is a robust
global expeditionary force, these futures will have
profound implications for East Asian regional security dynamics, U.S.-China relations, and the global
system. Authors in Chapters 9 to 11 examine how the
aforementioned alternative futures will affect relationships with, and factor into the security calculations of,
regional actors and the United States, and ultimately
the implications of this for the global system.
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In Chapter 9, Michael McDevitt examines the implications of PLA modernization for countries in the
Asia-Pacific region. According to McDevitt, China’s
military modernization is not a new phenomenon,
and that China can already “reach out and touch”
many countries in its near region. Therefore, for
some countries in China’s immediate neighborhood,
China’s military modernization will be threatening
regardless of whether it increases, or if the pace begins to slow. For other countries, however, China can
use various elements of its “smile diplomacy” to reassure them of China’s benign intentions, and allay
regional anxieties.
According to McDevitt, China’s military modernization, regardless of which vector it takes, will have
the same impact on certain countries in China’s near
periphery. For example, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam will likely continue their military
modernization programs regardless of the vector of
China’s military modernization. South Korea’s primary security threat will likely continue to come from
North Korea, and South Korea has ambitious naval
modernization plans underway. Japan, Taiwan, and
Vietnam are close enough in China’s periphery to be
highly concerned about China’s military modernization program, even if its pace begins to slow.
Further outside the region, countries in Southeast Asia can be divided as follows: countries that
are likely to be threatened immediately by China’s
military modernization efforts; countries that are affected by how China handles its maritime disputes;
and countries that are more likely to accommodate
China. Countries such as Australia and India are most
likely to be concerned about China’s naval modernization efforts, particularly its efforts at obtaining global
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expeditionary capabilities. Nevertheless, McDevitt believes that China can allay regional anxiety through its
political, economic, and diplomatic efforts. As for the
future composition of the PLA, McDevitt envisions a
PLA that is primarily a regional force, with some global expeditionary elements, as these capabilities are not
mutually exclusive.
Beyond its implications for regional dynamics,
the PLA’s modernization will have significant implications for the international system. In Chapter
10, Phillip Saunders explores the implications of the
PLA’s modernization for the international system.
After examining Chinese debates regarding international norms, Saunders argues that China appears to
be a “moderate revisionist power.” The factors likely
to determine China’s approach to international norms
include China’s aversion to a military conflict with the
United States, China’s global economic ties, its domestic stability, regional stability, and China’s power relative to the United States. Overall, Chapter 10 explores
how a regionally focused PLA, a global expeditionary
PLA, and a weakened PLA could impact the international system.
The first scenario considered by Saunders is that
of a China and a PLA that remain focused on regional
challenges. This implies a more competitive U.S.-China relationship within Asia. Saunders suggests Beijing
would likely seek to moderate competitive tensions
with bilateral cooperation on issues of mutual concern and adopt an incrementalist approach to altering the international system. Globally, China would
likely pursue strategic partnerships to promote trade
and finance rules more amenable to Chinese interests,
and to promote the yuan as a global reserve currency.
China would remain opposed to any U.S. interven-
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tion. Saunders also contends that China could become
more active internationally in combating transnational concerns such as terrorism. However, one concern for U.S. policymakers would be that China could
develop closer relations with countries hostile to the
West when it has concrete interests at stake.
Saunders also examines the implications of a global expeditionary PLA for the international system. According to Saunders, a PLA focused on global power
projection implies that China has peacefully resolved
its regional disputes and that the United States is comparatively weaker. In such a circumstance, the United
States may encourage China to take on greater global
responsibilities, and the two could achieve peaceful
coexistence. Yet, if China’s new position of power is
a result of failed U.S. policy, U.S. policymakers may
approach Beijing with more suspicion. A global expeditionary PLA may also be motivated to meet security
challenges in alternative security institutions outside
the purview of the United Nations. It is likely, however, that the PLA would be selective in its use of force,
considering that Chinese elites view U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as eroding U.S. power.
Lastly, Saunders discusses the implications of
a weakened PLA for the international system. This
would likely be the result of domestic problems that
cause Chinese leaders to redirect resources away from
PLA modernization to address internal security, requiring the PLA to assume a more defensive posture.
A weakened PLA would likely allay U.S. and global
concerns about China, but would not preclude China
from conducting demonstrations or limited use of
force when major interests are at stake. In international institutions, China would likely continue to oppose interventionist policies, and Beijing would likely
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seek closer bilateral relationships with other countries
dealing with separatist issues such as Turkey, Russia,
and Central Asian states.
In Chapter 11, Robert Sutter examines how the alternative futures discussed in previous chapters will
affect U.S.-China strategic dynamics. Sutter discusses
various aspects of U.S.-China strategic dynamics, such
as the state of strategic equilibrium, China’s tougher
approach in the Asia-Pacific, China’s domestic occupations, the high degree of economic interdependence
between the United States and China, and U.S. leadership in the region.
Sutter contends that if the PLA becomes a regional
force, although it would challenge U.S.-China relations, relations between the two would likely remain
manageable. If China is a regionally oriented force and
the United States maintains its leadership role in the
region, China would likely be very cautious to enter
into a military conflict with the United States. There
are, however, “wild card” factors that could provoke
conflict. For example, belligerent regional neighbors
in Taiwan or Southeast could adopt policies that bring
the United States and China into greater tension.
As for a global expeditionary PLA, Sutter contends
that the implications of such a development would
depend significantly on the reasons why China became a global expeditionary force. If China becomes
a globally oriented force because it has resolved its
territorial disputes peacefully and has reassured
its neighbors, Chinese expeditionary forces may be
welcomed and may be coordinated with the United
States. If, however, China attains its position of power
through coercive measures or by forcing the United
States out of the region, the United States may check
Chinese expansion outside of Asia. On the other hand,

26

the two powers could possibly form a more pragmatic
and cooperative relationship.
Lastly, Sutter examines the implications of a weak
CCP for U.S.-China relations. According to Sutter,
U.S.-China relations in this scenario would depend
largely upon whether or not China was still ruled by
the CCP. If the CCP still ruled over China, it would be
reasonable to expect greater U.S. interference. However, it is not in U.S. interests for the CCP to experience a sudden collapse. Thus, one of the key themes
in future U.S.-China relations will be how the United
States approaches its relations with the CCP.
THE PLA IN 2025
This volume is an effort to assess some of the most
plausible drivers and trajectories for the PLA’s modernization and the potential ramifications this could
have for regional, international, and U.S.-China relations. From these chapters several themes emerge.
First, the futures are not mutually exclusive. While
there will be differences in terms of magnitude, none
of these futures rule out all elements of the other futures. For example, though a robust regional PLA
may not possess or require forces to project power
globally, this does not preclude the PLA from having an increased presence in international operations.
Similarly, a weakened PLA, with fewer resources and
thus more limited capabilities, could still maintain
forces with considerable potential impact on regional
neighbors.
Second, this volume somewhat considers the domestic political context in which PLA modernization
will occur over the next decade, but it inevitably makes
judgments about the future based on what has already
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occurred. It does not, and indeed cannot, anticipate all
future possibilities. Consider for example, the case of
General Xu Caihou, discussed at the beginning of this
chapter. Setting aside the relative merits of the charges
against him, or even what the charges say about how
endemic corruption might be within the PLA, it is the
case that the PLA has not prosecuted a retired CMC
Vice Chairman in the past; it was a wholly new development. Going forward, there may well be future
scenarios that lack historical precedent, and which
will clearly have uncertain and unanticipated effects
on the PLA.
Third, as is concluded in several of the chapters
in this volume, and was evident during the broader
conference discussion at Carlisle, The Chinese PLA in
2025 is anticipated still to have a regional orientation.
In one scenario, these capabilities will be limited, in
another much more robust, and in a third scenario,
a regionally-capable PLA would be part of a larger
global expeditionary force. Indeed, many of the technologies procured by a future PLA will have dual
functions, making them useful for regional contingencies or limited power projection. That participants
foresaw a PLA largely maintaining a regional orientation for a decade hence is certainly consistent with the
shift in prominence to regional foreign affairs that has
emerged in 2013-14.
Fourth, a PLA that it is largely regionally oriented would have important policy implications for the
United States. Would such a PLA be less likely to strive
for global competitor status with the United States,
thereby avoiding the fundamental system struggle
experienced by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War? If so, a
certain level of security tension might be avoided. But
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it becomes also necessary to assess whether a regionally focused PLA will be less welcoming of U.S. posture and presence, especially if an “Asia for Asians”
motif gains strength. If this proves true, we can expect
higher levels of security contestation since the United
States would likely continue pursuing its freedom of
navigation aims and support for regional allies.
Fifth, even though the PLA must overcome many
obstacles in its modernization efforts, if the PRC continues to invest heavily in PLA modernization, the
PLA could very well develop the types of capabilities
that could supplant a regional focus with a more global orientation. Yet, as the PLA continues to modernize
policymakers must accord these developments their
proper weight, and assess whether technological developments address important tactical goals or more
strategic aims. Moreover, the degree to which the PLA
is a technological innovator will shape how much the
PLA is able to fundamentally reshape the regional
security landscape and potentially challenge U.S. interests and sustained focus on the Asia-Pacific region,
thus on the part raising important policy implications
for the United States.
Sixth, the process of transition to alternative futures—how they come to pass—will likewise have
important ramifications for regional security. For instance, a strong and regionally focused PLA does not
necessarily harm U.S. interests if disputes are resolved
peacefully and if China is able to successfully reassure
the United States and its regional neighbors. Likewise,
a PLA that is weakened is not necessarily a future
that should be welcomed if it invites aggression from
China’s neighbors or if it leads China to behave more
belligerently in an effort to resolve territorial disputes
before its capabilities go into further decline.
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Last, any future-oriented assessments must be
approached with caution. There are numerous, unexpected “wild card” events that could potentially
undermine the trajectories discussed in this volume.
These wild cards include both domestic and external
developments. Similarly, though PLA capabilities will
be a significant component of China’s comprehensive
national power, future-oriented projections of China’s
role in the world must take into account other factors
such as economic interdependence and diplomacy.
Additionally, the future of China’s political leadership
likely matters as well. While conference participants
were not predisposed to imagine a China without the
CCP in charge, such a huge change would almost necessarily have an impact on PLA futures as well.
Overall, the trajectory China’s military follows
will be of significant consequence for security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region and for global security
and international norms. This volume represents an
effort to examine the drivers, potential vectors, and
implications of China’s military modernization for the
near-to-medium future. The authors in this volume
are among the foremost experts on China’s military.
Their unique insights and perspectives illuminate
some of the most pressing concerns for policymakers
in the near future. We hope readers find this book to
be informative and that it illuminates their own work
regarding China.
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CHAPTER 2
WHITHER CHINA?
ALTERNATIVE MILITARY FUTURES, 2020-30
Lonnie D. Henley
The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s
alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Department of Defense or any other element of the
U.S. Government.

Projections of China’s future are hardy perennials in the garden of punditry, so this chapter does not
pretend to any earth-shaking new insights.1 Its purpose is to frame the discussion for other authors in
this volume. The focus is on alternative visions of Chinese military posture in the decade between 2020 and
2030, dates chosen because of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army’s (PLA) continued reliance on 5- and
10-year planning cycles. Although Chinese public
statements are not very transparent about the goals
set for the PLA between now and 2020, it is reasonably clear that there are such goals and that barring a
major change in strategic objectives, the PLA’s course
through 2020 is already determined. We will examine
what those goals might be, and what kind of developments might lead them to change between now and
then. The main focus of this chapter, however, is on
what might happen afterwards if the PLA achieves its
2020 goals and what direction PLA force development
might take in the following decade through 2030.
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ASSUMPTIONS
To assess potential PLA development toward
2020-30, we must first establish a baseline understanding about the future of the global order. Dr. Phillip
Saunders wrote the chapter in this volume entitled
“Implications: China in the International System,” in
which he explores the impacts on China’s participation in the global order under the three future scenarios detailed later in this discussion. In his original
conference draft, Saunders listed a range of assumptions about the international system and global technology in 2025 that should be taken into consideration
when considering the future. As Saunders’ list was the
most comprehensive and captured all of the various
inputs discussed in the conference, participants urged
that the assumptions be incorporated into an enlarged
conference précis, which served as the starting point
for each individual chapter as authors undertook their
assigned tasks. Assumptions about the international
system and global technology and assumptions about
China in 2025 will be discussed.
Assumptions about the International System and
Global Technology in 2025.
•	
Today’s global governance (United Nations
[UN] General Assembly; UN Security Council;
nonproliferation regime) and economic (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and
World Trade Organization) institutions still exist and perform their basic functions. Their effectiveness is a function of the degree of major
power consensus on particular issues, with less
U.S. ability to shape consensus and determine
outcomes.
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•	Globalization and a liberal global trade regime
continue, but major economies and major regional powers are more willing to carve out
exceptions to global rules when it suits their
particular economic interests. Regional trade
mechanisms have become more widespread
and cover a significant percentage of global
trade. Enforcement of global trade, finance,
and intellectual property rules and norms has
become more difficult.
•	Continued growth in major regional powers
means that the U.S. share of the global economy
has declined somewhat relative to others. The
United States is still the most powerful country,
and one of only a handful of states able to wield
all the elements of national power (diplomatic,
information technology, military, and economic) on a global level.
•	The United States still plays an active global
role and is involved in most other regions of the
world. The United States depends even less on
Middle East oil, but its economy is still affected
by fluctuations in global oil and natural gas
prices.2 The Asia-Pacific is the region of most
importance to the U.S. economy.
•	The United States has significant military power
projection capabilities, but is less willing to intervene militarily in other regions. The United
States will provide military training; advisors;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) support; and logistics and airlift to help
allies and partners deal with regional instability on a case-by-case basis.
•	Other major powers have only limited extra-regional power projection capabilities (less than
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today in case of European Union members;
somewhat more than today in case of Russia
and major regional powers such as India and
Brazil).
•	The world includes a diverse range of democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian
regimes.
•	Most countries remain dependent on fossil fuels for most of their energy; renewable forms
of energy and nuclear power have a somewhat
expanded share.3
•	No fundamental improvements in the speed
and cost of land, water, and air transportation,
although the Northern passage will provide
a shorter route from Asia to Europe during
summer months.
•	The speed and distribution of telecommunications and internet access continue to increase
in both developed and developing countries;
satellites play a more important role in global
communications.
•	Only a few countries and companies produce
state-of-the-art weapons (e.g., fifth generation
fighters), which are sold to select customers at
high cost and in limited quantities.
•	
Weapons that incorporate 1980s-1990s technology are widespread in medium-sized developed countries and major regional powers;
some countries have militaries equipped with
somewhat more advanced technologies, including some anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities.
•	Major regional powers and some medium-sized
developed countries have deployed better sensors (radars, drones, and satellites) and Com-
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mand, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) capabilities to improve their situational
awareness and military effectiveness.
Dr. Saunders’ assumptions provide critical context
for the individual chapter authors’ analysis in this
volume. Beyond the context these assumptions have
provided authors, they also serve to demonstrate the
expected developments, in a global context, to which
the PLA will need to adapt its goals and capabilities in
the coming decades.
2020 DEVELOPMENT GOALS
It is clear that the PLA relies heavily on 5- and 10year plans to guide long-term force development. It is
much less clear what those plans contain. The 2020 goal
is frequently stated in terms of “basically accomplishing mechanization” and “making substantial progress
in informationization” to “lay a solid foundation for
the building of fully informatized military forces.”4
Even more vaguely, the 2006 defense white paper
articulated PLA modernization goals as “lay[ing] a
solid foundation by 2010,” “mak[ing] major progress
around 2020,” and “basically reach[ing] the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and
being capable of winning informatized wars by the
mid-21st century.”5 The 2020 part of that formula appeared again in the 2010 defense white paper, with no
more definition.6
Public statements about 5-year plan objectives are
equally opaque. Press articles about the General Staff
Department’s “Plan for Reform of Military Training
during the 12th Five-Year Plan”7 (“十二五”时期军事
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训练改革总体方案) are full of PLA-speak platitudes
about advancing from training under conditions of
mechanization to training under conditions of informationization, accelerating the change in PLA modes
of training to respond to the rapidly changing requirements for generating combat power, etc.8
The Hong Kong journal Wen Wei Po asserted in
2011 that the PLA will enjoy a major upgrade in military hardware during the 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP).9
The article quoted then Chief of General Staff Chen
Bingde speaking at the end of the 2011 National
People’s Congress, saying the PLA will:
make accelerating the transformation of the modes
for generating combat power the main battle lines of
national defense and armed forces development, and
carry out the entire process of armed forces development and reform and military combat preparations in
every realm.10

After decades of studying the PLA, I still cannot
decide whether the reams of boilerplate issued on
such occasions convey any useful information to PLA
insiders. I certainly get little out of them.
Since the PLA will not tell us what its development
goals for 2020 consist of, we are left to infer them from
logic and our basic understanding of Chinese security
objectives. The goals seem to fall into two major categories. The first, and most challenging, is completing preparations for potential conflict around China’s
periphery. These “strategic directions,” the Chinese
equivalent of U.S. Defense Planning Scenarios, were
articulated in the 2004 iteration of the Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Era (新时期军事战略方针),
issued by the Central Military Commission on behalf
of the collective political leadership.11 Authoritative
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PLA documents make clear that the “primary strategic direction” (主要战略方向) serves as the driver of
military force development, or “army building” (军队
建设) in the PLA lexicon:
Planning for the national defense and modernization
of army building, and planning for military combat
preparations requires a prominent primary strategic
direction. While paying attention to other strategic directions, the primary strategic direction is the impetus
for army building in other strategic directions.12

A 2013 text for masters’ degree candidates at the
Academy of Military Science says that there should be
only one primary strategic direction at any given time,
providing the foundation for strategic decisionmaking, combat preparations, strategic disposition, and
the employment of forces.13
Although the PLA tries not to discuss openly what
scenario constitutes the primary strategic direction,
many sources make clear that it is the “southeast coast”
(东南沿海); that is, a conflict with Taiwan and the
United States over Taiwan’s status.14 The secondary
strategic directions are harder to identify. One source
specifies the South China Sea and the Indian border;15
other obvious candidates include the East China Sea
(that is, conflict with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands), the Korean border, and possibly the Central
Asian frontier.
It is also clear that the PLA does not yet have all
the capabilities it requires for those missions. I will not
rehash the arguments developed very well in many
other sources—the U.S. Department of Defense annual report to Congress,16 previous volumes from this
conference series,17 monographs and edited volumes
by my many esteemed colleagues.18 It therefore seems
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likely that one major focus of PLA force development
through 2020 is on the hardware, doctrine, organizational structure, tactics, techniques, and procedures,
and support structures required for the Taiwan mission, including counterintervention operations against
U.S. forces and any third party that joins in defending
Taiwan, and training the force to execute such operations. With only a few exceptions, the capabilities
required for the other strategic directions are a lesser
included set of those required for Taiwan.
The other candidate for 2020 force development
objectives is the out-of-area power projection capabilities required for the “Historic Mission of Our Armed
Forces in the New Century and New Era” (新世纪新
阶段我军历史使命) articulated by Hu Jintao in 2004.19
Again, my colleagues have examined in depth the associated missions, the capabilities required, and where
the PLA stands in pursuit of those objectives, and
there is no need to repeat that excellent work here.20
That leaves the question of the relative balance
between those two objectives, between getting ready
for potential fights around China’s periphery versus
developing capabilities to defend China’s interest outside the immediate East Asia region and to conduct
other “military operations other than war” (非战争军
事行动, MOOTW). It seems to me that the former must
take priority until such a time as the PLA can assure
political leaders that it is fully capable of defending
China’s territory and sovereignty, including compelling Taiwan’s unification with mainland China by
military force if called upon to do so. This is not to the
exclusion of building other capabilities, as highlighted
by the focus of China’s 2012 defense white paper on
“diversified missions” for the PLA.21 But the Taiwan
mission will take priority, in my view.

38

If nothing changes, the most likely course of events
for the PLA is to stay focused through 2020 on developing whatever capabilities the PLA and Chinese
leaders have decided are necessary to fight and win a
war with Taiwan and to thwart U.S. military intervention in that conflict. But something will change sooner
or later, if only that the PLA achieves its Taiwan-related force development goals and is able to give more
attention to other issues. The heart of this chapter,
therefore, addresses the range of possible outcomes
for Chinese military force posture, starting with a set
of assumptions by Dr. Saunders about China through
2025, leading to an examination of the factors likely
to have the greatest impact on the outcome. The concluding section aggregates these drivers into several
representative cases illustrating the range of alternative futures of interest for this conference.
Assumptions about China in 2025.
•	China will remain dependent on imports (food,
energy, and raw materials) and foreign markets and thus must be engaged internationally.
Higher economic growth rates will likely increase Chinese demand for imports (and likely
increase exports as well). China will continue
to be the world’s largest oil importer and its
demand for imported oil, natural gas, and coal
will increase significantly through 2025.22
•	The pattern of Chinese trade will determine
the relative economic priority Chinese leaders
place on different regions.
•	Chinese interests outside Asia will likely follow
this pattern, with highest priority countries and
regions listed first:
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— Internal Security: Beijing will focus on countries that might support terrorist or separatist groups operating in China and seek to
obtain cooperation in suppressing the activities of those groups. Priorities: South Asia
(Pakistan, Afghanistan, India), Central Asia
(bordering countries), and the Middle East
(Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Yemen).
— Energy: Beijing will focus on countries able
to export oil and natural gas to meet China’s
energy needs. Priorities: Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and North
America.23
— Raw Materials: Beijing will focus on countries able to export minerals, metals, and
food to meet China’s economic needs. Priorities: Africa, Latin America, and Central
Asia.
— Markets: Beijing will focus on markets for
Chinese exports, with developing countries
gradually playing a more important role.
Priorities: Europe, North America, Middle
East, Latin America, and Africa.
•	China’s military posture will have only a limited direct impact in shaping the international
security environment outside Asia. That impact
will depend primarily on China’s ability and
willingness to project power outside Asia or to
sell significant quantities or types of advanced
weapons that change local military balances.
However, Chinese actions in Asia (e.g., using
coercion to assert control over disputed territory, ignoring rulings by international courts,
or enforcing restrictive rules on military operations in exclusive economic zones) may set
precedents that affect other regions.
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•	The approach Chinese leaders adopt toward
regions outside Asia will remain focused on
obtaining concrete benefits (or forestalling specific harms) for China and Chinese citizens.
•	China will have neither an ideology with global
appeal nor an attractive vision of a new world
order; as a result China’s “soft power” will remain limited.24 The partial exception is potential
support for Chinese calls for an international
economic order more favorable to developing
countries, although concerns about competition from Chinese companies will complicate
Chinese efforts to build coalitions on this issue.
Drivers Part 1: Variables.
Most of the factors likely to drive the course of Chinese military development are variables, in that there
are a number of possible paths to consider in each category. The variables that seem most likely to have an
impact include:
•	Status of Taiwan. If Chinese leaders are able to
achieve a reconciliation with Taiwan that satisfies their political and nationalist objectives, and
that they can be confident will endure, this may
eventually lead them to relieve the PLA of the
requirement to be able to intimidate and coerce
Taiwan or compel its unification with China
with military force. It probably would not have
that effect immediately, as it would take some
time to gain confidence that whatever compromise they had achieved would not be reversed
by future leaders in Taipei or Washington. So a
reconciliation in the next year or two probably
would not change China’s military posture
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until 2020 or so, while a much later reconciliation might not have military effect until closer
to 2030. Conversely, if Chinese leaders lose
confidence in the long-term viability of political
and economic approaches to Taiwan, becoming
convinced that time is not on China’s side and
that developments on Taiwan are foreclosing
the possibility of peaceful unification, then it
is likely they would accelerate military modernization beyond the pace currently intended,
and that out-of-area missions would drop to a
much lower priority. Finally, if neither of those
extremes comes to pass, but the Taiwan issue
remains unresolved, then achieving and maintaining the capabilities required for a Taiwan
conflict will remain the central focus of Chinese
military modernization, at roughly the same
development pace as today.
•	
U.S. Military Capabilities. The PLA’s modernization trajectory is shaped in large part
by Chinese perceptions of current and future
U.S. military capabilities relevant to a potential
conflict in China’s “near seas.”25 If they reach
their 2020 force development objectives only to
find that U.S. capabilities are progressing faster
than they anticipated in an environment where
the Taiwan mission remains their primary focus—if U.S. military modernization has moved
the goalposts, so to speak—then the subsequent decade of PLA modernization through
2030 probably also will center on countering
U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict.
Conversely, if they achieve their goals and consider themselves ready for whatever the United
States might bring to the fight, then their 2020-
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30 force development may exhibit more balance
between staying ready for a conflict near China
and projecting power elsewhere in the world.
•	Military Conflict. If China is involved in a military conflict with any of its neighbors or with
the United States (probably in support of a
neighbor), that will radically change Chinese
perceptions of the international security environment, and not for the better. Even if China
is successful militarily, the conflict is likely to
so inflame patriotic sentiment among elites and
the general public that Chinese leaders perceive
the need for more rapid military development
to prepare for the next fight.
•	Status of Territorial Disputes. Closely related
to possible conflict is how well China and its
neighbors deal with festering disputes in the
East China Sea, South China Sea, and along
the Indian border. If Beijing were able to reach
some kind of accommodation with rival claimants, either a final settlement or a durable modus vivendi, then depending on the status of
the Taiwan issue discussed earlier, it might
not perceive any near-term issue that would
be likely to spark a conflict with the United
States. It is likely Chinese leaders still would
perceive a long-term U.S. intention to contain
China’s rise to world power, and perceive that
military pressure would always form a central
part of that containment scheme. So preparing
for a potential conflict with the United States
would still shape Chinese military modernization, but the perceived arena for that contest
might be broader than China’s maritime periphery. At the other extreme, a potential war
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with the United States in the Senkaku/Diaoyus
or Spratlys could replace Taiwan as the focus of
PLA modernization.
•	Internal Stability. How Beijing views the outside world depends heavily on how well they
are coping with their many internal challenges. “Internal strife and external calamity” (内
乱外患) will always be linked in the Chinese
mind, but as Chiang Kai-shek famously said,
the external threat is a disease of the limbs, but
the internal threat is a disease of the heart. A
Chinese regime that was overwhelmed with
internal crises might welcome a relatively benign external environment, to the extent that
it cut spending on warfighting capabilities in
order to concentrate resources on internal political, economic, environmental, and security
concerns (to include, of course, the military’s
ability to crush opponents inside China). A severe and prolonged economic downturn would
probably accompany such strife, if it did not
cause it in the first place, further reducing the
resources available for military modernization.
Alternatively, beleaguered officials could stir
up external trouble to divert their internal opponents. Such events are rarer in actual world
affairs than in political prognostications, but
they do occur.
•	
Progress toward China’s Strategic Goals. By
the mid-2020s, China could have made enough
progress toward being a respected great power to begin defusing the deep-seated sense of
historical victimization and national grievance
against the outside world. A more satisfied
China could take a more relaxed and nuanced
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approach to relations with its neighbors, to
Taiwan affairs, and to the United States and
other great powers. Alternatively, the growth
of Chinese power could fuel greater national
arrogance, a determination to impose China’s
will on others using all the components of comprehensive national power, including military
might. Similarly, at the other extreme, a China
that was visibly failing to achieve its goals of
economic prosperity, military strength, and
international influence could seethe with resentment at those deemed responsible for frustrating its rightful ambitions. Least likely, but
still possible, is a national acceptance that such
ambitions were overly grandiose to begin with,
and that China needs to be less confrontational
abroad in order to focus on its own internal
problems.
Drivers Part 2: Constants.
There are several factors likely to influence the
course of Chinese military modernization that do not
seem likely to vary over the coming 15 years, at least
in the opinion of this observer.
•	Chinese Views of China’s History. The narrative that dominates Chinese views of their own
modern history pivots around China’s unjust
treatment at the hands of rapacious foreign
powers, China’s “century of humiliation” from
the Opium War to the reunification in 1949,
and of the “sacred mission” to complete China’s return to national power and international
respect. The Communist Party-dominated
regime has assiduously fanned the flames of
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wounded nationalism, but they did not invent
this narrative, and it will not fade soon from
public consciousness, regardless of any other
developments. As a result, any future China,
however consumed with internal problems or
however satisfied with progress toward its strategic goals, will remain distrustful of foreign
intentions and feel the need for a significant capability to defend against the world’s leading
military powers for considerably longer than
the 2030 time frame of this projection.
•	
Aversion to Political Fragmentation. Closely
related to the historical narrative is the perception that China must, at all costs, remain politically unified and remain committed in the
long term to regaining lost territories such as
Taiwan. Political fragmentation was one of
the main tools China’s enemies used to drag
it down from the world’s richest nation in the
high Qing dynasty to one of its poorest in the
mid-20th century, according to the narrative,
and no patriotic Chinese of any political persuasion could countenance dividing the country. Of course, some ethnic minority groups
disagree on whether Tibet and Xinjiang should
rightly be part of China, but the majority Han
Chinese opinion on such issues is not likely to
evolve very far in the next decade or two. As
a result, if there is no acceptable political resolution of the Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu, or
South China Sea issues, those will continue to
shape Chinese military modernization for the
foreseeable future.
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Drivers Part 3: Non-Drivers.
Finally, a few issues that will not have much effect
on the course of military modernization, in this author’s opinion, even though others might vigorously
disagree.
•	Fate of the Chinese Communist Party. It matters a great deal whether the Chinese government is able to maintain stability, address the
legitimate demands of the people, and sustain
economic development while ameliorating its
adverse effects. For the purposes of projecting
military modernization trends, however, I am
convinced that it does not much matter whether that government is the Chinese Communist
Party or a post-Communist regime of some
sort. Of course, it matters how traumatic the
transition was, whether the successor regime
was hostile to the United States, whether they
blamed us or praised us for whatever sequence
of events led to the end of the former regime.
But with regards to the effect on China’s military posture, whether the Party retains power
is a dependent variable driven by the independent variables outlined earlier. Any of the alternative futures assembled below could come
to pass under Communist leadership or under
any of various possible post-Communist governments. Or so it seems to me.
•	Party-Army Relations. Similarly, for the purposes of this analysis, it does not matter much
whether the PLA remains the army of the
Communist Party or becomes a nonpolitical national army. The issue at hand is what
kind of missions the Chinese armed forces are
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prepared to undertake, what national aspirations and economic resources underpin military modernization, and what kinds of issues
might lead to military conflict between China
and other states. Whether the Chinese armed
forces develop such capabilities in the name of
the Party or the state has little effect on those
questions. So in the remainder of this chapter,
we will continue referring to “the PLA” for
convenience sake, but the reader should interpret that to mean “China’s military forces” in
general, whatever their future name or political
orientation.
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
This list of drivers is far from exhaustive, although
a motivated pundit probably could stuff whatever
other factors one wanted to raise into one of the broad
categories listed previously. Nonetheless, there are far
more permutations of those variables and constants
than we can examine here, and each construct is a perfectly plausible alternative for how China might develop over the coming decade and a half. Our purpose
here is not to predict the single most likely outcome,
but we also should not get lost in an endless thicket
of possible futures. In order to set the stage for useful
analysis by the other contributors to this volume, we
will group the hundreds of possible futures into three
major bins.
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Alternative Future 1: A PLA Focused
on Regional Issues.
In this future, the PLA’s primary mission remains
to prepare for conflict on China’s periphery, particularly its maritime frontier along the southeast coast,
and in particular to fight a high-intensity war against
U.S. military forces intervening on behalf of Taiwan,
Japan, Vietnam, or whoever else China is fighting.
The Taiwan issue has not been resolved to China’s
satisfaction, or some other issue has loomed as large
as Taiwan was before. The Chinese government has
its internal issues well enough in hand to continue
prioritizing and funding military modernization. The
PLA is not confident that its modernization through
2020 was sufficient to meet the U.S. threat, and outof-region missions continue to take a back seat as
the PLA responds to the previously-unexpected increase in U.S. military capabilities. Regional conflict
remains the central focus of PLA military modernization through 2030, and its ability to project power to
other regions of the world increases only as an adjunct
to developing combat capabilities out to the second
island chain.
Alternative Future 2: A Global Expeditionary PLA.
The PLA’s primary focus has shifted to military
power projection beyond China’s maritime periphery, whether because regional tensions have faded,
because the PLA has satisfied Chinese leaders that
it has achieved what needs to win regional conflicts,
or because unexpected events elsewhere in the world
have raised Beijing’s sense of urgency about protecting Chinese interests farther afield. The government
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has internal issues under control and can afford the
required new military capabilities. For most of the decade between 2020 and 2030, the PLA focuses on power projection, the details of which we leave to other
contributors to explore.
Alternative Future 3: A Weakened PLA.
Chinese leaders are overwhelmed with China’s internal problems, and the resources available for military modernization have dropped sharply. The PLA
failed to achieve the development it intended, and the
decade through 2030 is consumed in a protracted effort to achieve capabilities relative to the United States
that it intended to achieve by 2020. Internal missions
including disaster relief, internal security, and assistance to civil authorities consume a great deal of the
PLA’s time. The external situation remains tense, the
possibility of conflict has not diminished, and Chinese
interests remain threatened in other parts of the world,
but the PLA does not have the time or resources to
address those challenges as well as it would wish.
POSTSCRIPT
The arbitrary choice of three alternatives is not intended to constrain further analysis, but just to provide
a framework for discussion. The other contributors to
this volume will do the heavy lifting, examining their
assigned topics in light of these three alternatives,
then pointing out any other important possibilities
which this overly-simplistic schema omits. I hope this
exercise has at least provided a good starting point for
their analysis.
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CHAPTER 3
DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF
CHINA’S FUTURE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Joseph Fewsmith
If there is any tenet of Chinese foreign policy that
seems to have held over the decades, it is that foreign
policy serves the needs of domestic politics. Thus, the
whole policy of “reform and opening” adopted by the
Dengist leadership beginning in 1978 was designed to
support China’s economic development by opening
up markets, bringing in new technologies, and encouraging large-scale foreign investment. Deng Xiaoping
undertook three major foreign trips—to Japan in October 1978, to Southeast Asia in November 1978, and
to the United States in January-February 1979—to
help create a peaceful international environment to
support his reform program.1 Throughout the 1980s,
“peace and development,” a theme officially endorsed
in 1984, dominated China’s approach to foreign policy. In 1989 and in the years immediately following,
China adopted the policy of “avoiding the limelight
and keeping a low profile” (taoguang yanghui 韬光养
晦). Evolving over the 1990s to include such phrases
as “get some things done” (有所作为) and “never take
the lead” (决不当头), this policy was expressed differently at different times, but it always undergirded a
policy of caution.2
Over the first decade of the new century, however,
China’s taoguang yanghui policy came under increasing criticism for being too weak. Finally, in 2009, Hu
Jintao said China should adopt a strategy of “upholding avoiding the limelight and keeping a low profile
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and proactively (积极的) getting some things done.”3
That more pro-active approach to foreign policy has
continued to the present.
What needs to be explained is why China would
move beyond a foreign policy that had been so successful for it and adopt a more active or assertive
foreign policy that seems, at least from the outside,
to have many negative consequences for China itself. The most obvious factor is that China is simply a
much stronger actor than it was either coming out of
the Cultural Revolution when its economy and polity were in shambles or in 1989 and the early-1990s
when its economy was still not strong, its military not
yet well-modernized, the Soviet Union—the strategic
basis for Sino-U.S. relations—had broken up, when
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself had been
badly shaken by the events of Tiananmen, and when
socialism around the world seemed headed quickly
for the dust bin. Twenty-five years later, China has
emerged as the second largest economy in the world,
its military is vastly improved, and the world, if not
quite multipolar, is certainly less unipolar than it has
been any time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Basic
international relations theory suggests that countries
that are stronger economically and militarily are simply going to pursue their interests more vigorously on
the world stage.
Yet, the stronger economy and military still does
not explain why, in this particular period, China has
adopted a more activist foreign policy, especially when
its previous policy, which employed a healthy dose
of reassurance to offset concerns aroused by China’s
rapid economic growth and military modernization,
seemed to serve China’s interests so well. It seems that
one needs to turn to domestic factors, including issues
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of social stability, legitimacy, nationalism, and generational change to have a more nuanced understanding
of why China’s foreign policy stance has evolved and
where the country may go in the future.
SOCIAL ORDER
It has been evident for some time that China faces
challenges of governance and legitimacy, and these
challenges appear to be growing over time. As is well
known, the Public Security Bureau reported that there
were 8,700 “mass incidents” in 1993 and that by 2005,
the last year the Public Security Bureau reported such
figures, the number of mass incidents had increased
to 87,000. Later, there was a widely reported figure of
180,000 mass incidents for the year 2010. The definition of a “mass incident” has generally been more than
five people engaged in public protest, but that definition has varied enough over time that there can be no
confidence that these figures are accurate or consistent
in terms of what is being reported. Moreover, there
are obvious reasons why some authorities might want
to minimize the numbers, while others might want to
exaggerate. Whatever the accuracy of the numbers,
there is widespread agreement that the number of
mass incidents has been increasing, the number of
people involved is growing, and the level of violence
is increasing.
As early as 1993, Wan Li, the head of the National People’s Congress (NPC) reported that when the
peasants in Renshou County (仁寿县, the location of a
particularly large mass incident that year) were asked
what they needed, they said, “We need nothing but
Chen Sheng and Wu Guang (陈胜and吴广),” the legendary leaders of the peasant rebellion who brought
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down the Qin dynasty in 209 BCE.4 In 2003, more
than 3.1 million people participated in mass incidents
(Chung, Lai, and Xia, 2006), and there were at least
248 mass incidents involving more than 500 participants between 2003 and 2009.5
Increasing concern with social stability was reflected in a new policy of “social management”
(“社会管理”), which was introduced at a collective
study session of the Politburo in September 2010. As
Hu Jintao would later explain, social management
would include “supporting people’s organizations”;
forming “scientific and effective mechanisms” for coordinating interests, expressing demands, and mediating contradictions; and improving the “management of
and services for” the transient population and special
groups. There was also a coercive aspect of social management that revolved around “stability maintenance”
(“维稳”).6
Perhaps the most direct evidence of growing concerns with social order comes from the creation and
growth of new organs assigned to deal with the issue.
In 1991, the party created the Central Commission on
Comprehensive Social Order (中央社会治安综合治理
委员会) to better coordinate among departments of the
State Council. The new commission was headed concurrently by the head of the Political and Legal Commission, giving the two organs a largely overlapping
leadership, but the latter organ had a broader mandate. In 1993, nine new ministries became members
of the Commission on Comprehensive Social Order,
including Post and Telecommunications, Communications, People’s Bank of China, and the Ministry of
Personnel. In 1995, the scope of the commission was
expanded yet again to include the Central Discipline
Inspection Commission, the Ministry of Supervision,

60

the Family Planning Commission, and others.7 In
2003, the 610 office, whose duties are to handle “heterodox religions” (“邪教”), was added, and in 2011,
the Commission was expanded yet again, adding 11
new departments and changing its name to the Central
Commission on Comprehensive Social Management
(中央社会管理综合治理委员会), reflecting the new focus on “social management.”
As the commission expanded, its budget rose accordingly. It should be noted that figures are difficult
to obtain, in part because so much of security expenditures are off-budget—they come from funds obtained
through fines and penalties. For instance, in 1996, the
budget expenditures for public security in Guangdong
province were only 30 percent of their total spending.
In Qinghai and Gansu, 40 percent of county-level expenditures were financed through fines and penalties. Overall, according to official figures, spending
on public security increased more than 10-fold from
28 billion yuan in 1995 to 390 billion yuan in 2009. By
2013, the public security budget had risen to 769 billion yuan ($123 billion), exceeding China’s announced
defense budget of 720 billion yuan.8
Despite the increase in the amount of money and
personnel devoted to maintaining social stability, as
noted previously, the number of mass incidents has
increased. This is surprising not only because protest
is a high-risk activity, but also because the state made
a serious effort to respond to a major cause of unrest,
namely overtaxation. Although not the only cause of
unrest, the 1994 tax reform, which recentralized much
of China’s fiscal system, left local government—counties and townships—largely bereft of funds. Local
party cadres, under a mandate to continue economic
growth, responded by overtaxing local residents.
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Whereas rural taxes were not supposed to exceed 5
percent of income, local governments often taxed 3040 percent. No wonder mass incidents increased.
In 2006, however, the government responded by
abolishing agricultural and miscellaneous taxes, cutting off this revenue source for local governments.
Local governments, ever resourceful, responded by
turning to land sales, and in order to sell land, they
had to requisition it first. Although land is collectively
owned, it is farmed by individual households through
the contract system. One would think that overtaxation would affect everyone, generating widespread
discontent, but that requisitioning land would only
affect those unfortunate enough to have their land
taken from them (compensation varied but was widely viewed as inadequate). Although the local state has
continued to do things, whether to pay civil servants
or collect funds for necessary projects, in general peasants have had their financial burdens reduced. Nevertheless, the number of mass incidents continued to
increase, suggesting widespread discontent with local
government.
It has often been noted that the concepts “state”
and “society” are not so neatly divided in China (and
Asia in general) as they are in the West. There can
often be a dynamic interaction in which contesting
interests negotiate with each other, reaching accommodations that do not threaten the authoritarian government on the one hand or legitimize societal actors
on the other. Indeed, protest can provide information
to the regime and provide a safety valve for societal
frustration. Moreover, as Ching Kwan Lee has recently suggested, there seems to be an increasingly salient
“market nexus” between state and protest in which
the state buys off protestors and protestors seem to be
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willing to monetarize their citizenship rights. Nevertheless, the continued increase in the number of mass
incidents suggests a gradual undermining of state
authority. Although the sort of cash nexus that Lee
discusses could extend the life of the regime, she also
sees it as introducing a “creeping erosion of state authority” that may “subject the regime to a deep-seated
vulnerability. . . .”
When one looks at public opinion polls, there are
two results that suggest that such an erosion of state
authority has already set in. First, citizens routinely
rate the effectiveness of the central government more
highly than they do their own local government—the
one they come into contact with more often. Moreover,
the more citizens come into contact with government,
the less satisfied they are with it. Second, the group
that citizens see as benefiting the most from reform
and opening are cadres.9 Such survey results suggest
that the state is right to spend more money on “stability maintenance” even though such expenditures are
likely to feed further dissatisfaction.
When one looks closely at the causes of mass incidents, it is apparent that the fundamental cause is
structural—the cadre management system forces cadres to fulfill mandates given by their superiors, not to
respond to the needs or desires of their constituents.10
This suggests that the problems of governance are
likely to get worse over time even if specific issues are
addressed.
NATIONALISM
It is difficult to discuss nationalism in contemporary China because nationalism has been the leitmotif
of 20th century China. Yet, China’s policy of reform
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and opening was accompanied—for the most part—
by a new wave of cosmopolitan thinking, epitomized
if not limited to the 1988 television series “River
Elergy” (河殇).11 Part of the backlash against such cosmopolitan trends came in the early-1990s as the government sponsored a “patriotic education campaign,”
as populist nationalism spread with the publication
of such books as China Can Say No (中国可以说不)
and Looking at China through a Third Eye (第三支眼睛
看中国), and the development of the so-called “New
Left,” which built on neo-Marxist thought to critique
China’s policy of reform and opening.12 This “new
nationalism,” as it is sometimes called, was certainly
rooted in previous nationalist traditions but was new
in its juxtaposition to the intellectual trends of the
previous decade.
There were several incidents that fed into and exacerbated such trends in the 1990s. First, there was
China’s bid to host the Olympics in the year 2000.
When that bid failed, the United States was widely
blamed; indeed, the Congress had passed nonbinding
resolutions opposing the Chinese bid, thus fanning
the flames. It was after that event that one often heard
statements such as the United States was not opposed
to the Chinese government for human rights violations but rather was opposed to China. This was an
early expression of the popular belief that the United
States is trying to “contain” China, a narrative that
seems quite wide spread in recent years. Second, there
was the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis, an event that not
only kicked People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization into high gear but also generated expressions
of popular nationalism, such as China Can Say No. It is
useful to recall that there had been no popular discussion of Chinese foreign policy in the years before that.
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Such expressions certainly had support from some official quarters, but they also appealed to many people.
Third, there was the Milky Way incident, in which a
ship thought to be carrying precursor chemicals for
the making of chemical weapons was stopped and
searched before entering the Straits of Hormuz. No
chemicals were found; and no apology was issued.
The popular impression of the United States as the
“world’s policeman” spread. Finally, there was the
U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade,
which touched off days of demonstrations against the
United States.13
The question is: How widespread is such nationalism? How intense is it? Does it affect Chinese foreign
policy, and, if so, how? These questions are not easy
to answer. There are questions about how to measure nationalism, about how widespread nationalism
needs to be to have an effect on foreign policy, and
how such nationalism is perceived by policy elites.
For instance, it is apparent that strong nationalistic
opinions are expressed on the Internet, but it is far less
clear how representative of the Chinese people such
expressions are.
Although many scholars, including myself, have
subscribed to the belief that nationalism is widespread
and rising, Alastair Iain Johnston has used survey
results to argue that nationalism is not particularly
widespread, not particularly intense, and, moreover,
tends to decrease as people become more affluent and
travel more. Assuming that Chinese citizens are likely
to become more affluent and travel more, perhaps the
issue of nationalism is a passing one.14
But even assuming that Johnston’s survey research has accurately measured nationalist feelings in
China, officials may still be right to focus on the sorts
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of people who post highly nationalistic rants on the
Web after all; such people are more likely to take to
the streets over some incident. In other words, even if
the “echo chamber” of Chinese nationalism is smaller
than many presume, it may still be large enough for
Chinese officials to be wary of it.15
The really interesting question, however, is how
policy elites interact with public opinion. Before trying to answer this question, however, it is necessary to
look at issues of legitimacy and the sense of crisis that
seems to be prevailing.
LEGITIMACY ISSUES
Evidence has mounted in recent years that many
intellectuals are clearly unhappy with the pace of political reform. Intellectuals may not have the social
status and impact that they once did, but they can
still mobilize significant public opinion—which is
why the government keeps such a close eye on them.
About a decade ago, a group of intellectuals tried
to bring about political reform by focusing on the
law. The catalyzing event was the Sun Zhigang case
(孙志刚事件). Sun Zhigang was an unemployed college graduate who travelled to Guangzhou in search
of employment. Mistaking him for a migrant laborer,
police asked to see his identification. Unfortunately for
Sun, he had forgotten to carry his, and he was quickly detained under China’s custody and repatriation
(收容遣送) system whereby unemployed migrants are
detained before being sent back to their villages. What
happened next is not clear, but for some reason, he
was badly beaten and died.
In response, three recent Ph.D.s in law—Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Teng Biao (滕彪), and Yu Jiang (俞江)—
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wrote an appeal to the NPC Standing Committee, the
body charged with interpreting China’s constitution,
arguing that the custody and repatriation system
violated the constitution. The system had long been
controversial, and the Standing Committee took the
opportunity of the legal appeal to rule the system illegal. This fascinating case seemed to open up a path
to political reform not by confronting the government
but by pressuring it to enforce its own laws. Quickly
dubbed the “rights protection movement” (维权运
动), the Sun case quickly spawned a group of public
interest lawyers.16
Unfortunately, the so-called “color revolutions”
broke out the following year, and before long the
growing ranks of “stability maintenance” police began to look at the rights protection movement as a
problem for social stability. This contest between popular rights and social stability has continued through
to the present, not only derailing an effort to build law
but also resulting in the recent arrest and conviction
of Xu Zhiyong, one of the founders of the movement.
The issue was rejoined shortly after China’s President Xi Jinping took office at the Eighteenth Party
Congress in November 2012. Like Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao before him, Xi Jinping gave a major
speech on the 10th anniversary of the promulgation
of China’s 1982 constitution, declaring, “protecting
the authority of the constitution means protecting
the authority of the common will of the party and the
people.” He went on to assert:
To manage state affairs according to law, first we must
run the country in accordance with the Constitution.
The key to holding power in accordance with the law
is to first rule in accordance with the Constitution. The
party leadership formulates the Constitution and the
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law, and the party itself must act within the scope of
the Constitution and the law to truly achieve the party
leadership’s establishment of the law, ensuring the enforcement of the law, and taking the lead in abiding
by the law.17

Xi’s strong comments seem to have led liberalminded reformers to push ahead, either believing that
Xi was inclined to support them or that circumstances
would convince the new party chief that he should
support them. In December 2012, 70 scholars signed
a petition calling for political reform, particularly constitutional government.18 The Guangzhou-based paper, Southern Weekend (南方周末), picking up on Xi’s
theme of a “China dream,” wrote a New Year’s editorial for the paper—“China’s Dream is the Dream of
Constitutional Government”—that was rewritten by
Guangdong provincial propaganda chief Tuo Zhen as
a paean to the party. Journalists at Southern Weekend
objected and petitioned provincial authorities; soon
they went on strike, only to have the editor removed.
The Global Times then ran an article, republished
throughout China, saying with unusual bluntness
that “anyone with common sense knows that in China
there is no room for a ‘free press,’ and that the media
should not harbor the unrealistic hope of becoming a
‘political special zone’.”19
This incident was particularly important because
the new Xi administration reacted particularly strongly in asserting ideological control. In April 2013, the
General Office promulgated “Document No. 9” denouncing seven trends it found pernicious. The first
one was propagating the idea of “constitutional government,” which it denounced as a way to negate
the leadership of the party and “import the Western
political system into China.” Document No. 9 set off
a wide-ranging debate as conservative publications
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supported the government’s position and liberal intellectuals took to the Internet to support constitutional
government.
The important point was that it became evident in
the course of the debate that both sides had significant
support within the party. Such a politically charged
argument about China’s direction suggested deep
division within the party, sharp division among politically active intellectuals, and a very weak middle
position that might potentially restrain debate.25
SENSE OF CRISIS
During the Jiang Zemin era, China made significant
progress in extricating itself from the diplomatic isolation in which it found itself following Tiananmen. Perhaps ironically, given today’s tensions between China
and Japan, it was Tokyo that took the lead in breaking
ranks with the Western nations that had imposed economic sanctions following Beijing’s crackdown. Before long, China established diplomatic relations with
Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Saudi Arabia,
and South Africa, stealing diplomatic partners from
Taiwan and breaking out of the near pariah state that
China had been in only 3 years before. Economically
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) moved ahead
rapidly, growing from about 1.7 trillion yuan in 1989
to about 12 trillion yuan in 2002 when Jiang Zemin left
office.26 Jiang’s doctrine of the “Three Represents” was
much lampooned, but it dealt with a critical issue in
China’s political economy, namely the political status
of entrepreneurs. As Jiang advisor Li Junru (李君如)
wrote at the time, if China did not absorb the most
dynamic sector of the economy—entrepreneurs and
young intellectuals—it would inevitably push them
into opposition.27
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In his first term, Hu Jintao was rather active. He effectively reinterpreted the “Three Represents” by emphasizing the third principle (representing the interests of the vast majority of the people) rather than the
first principle (representing the advanced productive
forces), by introducing the “scientific development
concept,” talking about the need to create a “harmonious society,” and launching China onto the path of
a welfare state by emphasizing a “service-oriented”
government. Although spending on welfare (health
care, education, pensions, and so forth) continued to
grow in Hu’s second term, it is difficult to point to any
major initiatives in those 5 years. Whether this slowdown was due to Hu’s weak personality, the size of
the Politburo Standing Committee (which stood at
nine members), interference from retired leaders, or
the growth of so-called “vested interests,” there was a
sense that stagnation had set in.
This sense that the Hu Jintao administration, particularly the second term, had been a period of stagnation was put pointedly by Deng Yuwen (邓聿文),
deputy editor of Study Times (学习时报), the weekly
publication of the Central Party School, in a famous
article. As Deng said, “It cannot be denied that this
decade has seen the festering or creation of immense
problems” and “the decade of the Hu and Wen has
seen no progress, or perhaps even a loss of ground”
with regard to several issues, including the economic
structure, environment, “ideological bankruptcy,”
and political reform.28
Although Deng expressed his frustration from
the “right” side of the political spectrum, the “left”
felt equal frustration. These were the years in which
leftists looked to Mao Zedong for political inspiration
and when, politically, Bo Xilai (薄熙来) promoted the
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Chongqing model, which drew on Maoist populism
to go after organized crime, implement new land exchange schemes, build new housing for the disadvantaged, and—most famous of all—re-emphasize socialism through the signing of “red” songs.29
There was also a sense of vulnerability—that China’s political system might follow those of other socialist nations onto the dustbin of history. For instance, a
debate on the cause of the failure of the Soviet Union
heated up around the 20th anniversary of that event.
The orthodox view that Russian President Mikhail
Gorbachev was the cause that was countered by more
liberal commentators who blamed the demise of the
Soviet Union on structural problems.30 This concern
with the fate of the Soviet Union, which has been even
stronger in the period of Chinese President Xi Jinping
reflects the continued debate about the appropriate
course for China to follow and the sense that, unless
appropriate measures are taken, China could go the
same way.
XI JINPING AND THE EMERGENCE
OF A NEW GENERATION
When popular nationalism emerged in the mid1990s, despite support from some quarters in the political system, it was still very much on the periphery.
Two decades later, however, following impressive
economic growth that is nonetheless accompanied by
inequality, social instability, legitimacy issues, and
growing populism, a new generation of leaders has
emerged on the scene. As the children of revolutionary leaders, they are “to the manor born.” This is not
to say that all “second generation revolutionaries”
(“红二代”) are united; on the contrary, there have been
some very obvious divisions and, no doubt, there are
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others that are not as visible. However, Xi Jinping
and his close associates are quite different than Jiang
Zemin, who was promoted to general secretary unexpectedly in a crisis situation, or Hu Jintao, whose father was a small entrepreneur (小业主). Although the
dynamics of leadership succession are not well understood, Xi Jinping has certainly been able to move much
faster than his predecessors to consolidate power and
set an agenda. His family background and network
among the political elite account for at least some of
this. As suggested earlier, there is a sense of urgency
stemming from a sense of vulnerability derived from
legitimacy issues and a sense that the party pursues
departmental interests more than national interests.
Some of what we have seen from Xi in the first
year and more of his administration reflects, in part,
what all new leaders need to do—consolidate power
(by prosecuting rivals), carrying out campaigns, and
adopting new ideological slogans. But what Xi and the
new leadership have been doing, both domestically
and in terms of foreign policy, exceeds a new leadership’s need to set an agenda. The strong reaction to
the Japanese arrest of a fishing captain who rammed
two Japanese Coast Guard ships, the reaction to the
Philippine fishing in Scarborough Shoal, the extremely strong reaction to the Japanese purchase of three of
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the sudden declaration
of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ), the apparent effort to take control of Second Thomas Reef,
and the movement of an oil-drilling rig into waters
claimed by both China and Vietnam suggest a pattern
of behavior that is more provocative than China’s past
behavior.
The question is why, when China is facing enormous domestic challenges, would it pursue a seem-
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ingly provocative foreign policy? Why has China’s
policy moved from the cautious “avoid the limelight
and keep a low profile” stance of the 1990s to emphasize the more “proactively get some things done.” As
suggested earlier, this evolution was largely the result of a debate carried out by policy elites in the first
years of this century, but behind that evolution lies a
volatile combination of a sense of stagnation (in the
Hu-Wen years) and vulnerability (legitimacy remains
uncertain), the seeming self-confidence of a particular group of “princelings,” and nationalistic emotions among parts of the public and the policy elite.
Moreover, a certain degree of assertiveness in China’s
foreign policy, particularly combined as it is with the
articulation of ideals of greatness (the China Dream),
depictions of victimhood (the exhibit on China’s
“Road to Renaissance” in the Revolutionary History
Museum), the campaign against corruption, and the
revival of certain revolutionary traditions (the mass
line, criticism and self-criticism), appears to have certain benefits for the new leadership: nationalism and
assertive policy appear to facilitate centralization (resistance appears unpatriotic), it builds off of and coopts the populist neo-Maoist ideas of Bo Xilai, and it
appears to allow the new leadership to confront—to
some still unknown extent—some of the factions and
vested interests that might otherwise be expected to
resist the leadership’s initiatives.
It must be noted that the concern of the new leadership with the fate of the former Soviet Union, a
concern never far from the surface in any leadership,
seems to have become a near obsession. There was Xi’s
internal but widely reported remarks in Guangdong
in December 2012 when he reportedly asked:

73

Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the
Soviet Communist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and convictions wavered. . . .
Finally, all it took was one quiet word from Gorbachev
to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Communist
Party, and a great party was gone. In the end nobody
was a real man, nobody came out to resist.31

Since then there have been many similar, if less
colorful, warnings. For instance:
•	In October 2013 a “Ren Zhongping” (“任仲平”)
(short for “Important Commentary from People’s Daily” [“人民日报重要评论”]) commentary
said unusually bluntly:
Today, the Soviet Union, with its history of 74
years, has been gone for 22 years. For more than
2 decades, China has never stopped reflecting on
how the communist party and nation were lost
by the Soviet Communists.

•	In September 2013, National Defense University produced a film called “Silent Contest”
(“较量无声”), which warned of Western attempts to subvert China through propaganda
and spreading ideas like constitutional government.32
•	In October or November 2013, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, and the Research
Center on World Socialism jointly produced a
four-part documentary called, “In Memory of
the Collapse of the Communist Party and the
Soviet Union” (“苏联亡党亡国20年祭”).33
•	In November 2013, the party’s theoretical journal, Qiushi (求是), published an article by its
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commentator that warned, “The collapse of a
government usually starts in the field of ideology. . . . What caused the dissolution of the Soviet Union?” the journal asked, “An important
reason was the wavering of ideals and beliefs.”
•	In November 2013, Li Zhanshu (栗战书), the
head of the General Office and reportedly a
close friend of Xi Jinping, wrote an article in
People’s Daily in which he said that the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe
had undertaken “reform” (it was in ironic quotation marks in the original), but it had gone
array, leading to the “burying of the socialist
enterprise. The lesson is extremely deep,” Li
declared.34
As long as this strategy is not over played, i.e.,
does not lead to real conflict or set loose uncontrollable populism, and is put in the service of attaining
the economic reform objectives put forward by the
Third Plenum in November 2013, it could prove to be
a relatively effective strategy, albeit one that inevitably kicks the most difficult issues down the road.
DURABILITY
At the moment, it seems that domestic political
factors and the dynamics of the new leadership are
aligned to support, if not drive, a continued assertive security policy. Whether one considers the current more proactive policy as a matter of responding
to significant domestic issues, including social issues,
weak legitimacy, and a sense of vulnerability, or more
a matter of competition among elite actors, any which
of whom could face criticism if a “weak” policy was
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adopted, the current dynamic supports a more assertive policy. One caveat is in order, and that is that tension seems to serve the leadership well, but conflict,
with its much greater consequences, does not. Thus,
we may see some ratcheting down of tensions if the
costs rise significantly.
Would domestic issues and/or pressures permit
or drive a yet more assertive policy and the degree of
investment in military modernization that would be
necessary to support it? To the extent that the military
pursues institutional interests, it seems likely to continue to pursue military modernization, which may,
to a greater or lesser extent, conflict with broader political goals. But defense spending as a percentage of
central government revenues (which is different than
GDP growth) has remained quite consistent in recent
years, suggesting that there are real limits that domestic expenditures are not likely to exceed. These trends
suggest that a PLA focused on more than regional
issues is unlikely, despite nationalistic trends.
The social and economic challenges China faces
in the not so distant future—a slower growth rate, an
aging population, a more expensive labor force, environmental challenges, a shrinking labor force, and the
loss of a demographic dividend in terms of a young
work force—all suggest that there are real limits to
China’s ability to support the development of the
PLA as a global expeditionary force. The possibility
that defense expenditures could compete with social
expenditures—health care, education, environmental
control, pensions, and so forth—seems real. This is
something that has not happened over the 3 decades
of reform and opening, so it would take something of
a political upheaval to imagine a significant reduction
in military expenditures.
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CONCLUSION
The emergence of the new nationalism, however
widespread or narrow it might be, certainly supports
China’s turn toward a more assertive foreign policy,
but it does not, in and of itself, propel China in such
a direction. However, the migration of nationalism
from the periphery toward the policymaking elite
is a new and significant trend. But however nationalistic China’s new leadership is, it appears that it is
more their concern with issues of social stability, legitimacy, and systemic vulnerability that drive their
more assertive nationalism. Public opinion, aided by
the power of social media, makes it more difficult to
back down—and disaffected elites seem ready to turn
to social media to suggest that the leadership is too
“weak.” Elite competition, the institutional interests
of the PLA, concerns with social and regime stability
all seem to bias the system toward a more assertive
policy, and 3 decades of economic development and
military modernization support such inclinations.
Although the emergence of a more assertive foreign policy predates the Eighteenth Party Congress
(remember Hu Jintao’s vow to “proactively get some
things done”), the new leadership seems better positioned to use nationalistic appeals to quell elite divisions, centralize power, and possibly to carry out an
economic reform agenda.
To the extent that such strategies are successful,
they will reinforce more assertive policies. But, so far
at least, there is a caution underlying China’s policies.
There is no indication that China welcomes armed
conflict, much less that it would initiate such conflict.
Given the socio-economic issues likely to dominate
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Chinese politics over the next decade or more, it seems
likely both that a degree of nationalistic assertiveness
will continue, but that it is unlikely to undergird the
sort of national effort that would be required to support a global expeditionary force.
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CHAPTER 4
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY TRAJECTORIES:
INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS
Eric Heginbotham
Jacob Heim
INTRODUCTION
It takes only modest imagination and a cursory
look at the historical record to understand that external events, even those that do not directly involve a
given country, can profoundly shape its military trajectory. The Franco-Prussian War, a war in which Britain did not participate, sparked the most fundamental
army reforms there since Oliver Cromwell’s day, as
well as a reevaluation of England’s long-standing antipathy toward peacetime continental commitments.
The Great Depression not only facilitated the rise of
fascist and fascist-leaning regimes, but also caused
strains within the community of democratic nations
that made confronting Germany and Japan far more
difficult. As a rapidly rising state, China’s strategic direction may be as subject to redirection or redefinition
as America’s or Germany’s was during the late-19th
or early-20th centuries, as both of those countries assumed the mantles of great power.
This chapter assesses the impact of external variables on four potential futures: (1) a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focused on its immediate periphery;
(2) a regionally oriented PLA with some power projection capability; (3) a globally expeditionary PLA;
and (4) a weakened PLA. The Chinese military, once
focused overwhelmingly on its immediate periphery,
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is already set on a path to acquire capabilities relevant
to wider regional and, to a very limited extent, global
missions. The discussion of variables and their impact
assesses movement off of the current trajectory. In
other words, the question is not what could prompt
the PLA to develop power projection capabilities, but
rather what could cause the PLA to accelerate the acquisition of power projection capabilities or, alternatively, to refocus on forces optimized for conflict in its
immediate periphery?
Following is a discussion of the differences between
a PLA optimized for combat in China’s immediate periphery from one with a wider regional orientation—a
distinction that results in a slight modification of the
trajectories discussed by Lonnie Henley in his excellent introduction to this volume. We then move on to
discuss a range of external variables. The first three
groups of variables primarily affect the geographic
focus of the Chinese military. These include: (1) the
degree of conflict with China’s regional neighbors, including Taiwan, Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines; (2) U.S. power, strategy, and Sino-American
relations; and, (3) the development of Chinese interests or challenges outside the region. We also examine
a set of possible developments that could produce a
weakened PLA: military failure that could discredit
the military, foreign overcommitment that could strain
resources, a loss of external sources of technology, and
external support for domestic Chinese insurgency or
terrorism.
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PERIPHERAL VS. WIDER REGIONAL
CAPABILITIES
Discussion of a “regional” military capability in
Asia can be somewhat misleading for those who may
not fully appreciate the distances involved. With a bit
of rearranging, the combined 37 countries of Western Europe, Southern Europe, and Northern Europe
would fit more than twice into mainland China; they
would fit almost two more times in Australia; and, if
placed in the South China Sea, they would spill just
a bit outside the sea’s maritime exits. Flying a mission from China’s Hainan Island to Bali (3,000 kilometers [km]) would be roughly the same distance
as flying from Madrid to the Crimea; and even the
distance from Hainan to the Spratly Islands (1,700km) would be equivalent to that of Madrid to the
Czech border.
Military and Operational Distinctions.
Given the great area encompassed by Asia, we
differentiate a PLA optimized for operations along
the immediate periphery (operationalized as roughly
1,000-km from the Chinese mainland) from a PLA
optimized for fighting in the wider regional space
(between 1,000 and 3,000-km). The ability to project
power can always be evaluated on a continuum, and
from one perspective, this parsing of regional distances simply adds an intermediate distance into the
equation. However, the military distinctions between
capabilities required for a close fight in China’s immediate periphery and one at more distant locations
in the region are important. The types of anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities developed by China
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in recent years are most relevant to its immediate periphery, and, while it could develop another, longerrange layer to its A2/AD capabilities, the costs would
be higher—making the trade-offs involved more
questionable.
The 1,000-km distinction made here is useful for
several reasons. It corresponds to the 1,000-km range
definition of short range ballistic missiles (SRBM),
which are generally one-stage systems and therefore
cheaper than generally two-stage medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM).1 The distinction also roughly
matches the unrefueled combat radius of fighters and
strike aircraft (which are somewhat less than 1,000km for single-engine fighters and roughly 50 percent
more than this for larger, twin-engine aircraft). Just as
important is the relative ability to use ground-based
or air-breathing (as opposed to space-based) communications and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.2 Although range limitations
may be less clear cut, the relative utility of diesel submarines, green water surface craft, and even lighter
frigates and destroyers, would be more in scenarios
within 1,000-km of China than in contingencies farther from home. Finally, the distinction also has political significance within Asia, roughly corresponding
to those areas inside the first island chain and those
outside of it.
Mapping Strategic Depth: Taiwan vs. the Rest.
The PLA’s focus on Taiwan during the 1990s and
early-2000s drove it toward short range forces with
limited power projection capabilities. As China’s focus has shifted beyond Taiwan since the mid-2000s,
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the PLA has begun to place greater emphasis on limited regional power projection capabilities. While an
escalation in tensions with Taiwan could encourage
the PLA to redouble its attention to peripheral capabilities, the same would not necessarily be true of tensions with other neighbors. Taiwan is unique among
China’s potential military targets in terms of its lack
of strategic depth—i.e., in terms of the size of territory across which forces opposing China could be
deployed and in terms of the most distant militarily
usable territory from China.
Taiwan is the only major neighboring “state” (using the term to denote territory controlled by an independently functioning government) in East or West
Asia that falls entirely within range of Chinese shortrange combat systems. Measured by the distance from
the closest part of mainland China (including Hainan)
to the most distant point of each neighboring state,
Taiwan’s depth runs to roughly 380-km, while the other neighboring countries with which combat is most
thinkable (including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam,
and India) range between 1,170-km and 2,160 or 2,500km in depth (depending on how distances against Japan are measured). Taiwan is also far smaller than the
others in its total land area and in length of coastline.

87

Max distance from
PRC Mainland
(in km)

Total land area
(in km2)

Length of Coastline
(in km)

Taiwan

380

32,300

1,600

Vietnam

1,170

310,100

3,400

Japan

1,260/2,500*

364,500

29,800

Philippines

2,160

298,200

36,300

India

2,380

2,973,193

7,000

* If measured across the Korean Peninsula, the shorter distance
applies. The longer distance applies to distances measured
around third party airspace.

Table 4-1. Indicators of Strategic Depth
vis-à-vis China.
Using SRBMs and ground-launched cruise missiles, China could strike all air and naval bases on
Taiwan.3 If the PLA could suppress Taiwanese air-defenses, most of China’s 4th generation strike fighters
could range over the entire country without refueling.
PLA naval forces, including diesel submarines, could
move to positions off all ports and harbors relatively
quickly or easily.4 To be sure, major Taiwan scenarios (including either blockade or invasion) would be
extremely demanding for the PLA, and an invasion
could fail even without U.S. intervention. Power projection capabilities would be useful for the PLA in
Taiwan scenarios for a variety of purposes. But the
trade-offs between “tooth” (combat capabilities) and
power projection “tail” (support capabilities) would
be different against Taiwan than against virtually all
other plausible opponents.
U.S. participation in a Taiwan scenario would
vastly complicate the PLA task and could potentially
expand the potential battle area. But the impact of
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this new depth would be limited unless significant
adjustments were made to U.S. force posture. (See
the upcoming section on U.S. military force posture
and strategy for more on this topic.) U.S. forces are
overwhelmingly concentrated in a few bases in Northeast Asia, almost all well within range of Chinese
MRBMs.5 The United States operates a single U.S. Air
Force Base (Kadena) and a single Marine Corps Air
Station (Futemna) within unrefueled fighter range
of Taiwan—against roughly 40 for China, as shown
in Figure 4-1.6 Under some circumstances, Chinese
leaders might believe that they could either deter the
United States from entering a conflict by holding even
a handful of bases hostage, or, potentially, hold off
U.S. attacks long enough to achieve their objects with
regard to Taiwan.

Figure 4-1. PLAAF, USAF, and USMC Air Bases
within 1,000-km of Taiwan Strait.
89

In contrast, other regional states that have conflicts with China have significantly greater strategic
depth than Taiwan and would require a greater mix
of at least regional power projection capabilities. As
Table 4-1 indicates, all have areas that would constitute sanctuaries against a Chinese adversary armed
exclusively with short range systems. In reality, China
already has the capability to launch limited punitive
operations against any of these states. Nevertheless,
if PLA leaders anticipate the possibility that an adversary could extend the campaign in time or space, they
would have significant incentives to invest further in
at least some types of limited power projection capabilities. Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, and India
all have the strategic depth to support and continue
a fight from positions beyond the range of Chinese
short range air and missile systems. Hence, even if a
conflict began over a flashpoint in China’s immediate periphery, such as the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, it
may need to engage forces significantly further away.
In the Senkaku case, the PLA would presumably want
to be able to strike Yokota Air Base (the U.S. Air Force
Base near Tokyo) or even more distant locations even
if it would prefer to keep the conflicted limited.
IMPACT OF RELATIONS WITH
REGIONAL ACTORS
China’s relations with neighboring states will be an
important driver of PLA direction. In addition to geography, political factors and the military capabilities
of regional states will also affect the degree and manner in which tensions or conflict with regional states
will influence future PLA trajectories. This section
provides a very brief country-by-country overview of
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political and military issues related to each actor. It
begins with Taiwan, which represents the only case
where, if the relationship sours and military conflict
becomes more likely, the PLA will refocus relatively
greater efforts on peripheral capabilities. It then goes
on to address other potential competitors in Asia: Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Increased
conflict with all of these would push China, on balance, toward the acquisition of a regional power projection capability. Given limited space, Indonesia and
Malaysia are not discussed, though they each have at
least minor territorial disputes with China and could
potentially come into sharper conflict with it.
Taiwan.
In addition to Taiwan’s unique geographic position
(discussed earlier), Taiwan is also a special case from
the political dimension. Under Beijing’s one-China
policy, Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. When
Chinese senior leaders deliver formal remarks on the
state’s “core national interests,” sovereignty over Taiwan and Tibet are often the only examples they provide.7 Indeed, some sources suggest that the language
of “core national interests” was created by Beijing in
order to better control the discussion of Taiwan.8 Preventing Taiwan’s de jure independence is central to
the Chinese government’s legitimacy.9 Should China
feel that Taiwan is moving toward de jure independence, the military requirements for Taiwan contingencies will likely take precedence over those of other
contingencies even if the latter scenarios also become
more likely.
Although Taiwan’s defense capabilities have suffered a prolonged decline relative to China’s, they
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remain potent. This is especially true in the context of
an amphibious invasion; capability against a blockade
campaign would be somewhat more questionable.
Taiwan operates 192 4th generation fighters (a combination of F-16s and Mirage 2000s) and 26 surface
combatants (including three classes of U.S. ships and
six La Fayette class frigates), in addition to substantial
ground forces. If it felt an invasion might be necessary,
China would probably seek to acquire more modern
amphibious ships, and given the possibility of U.S. intervention, would also probably seek to reinforce its
A2/AD capability and fighter forces. While it could
accomplish many tasks using short range capabilities,
it would nevertheless benefit from tankers, airborne
early warning and control aircraft (AWACS), and
conventionally armed MRBMs and IRBMs.
Japan.
After Taiwan, China’s security position vis-à-vis
Japan is probably the second most important to the
legitimacy of the government in Beijing. Against a
backdrop of distrust dating from Japan’s imperial era
(and fed by Chinese propaganda and Japanese nationalist rhetoric), territorial disputes over the sovereignty
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the economic exclusion zone boundary in the East China Sea, and the oil
and gas deposits under the East China Sea serve as
potential flashpoints.10 Both sides are extraordinarily
sensitive to perceived unilateral changes in the status
quo affecting these interests.
Among regional states, Japan stands out as having the largest defense budget after China’s. Japan’s
47 principal surface combatants include two Hyuga
class helicopter destroyers, each carrying up to 11
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helicopters and designed primarily for anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) and amphibious landing functions.
(They could also potentially support short take-off
and vertical landing aircraft.) Japan operates 18 submarines, all commissioned post-1990. The five most
modern are Soryu class boats with air independent
propulsion (AIP). The Japan Air Self-Defense Force
operates almost 300 modern fighter aircraft (the F-2
and the F-15J), supported by a small fleet of AWACS
and aerial tankers.
Given the political importance of Japan issues, the
country’s strategic depth, and its potent military capabilities, significantly increased tensions with Japan
could encourage the PLA to increase regional power
projection capabilities and acquire a sizable number
of tankers and AWACS, MRBMs, large surface combatants, and nuclear and conventionally powered
submarines.11 Liu Yazhou, a PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
General at the Chinese National Defense University,
has cited the failure to reform military institutions
prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 as a key factor in China’s loss.12 The reference comes in the context of a contemporary discussion military reforms
today that would likely enhance the status of the PLA
Navy (PLAN) and PLAAF and better support power
projection.13
India.
India is the only neighbor with which China has
significant continental territorial disputes (centered
on Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh). Having decisively bested India in the 1962 border war, China
looms far larger in the minds of Indian strategists
than India does in Chinese thinking.14 However,

93

media reforms in China have produced increased reporting on Indian perceptions of rivalry and opened
the door to negative feedback dynamics between the
two. The Indian acquisition of additional power projection, missile, and nuclear capabilities, often justified by the Chinese threat, has caught the attention of
the Chinese strategic community.15
India’s defense budget is large and, unlike Japan’s,
has grown rapidly over the last decade. Administrative and organizational problems endow it with capabilities that are not necessarily equal to the funds
spent, but it does have pockets of strength. India’s 25
principle surface combatants include two aircraft carriers (one acquired from the Unitd Kingdom (UK) and
one from Russia), and it is building two additional
carriers at home. The Indian navy also operates 14
modern submarines. The Indian air force has roughly 300 modern fighters (including the MiG-29, Su-30
variants, and the Mirage 2000), supported by small
numbers of AWACS and tankers. Increased tensions
or crises with India would, on balance, push China
toward acquiring more regional power projection capabilities, including conventionally armed MRBMs
and IRBMs, AWACS and tanker capabilities, nuclear
and conventional submarines, and, possibly, more aircraft carriers. They would also justify continued modernization of the ground forces, perhaps especially
army aviation.
Vietnam.
Similar to the Indian case, China looms larger in
Vietnamese strategic thinking than Vietnam does
in China’s, but maritime disputes between the two
keep Vietnam in the Chinese news. Recent collisions
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between vessels, protests, and riots over China’s deployment of an oil rig in Vietnam’s claimed waters
led China to evacuate thousands of Chinese citizens
from Vietnam and provided a sharp reminder of China’s sensitivity to the stability of its relations with its
southern neighbor.
Despite its limited resources and small defense
budget, Vietnam has taken steps to modernize its
military such that it could offer some resistance to
China in the air and at sea, and mount a more serious challenge on the ground. Vietnam has begun to
acquire a small but capable force of modern fighter
aircraft and submarines. As of late-2013, it had a total
of 34 Su-27s and Su-30s in service with another 14 on
order. As of April 2014, it had taken delivery of two
Kilo-class submarines, and has four more on order. Its
two Russian-built frigates (the Dinh Tien Hoang class)
have reduced radar signatures and field modern antiship cruise missiles and air defenses. Continued friction between China and Vietnam could encourage the
PLA to further modernize its land forces, as well as
further develop its fleet of large surface combatants,
MRBMs, and modern fighter aircraft, and AWACS.
Aircraft carriers and tankers would be relatively less
important in this case, given the proximity of Vietnam
to Chinese bases.
Philippines.
Like Vietnam, ongoing maritime disputes between
China and the Philippines provide an ongoing source
of concern for Beijing. The Philippines lacks any modern air or naval power, but unlike India, Japan, and
Vietnam, military operations against even the closest Philippines territory would require considerable
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reach. (The nearest point on Luzon is some 650-km
from the mainland.) While it is starting essentially
from scratch, the Philippines has begun the process
of modernizing its forces by acquiring jet training
aircraft from South Korea.16 A recently concluded
agreement with the United States to expand access to
Philippine bases could also facilitate the modernization of Philippines’ military capabilities.17 Anticipated
military conflict with the Philippines could encourage
the PLA to increase its power projection capabilities
including large surface combatants, flat-deck amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, MRBMs, IRBMs, tankers,
and AWACS. The quantity of forces required, however, would be less than in the case of India, due to the
much smaller scale of the Philippines military.
Lastly, for completeness, a quick survey of the PLA
serves to highlight the military balance between it and
the other selected regional powers. (See Table 4-2.)
The PLA Air Force’s roughly 600 modern fighters are
a mix of J-10s, J-11s, and Su-27/Su-30 variants. These
are supported by a handful of tankers (converted H-6
bombers) and a growing inventory of AWACS. Its 70
surface combatants include its first aircraft carrier, 15
modern destroyers, and 54 frigates. Its modern submarines include Shang SSNs, as well as Kilo, Song,
and Yuan SSKs.
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2013 Defense
Budget (in
billions$)

Modern
Fighter
Aircraft

Taiwan

10.3

192

26

0

Japan

51.0

277

47

16

247,150

India

36.3

312

25

14

1,325,000

Philippines

2.2

0

0

0

125,000

Vietnam
PRC

Principle
Modern
Surface
Submarines
Combatants

Active Duty
Military
Personnel
290,000

3.8

34

2

2

482,000

112.0

~600

70

35

2,333,000

Sources: The Military Balance, Vol. 114, No. 1, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014; “Vietnam Navy
Receives 2 Russia-Made Project 636 Kilo Class Diesel Electric
Submarines,” April 6, 2014, accessed on May 8, 2014, available
from www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/year2014-news/april-2014-navy-naval-forces-maritime-industry-technology-security-global-news/1725-vietnam-navy-receives-2-russia-madeproject-636-kilo-class-diesel-electric-submarines.html.

Table 4-2. Key Military Capabilities of Selected
Regional Powers.
IMPACT OF U.S. POWER, POSITION, AND
MILITARY STRATEGY
Despite periodic Chinese debates about the potential decline of American power—and assertions about
the continued advance of multipolarity—the United
States remains by far the most significant factor in
Chinese foreign and security policy. The United States
receives singular treatment in successive editions of
Chinese national defense white papers, whether by
name or clear implication. Article searches in PLA
Daily suggest that discussions of disputes involving
the United States and those involving other neighbors
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have generally co-varied over time (see Table 4-3).
This stands to reason, as the United States is generally
drawn into disputes with China’s neighbors and is often seen as the instigator by Beijing. In other words,
the degree of disputation with neighbors and that
with the United States is not zero-sum—an increase
in the former will not diminish the importance of the
United States in Chinese security planning.

U.S. Disputes

Other Neighbors'
Disputes*

Ratio
US:Others

1984-1988

14

10

1.4

1989-1993

18

14

1.3

1994-1998

51

34

1.5

1999-2003

72

57

1.3

2004-2008

64

50

1.3

2009-2013

103

70

1.5

Total

322

235

1.4

Year

*Neighbors included Japan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and
Taiwan.
Source: 解放军报 full text database, The China National Knowledge
Infrastructure, Bejing, China.

Table 4-3. Articles in JFJB Discussing
U.S. Disputes and Selected PRC Neighbors’
Disputes.*
*Article searches included country name (e.g., 美国) in title and
“dispute” (分歧 or 争端) anywhere in the article text. Note that
not all of the disputes mentioned were necessarily with China.
Thus, the data should only be taken as a very aggregate indicator
of threat perception in the context of other, qualitative evidence.
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By almost any measure, U.S. power relative to China’s has declined over the last 20 years, and Chinese
official publications see a continuing trend toward
multipolarity in the international system. In the military realm, China has increased its military spending
faster than the United States, and, in part because of
its low starting position and the availability of military technology from international sources, China has
been able to narrow (but not close) the technology
gap. Nevertheless, U.S. comprehensive national power remains superior to that of China, and a number
of Chinese specialists predict that the United States
will remain the world’s premier power for at least the
next 20 or 30 years.18 In the military realm, the readjustment of U.S. military assets toward the Pacific and
the pursuit of entirely new types of technologies have
mitigated the impact of Chinese modernization. Even
if U.S. dominance has waned somewhat, the United
States remains the only military in Asia with clearly
superior military capabilities.
Several U.S.-related developments could shift Chinese calculations and produce incentives to adjust the
balance of capabilities toward one of the trajectories
discussed earlier: (1) distracted or diminished U.S.
power; (2) changes to U.S. military strategy or posture;
(3) Sino-American crises that highlighted the danger
of war between the two; or, (4) a more cooperative relationship that was more welcoming of a significant
Chinese role in global security.
Distracted or Weakened U.S. Power.
A United States that was seriously distracted by
events elsewhere, or a significant weakening of relative U.S. military power such that continuing “rebal-
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ancing” would no longer significantly mitigate the
impact, could produce uncertain results. The United
States has been the great equalizer of Asian military
power, especially around China’s immediate periphery. Potential U.S. involvement in a Taiwan conflict,
for example, has maintained the standoff between a
country of 1,300 million people and one of 20 million.
Viewed from one perspective, then, the weakening of
U.S. commitment might free Chinese military planners to focus on other, more distant tasks, if they believed their capabilities were sufficient for security in
the immediate periphery.
There is, however, another equally plausible outcome. Balancing by regional states—and in particular,
a strong lean toward the United States—has sometimes
led Beijing to moderate its international approach lest
it push neighbors further into the U.S. camp. A diminished U.S. commitment might lead Chinese leaders to
take more forceful positions with regard to local disputes, leading to more crises and worse relations with
neighbors. This, in turn, could lead the PLA to focus
on capabilities maximized for peripheral or wider regional warfighting. Even in this latter case, however,
the withdrawal of the U.S power would reduce the requirement for some types of A2/AD capabilities, such
as the DF-21D ASBM, and increase the incentives to
acquire systems that might allow it to control air or
sea areas against regional foes.
U.S. Military Force Posture and Strategy.
The impact of the United States on Chinese military strategy will not simply rest on the maintenance
of U.S. composite or military power or its degree of
commitment to Asia. It will also depend on the U.S.
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military strategy and force posture. Since the end of
the Cold War, the United States has pursued operationally offensively oriented doctrines and operational
practices.19 Although these practices have developed
partly as a function of America’s dominant military
position, they may have become an enduring habit.
In recent wars, the United States has had the initiative and been able to launch early and intensive attacks, leading with airpower and missile strikes.20 The
U.S. forward-leaning posture in Asia, its permanent
rotational deployment of bombers to the region, and
the AirSea Battle concept all suggest that the United
States might rely heavily on offensive action from the
outset of a conflict in Asia, even if it did not initiate
hostilities.21
However, with the diminution of U.S. all-aspects
dominance in Asia and increased pressure on the
defense budget, there is some debate about whether
the United States should rethink its forward-leaning
strategy. There has, for example, been some discussion about whether a blockade strategy could either
complement or replace a strategy that relies on early
and intensive strikes.22 Less noted but potentially as
consequential is the discussion about improving operational resiliency through a combination of measures that might include: operating from more bases,
in smaller packages, with greater mobility and flexibility, and with improvements to active and passive
defenses.23 Unlike a blockade strategy, which faces
strong resistance from within the military (especially
the navy), the concept of resiliency has strong support
(at least in principle), and some funds have already
been allocated. Key elements to improve operational
resilience, including new techniques for rapid runway
repair, hardening of critical infrastructure, and operat-
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ing aircraft in an expeditionary manner, have already
begun.24 This strategy could include the dispersion of
assets to bases or locations at greater distances from
China, followed by phased operations taking the force
closer as Chinese A2/AD capabilities were degraded.
If the United States moves more concertedly toward an approach that capitalizes on strategic depth
within Asia (either as part of a blockade strategy or
phased entry strategy or both), it will likely accelerate
the Chinese development of power projection forces.
The distinction between a center of gravity in the first
island chain and one spread over the first and second
island chains and extending into southern Southeast
Asia and the Indian Ocean may appear one of degrees.
But for Chinese military planners, the differences
would be important.
If U.S. forces are able to operate from hundreds of
miles away from the Chinese coast and still threaten
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) values in the
event of war, Chinese planners would have more incentives to develop longer range strike systems, and,
especially, a far more robust support structure for regional power projection. Assuming that they wished
to challenge U.S. operations near their source of operations, or at least interdict attacks coming from distant locations, greater U.S. depth would place a premium on Chinese space-based communications and
ISR. Aircraft would require a large number of tankers
to extend the PLAAF’s range beyond the first island
chain. Operating beyond the range of land-based air
surveillance and C2 sites would create a greater need
for airborne early warning and command and control
aircraft. Naval platforms would require more at-sea
replenishment capacity, driving a requirement for a
larger Chinese combat logistics fleet.
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China might also seek, on balance, larger and
longer-ranged systems. Longer-range bombers may
be sought, as smaller strike aircraft may no longer
have the range to strike key U.S. bases or command
facilities. More and larger destroyers, especially airdefense destroyers, would be useful to provide enduring presence in operational areas. The PLA might also
seek to increase the proportion of nuclear powered attack submarines in the submarine force, since submarines may be required to operate even beyond areas
of U.S. presence in order to isolate U.S. basing areas
and prevent the flow of reinforcements to them. To
the extent that China wished to extend its TBM range
to newly relevant operational areas, it would have to
build multi-stage conventionally armed MRBMs and
IRBMs—though given the expense, it might also shift
to relatively greater reliance on cruise-missile armed
bombers.
In the multistep game of positioning for advantage
during peacetime, China will, like the United States,
have many options, and it would not have to adopt the
force structure discussed previously. The PLA could,
for example, conceivably adopt a hedgehog strategy. It
could continue to strengthen its shorter-range capabilities, allowing it to decisively influence events around
its immediate periphery and then dig-in and ride-out
more attacks into its operational periphery—much
as Japan sought to do during World War II. However, this would cede initiative to the United States,
and it is more likely that China would shift relatively
greater resources toward an ability to influence events
farther away.
The PLA forces designed to contest areas in more
distant parts of Asia may not require the same kinds
of very large lift aircraft or support ships that a more
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globally oriented strategy would. Nevertheless, these
intermediary steps would move the PLA incrementally toward a more global power projection capability.
Intensified Sino-American Tensions or Clashes.
If U.S. military capabilities remained strong relative to those of China and Sino-American relations
grew appreciably worse, punctuated by clashes or
more frequent crises, the PLA would have greater
incentives to maintain its high priority on defensive,
A2/AD, and peripheral warfighting capabilities. Chinese leaders might rate the chance of being attacked
at home (even as part of a war that the United States
might be fighting defensively) more highly, and might
therefore seek to continue improving defensive capabilities. While offensive and support systems could
still be useful, they are expensive and the relative
value of expenditures on them would lessen. Consequently, more might be spent on short range fighters,
surface-to-air missiles, and improvements to basing
infrastructure. On the naval front, there would be less
incentive to build aircraft carriers, which would be
vulnerable to U.S. submarine and air attack. Submarines might remain the naval weapon of choice.
U.S. Welcome for Larger Chinese Global Role.
When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke
of the “new model of major-country relations” to a
Brookings audience in September of 2013, he said:
China is prepared to engage in all-dimensional cooperation with the United States at regional and global
levels. . . . China is ready to shoulder international
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responsibilities commensurate with its national strength
and realities, and together with the United States, offer more quality public goods for the international
community.25

China is already a major contributor to United Nations (UN)-sponsored international peacekeeping efforts, as well as to some ad hoc international efforts,
such as anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. At
a minimum, improved relations with the United States
would, on balance, free up resources that might otherwise be devoted to defensive or peripheral tasks. A
more enthusiastic or explicit welcome by Washington
of global roles for China might further encourage it
to engage in peacekeeping and other operations overseas. On balance, this should increase incentives to develop a range of support systems, such as long range
air- and sea-lift and satellite communications and ISR,
as well as “harder” power projection capabilities, such
as aircraft carriers and, possibly, nuclear submarines.
IMPACT OF GLOBAL INTERESTS
AND DISTANT CHALLENGES
The growth of Chinese material and human interests overseas, as well as the development of strategic
military relationships with foreign states, could also
prompt China to invest relatively greater resources in
developing a globally oriented military.
Protecting Overseas Assets and People.
China’s 2013 white paper on national defense included a section on “protecting overseas interests”—
the first time the topic has been addressed in a Chi-
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nese defense white paper. The document observes the
growth of Chinese interests overseas and stipulates,
“vessel protection at sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas, and emergency rescue have become
important ways and means for the PLA to safeguard
national interests.”26
China’s overseas trade has grown rapidly over a
period of 30 years. However, its overseas investments,
which may be a bigger driver of overseas residency,
have only grown to significant levels in the last decade. In 2005, Chinese overseas investments and
contracts totaled around $18 billion yuan, a figure
that rose more than 600 percent to $132 billion yuan
by 2013. While the first and second largest recipients
of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) are the
United States and Australia, Chinese investment in
developing countries, including a number of unstable
ones, is disproportionately large. For example, Africa
accounts for around 2.5 percent of total global gross
domestic product. Less than 4 percent of China’s total
trade between 2005 and 2013 was with African states.
But fully 18 percent of China’s outgoing FDI over that
same period was in Africa, where it made investments
in 30 different countries.27
The number of Chinese citizens overseas has risen
as a function of both overseas investment and growing
wealth. A total of 97 million Chinese traveled overseas
for tourism in 2013, up from 29 million in 2004.28 Some
9.3 million Chinese went abroad to work or study in
2013, up from 4 million in 1990.29 The Chinese business presence has become a popular and political
target in countries where local entrepreneurs or labor
struggles, and anti-Chinese riots have been witnessed
in Solomon Islands (2006), Tonga (2006), Lesotho
(2007), Algeria (2009), Papua New Guinea (2009), and
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Zambia (2012).30 Riots in Vietnam, sparked primarily
by the activities of Chinese energy companies in Vietnamese claimed exclusive economic zones, were also
fed by dissatisfaction over labor conditions. In 2011,
Thai soldiers were charged in the killing of 13 Chinese
sailors in Thailand.31 Kidnappers have also targeted
overseas Chinese, taking 29 construction workers
in Sudan and 25 workers in Egypt in 2012. Closer to
home, ethnic Chinese have been targets of violence
and discrimination for much longer. Ethnic Chinese
were attacked in both the post-1965 anti-communist
purges in Indonesia and in riots in May 1998 on the
eve of Suharto’s fall.32
Historically, China has not taken a forceful position with regard to the protection of overseas citizens
or, especially, noncitizen ethnic Chinese. This may
be changing. While the Chinese government was
relatively passive as Indonesian Chinese came under
attack in 1998, the Chinese government came under
pressure from overseas ethnic Chinese to act, forcing
it to condemn the violence and encourage restraint.33
The increased flow of information to and within China since the 1998 riots, as well as higher expectations
concerning national power, may make it even harder
in future cases for the Chinese government to satisfy
its public with statements of condemnation. Indeed,
the recent production of a documentary in Indonesia
depicting the post-1965 killings there triggered public
calls in China for Beijing to write the massacre into
history books and cease aid to Indonesia—all over a
case that is now nearly 50 years past.34
As the 2013 white paper suggests and the 2011
Libyan case demonstrated, the PLA is ready and willing to participate in the evacuation of Chinese nationals. In the Libyan case, it diverted a destroyer from
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the Gulf of Aden to the Libyan coast and dispatched
four Il-76s on 40 sorties to evacuate 1,655 people to
Sudan.35 Chinese pundits and netizens have begun
to debate whether China should develop capabilities
that would make more forceful measures possible. Of
the killing of Chinese sailors in Thailand, an editorial
posted on Tencent (腾讯网) said, “Many netizens feel
that the appropriate authorities in this case were not
tough enough” and asked “if the dead were American, would an aircraft carrier already have sailed to
Thailand?”36 In 2011, Wei Xudong, a professor at the
Chinese National Defense University recommended
considering the establishment of a special strike unit
and conducting prior consultation with overseas
governments so that action to assist Chinese nationals could be conducted with the cooperation of local
authorities.37
A 2013 article by Yue Gang, a former colonel with
the PLA general staff, offers perhaps the most ambitious proposal.38 Gang writes:
The PLA should protect Chinese people overseas. . . .
The army should act as a deterrent against those who
attempt to harm Chinese people. We will not allow
any repeat of such tragedies as the May 1998 riots in
Indonesia.39

He suggests the PLA should do four things to
strengthen its ability to protect overseas assets. First, it
should increase its transport capacity, to include large
transport aircraft. Even when the Y-20 enters service,
he notes, it will have less than half the lift capacity of
a U.S. C-5 aircraft. Second, it should increase its “forward” presence. Third, it should deepen its international military-to-military cooperation. And fourth, it
should build up its military capacity to show its “will
and determination.”
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Two things could increase the relative emphasis
on protecting assets and people overseas. The first
would be the continued rapid increase of investment
and travel overseas. This would increase the stakes for
China overseas and increase the incentives for China
to develop the kinds of global power projection capabilities that would enable it to protect its interests
around the world. The second would be a large-scale
attack on Chinese nationals or diaspora, or the nationalization or destruction of important material assets or investments overseas.40 There are a number of
different capabilities that could be considered. Most,
however, would involve the acquisition of naval and
air lift and long-range capabilities, as well as the development of special operations forces with functions
similar to those of the U.S. Delta Force or SEALs.
One question is what sort of global economic and
security environment would correlate with and help
propel Chinese overseas investment. It stands to reason that a stable and prosperous global economy will
make overseas investment relatively safe and lucrative. Notably, commodity prices would also rise,
and much of China’s current overseas investment is
in these areas. A sharp global downturn or instability overseas could put Chinese investments at risk,
increasing the incentives to develop the capability to
defend or evacuate assets and people, but the interests
themselves will grow faster during periods of growth.
Strategic Military Relationships.
Another set of interests that could push the PLA
toward a global trajectory is the development of strategic military relationships with overseas partners.
The further expansion of overseas trade and invest-
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ment would provide some incentives for developing
or deepening such strategic relationships, as the PLA
might seek, for example, to protect an ever larger
volume of shipping and might, therefore, look for
dependable locations from which it could provision
ships on escort duty.
However, other factors, some less well appreciated, could also work to promote overseas strategic relationships. One such driver would be a desire to consolidate and build on common geopolitical interests with
states that share Chinese views on global governance
or specific international problems. Sharper differences
between the developed world and rising powers on
such issues as trade, the environment, and, especially,
sovereignty norms could cause Chinese leaders to cement ties with other like-minded states by increasing
military cooperation or assistance.
Expanded military-industrial ties could also serve
to cement new strategic relations. China’s arms sales
have a checkered history. Previous sales, such as Chinese sales of armored vehicles to Thailand during the
1980s, came with very little support, were of shoddy
quality, and gained China a reputation as a poor supplier. However, the quality of and support for Chinese
sales is improving. Chinese arms sales remain modest, but are increasing rapidly. In 2013 (the most recent
year for which data are available), China is estimated
to have exported roughly $3.3 billion worth of military equipment.41 The total value of arms sales for the
5 years between and 2009 and 2013 were more than
three times those of the period from 2004 to 2008. (See
Figure 4-2.)
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Source: Arms Transfer Database, Stockholm, Sweden, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, 2013.42

Figure 4-2. Annual Chinese Arms Exports, 2000-13.
Although China is best known for the sale of small
arms and other relatively light weapons, it is moving
toward the export of larger and more complex platforms, such as fighters, frigates, and submarines.43 A
more significant departure (since it has exported some
larger platforms in the past) is the increasing tendency
to include licensed production or “joint” development
as part of its deals. The JF-17, for example, was designed for Pakistan to be a low-cost 4th generation
aircraft utilizing avionics and other features from the
J-10, and Pakistan has committed to purchase 250 of
the aircraft. JF-17 Block 2 production began in 2013,
with Pakistan’s share of the airframe production stipulated at 58 percent.44 The fighter is currently being
marketed in Latin America and the Middle East, with
co-production being negotiated with Argentina.45
As the JF-17 example demonstrates, China is also
marketing its weapons, with some success, to a wider
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range of clients. Turkey’s announcement that it would
purchase the FD-2000 (an export version of the HQ-9
long-range SAM system) surprised many—and elicited warnings from Turkey’s U.S. North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) ally—but Ankara, the Turkish
capital, was drawn to the deal by both the low cost
and the Chinese willingness to co-produce the systems.46 Turkey is also interested in the FJ-17 for largely
the same reasons. Indonesia is looking to license produce the Chinese C-705 anti-ship missile.47 Thailand,
a long-time partner, is deepening its military-industrial relationship with China by jointly developing a
guided multiple rocket launcher system (the DTI-1G)
as follow-on to earlier unguided systems imported
from China.48 It is also considering a range of portable
Chinese SAM systems.49
Although China is currently the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, it lags far behind the United States
and Russia. However, the combination of low price,
reasonable (and much improved) quality, good terms
(often including co-production), few political conditions, and a growing range of available sub-systems
and weapons could mean China is on the cusp of significant expansion in overseas arms sales. The consequences would likely be significant. Military-industrial ties bring senior military leaders into regular contact
to discuss issues of common military interest. Arms
sales are often accompanied by the dispatch of technicians and advisors to recipient nations, and licensed
production and joint development may involve technology transfers greatly appreciated by the receiving
nation.50 The Chinese expansion of arms sales, licensed
production, and joint development overseas will likely create interests that China will want to secure.

112

In general, closer strategic relations with more distant powers (to include those in southern Southeast
Asia) will encourage the PLA to place greater emphasis on power projection capabilities. Transport aircraft, possibly supported by long range tankers, may
be a desirable way of bringing equipment, units, and
delegations to partner countries—even if commercial
transportation would be just as practical. Similarly, replenishment ships could support an expanded schedule of fleet visits. Finally, a wider range of military and
strategic partners could, at the margins, also increase
the incentives to deploy and maintain aircraft carriers
and other large surface ships that could carry the flag
and increase Chinese prestige in distant locations.
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES
AND A WEAKER PLA
Many of the most important developments that
would impinge on PLA strength are Chinese domestic
factors, rather than international ones. At the most extreme, domestic variables would include serious domestic instability, such as that brought on by regime
collapse or civil war, or an economic meltdown. Smaller, but nevertheless important developments would
include unchecked or more widely publicized corruption within the military, a more pronounced economic
slowdown than that currently being experienced, or
significantly increased nonmilitary demands on the
military budget. Although the most likely drivers of
a weaker PLA would be domestic, there are several
international developments that could also contribute
to that outcome.
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Military Failure and Misbehavior.
Military failure, especially failure that was accompanied by apparent incompetence, misbehavior, or civilian suffering, could undermine support for the PLA
at home. For example, a sharp defeat in a conventional
conflict against Japan might create pressure to find a
military culprit for manifest humiliation at the hands
of an old enemy. Should China become involved in a
conflict farther afield, such as one that might grow out
of a peacekeeping operation in Africa or elsewhere,
widely publicized misbehavior by Chinese forces
could similarly discredit or embarrass the military.
Loss of support is not the only possible outcome of
defeat, and a number of other intervening variables
would come into play. Domestic economic and social
maladies almost certainly exacerbated the U.S. reaction to the Vietnam War and even more significant
domestic problems conditioned Soviet responses to
losses in Afghanistan.
Imperial Overstretch.
Chinese leaders are likely to remain extraordinarily
cautious about overseas military commitments. However, should this change and China find itself engaged
in large scale, protracted operations to protect overseas
interests, PLA modernization efforts could be undermined. China’s military budget is far smaller than that
of the United States, and although PLA units are unlikely to deploy with all the amenities that accompany
U.S. forces, resources could be severely stretched and
crowd out modernization priorities. Alternatively, the
PLA might, like U.S. forces conducting stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, be forced to specialize
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in particular types of skills and structures that would
not translate well to high-intensity operations against
more capable foes. Weighed against these potential
negative effects would be the accumulation of combat
experience and a likely acceleration of lift acquisition.
Failure of Sino-Russian Military-Industrial
Relationship.
With the continued development of China’s own
defense industries, foreign arms purchases and technology acquisition have become progressively less
important to the PLA. Nevertheless, Russian military
industry remains significantly ahead of China in a
number of areas (e.g., aircraft engines, stealth technology, SAM systems, and systems integration more
generally). A shift in Russian threat perception or a
further deterioration in Russian confidence with regard to Chinese intellectual property rights protection
could impinge on China’s ability to leverage its relationship with Russia to acquire key capabilities. Alternatively, a major surge in Russian arms purchases for
its own military might consume its industrial capacity
and crowd out exports for a period. A similar result
could obtain from a collapse of the Russian arms industry brought on, for example, by serious political or
social instability, or by Western sanctions.
External Support for Domestic Chinese Terrorists.
Although the degree of internal threat faced by the
regime will be determined largely by domestic variables, external support for domestic insurgencies or
terrorists could increase the level and intensity of the
threat. The most plausible scenarios would involve
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support to Uighur separatists from extremist groups.
This would be particularly problematic for China if
it included weapons, such as advanced explosives or
portable surface-to-air missiles that could neutralize
the Chinese military’s mobility and firepower advantages. Intensified domestic threats could force the
PLA to turn inwards, toward counterinsurgency missions. Although this could provide incentives for the
acquisition of helicopters and other short range lift assets, it would generally detract from the PLA’s ability
to optimize its capabilities to counter more advanced
opponents.
SUMMARY AND OUTCOMES:
DESCRIBING FUTURE WORLDS
Having discussed a range of key variables, this
section returns to the trajectories themselves and summarizes which combinations of variables might push
China toward each outcome.
Trajectory 1: PLA Optimized for Operations
in the Immediate Periphery.
The PLA is currently developing greater regional
power projection capabilities. While a variety of factors
may be leading the PLA in this direction, it is possible
to imagine changes in the international environment
that would threaten China in its immediate periphery
and push it to refocus on short range systems. These
would include a relatively strong United States with
poor relations with China, perhaps brought on by
international crises that led Washington to recommit
itself to regional defense beyond the current pivot to
Asia. The impact would be particularly pronounced if
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it were accompanied by additional U.S. investments
in systems that could be used to strike targets in mainland China (such as prompt global strike or long range
hypersonic missiles). Poor Chinese relations or crises
with Taiwan, and anticipated military conflict with it,
could have similar effects. Under these circumstances,
Chinese political and military leaders might believe
that anti-access capabilities and large numbers of
short range platforms might be a cost effective way to
maximize its ability to prevail in relevant areas.
Trajectory 2: A PLA Prepared for Regional Power
Projection and Warfighting.
A different combination of factors could push
China to accelerate its acquisition of regional power
projection capabilities. If relations with Taiwan remained stable, while those with other states in Southeast, East, or South Asia worsened, the incentives to
develop capabilities to influence events further from
home will grow. Wildcards, such as naval or air
clashes with regional states or large-scale attacks on
the Chinese diaspora or citizens in these areas, would
provide additional incentives to acquire such capabilities. Positive regional developments (from China’s
perspective) could also draw Chinese military farther
from home. For example, were China to develop more
robust strategic relations with regional states, perhaps
cemented in part through military-industrial cooperation, Beijing might wish to develop the lift and other
capabilities to support exchanges or the transportation of heavy equipment or units for combined training exercises. Needless to say, a region in which some
countries are military or key strategic partners and
some present challenges is entirely possible, and this
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combination could draw China powerfully toward a
wider regional strategy.
Trajectory 3: Accelerated Investment
in Global Power Projection.
A peaceful environment in Asia and the shelving
or resolution of disputes with neighbors would provide the permissive environment in which the PLA
could accelerate its acquisition of global capabilities.
The growth of Chinese foreign investments, drawing
more Chinese companies and workers farther afield,
would provide the positive incentives for a globally
oriented PLA. The development of close strategic ties
with powers outside the region, underpinned in some
cases by military-industrial cooperation, could create
practical demands for the ability to deliver and sustain equipment and people to distant locations. An
environment of global economic growth and prosperity is more likely to be associated with this outcomes
than is one in which the world economy stagnates.
A Washington that welcomed Beijing’s cooperation
in peacekeeping or stability operations overseas,
while not necessary, would provide yet another
boost for the development of small but high quality
expeditionary forces.
Trajectory 4: A Weaker PLA.
The most plausible variables that might weaken
the PLA are domestic. Less likely, but still important,
external developments could contribute to a weaker
PLA. A high-profile military failure overseas could
undermine support for the PLA and PLA modernization at home. Alternatively, protracted overseas
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military operations could drain resources away from
modernization. Although China’s defense industries
have become progressively less dependent upon foreign assistance, a loss of access to Russian technology
might slow PLA’s modernization in key areas. Finally, foreign support for domestic Chinese insurgency
or terrorism, particularly in Xinjiang, could turn the
PLA’s focus inward and produce a military less well
suited for operations against foreign states.
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CHAPTER 5
CAPACITY FOR INNOVATION:
TECHNOLOGICAL DRIVERS OF
CHINA’S FUTURE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Richard A. Bitzinger
Michael Raska
DEFINING CAPACITY FOR INNOVATION
Innovation is generally seen as critical, if not central, to military modernization. Throughout history,
process of innovation—that is, the process of turning ideas and invention into more effective products
or services (in this case, the creation of more effective militaries)—was at the heart of gaining military
superiority over a rival (or rivals). This includes the
introduction of new ways of fighting (i.e., the phalanx,
used to great effectiveness by the Greek city-states in
antiquity), of organization (i.e., the lévee en masse of
the French Revolution), or of technology (i.e., the socalled “gunpowder revolution” of the 16th century, or
aviation and mechanization in the 20th century). Accordingly, while the literature on military innovation
has portrayed innovation through multiple facets, it
has been conceptualized primarily in the context of
major military change in relation to existing ways of
war.1 Stephen Rosen, for example, conceptualized
military innovation in the context of major “change
that forces one of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and its relation
to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade
traditional missions.”2 Rosen differentiated between
major military innovations (MMIs) and technologi-

129

cal innovations, with MMIs further subdivided into
peacetime and wartime processes. Theo Farrell and
Terry Terriff also distinguished major military change
or “change in the [organizational] goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization,” and
minor change or “changes in operational means and
methods (technologies and tactics) that have no implications for organizational strategy or structure.”3
More recently, Michael Horowitz equated major military innovations as “major changes in the conduct of
warfare, relevant to leading military organizations,
designed to increase the efficiency with which capabilities are converted to power.”4 Dima Adamsky, too,
focused on disruptive military innovation through the
lens of military-technical revolutions (MTRs) or revolutions in military affairs (RMAs), when “new organizational structures together with novel force deployment methods, usually but not always driven by new
technologies, change the conduct of warfare.”5
Inherent in the above definitions is the emphasis on
the theory, process, and debate of radical/disruptive
change, a large-scale RMA-oriented innovation defined by the synergy of technological change, military
systems development, operational innovation, and
organizational innovation.6 However, in a historical
perspective, most military changes concomitant with
select military innovations have arguably followed a
distinctly less than revolutionary or transformational
path, consisting of incremental, often near-continuous, improvements in existing capabilities.7 In other
words, while major, large-scale, and simultaneous
military innovation in military technologies, organizations, and doctrines have been a rare phenomenon,
military organizations have progressed through a sustained spectrum of military innovation ranging from a
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small-scale to large-scale innovation that have shaped
the conduct of warfare.8
Military innovation can therefore take multiple
facets and rarely proceeds in a synchronized rate,
path, or pattern. Given the prevailing external and internal variables—enablers and constraints that shape
the capacity of states to integrate, adapt, and utilize
military innovation under local circumstances, military innovation is not sequential nor does it follow a
particular model. Generally, however, we can distinguish between two types of innovation: (1) disruptive
and (2) sustaining. According to Peter Dombrowski,
Eugene Gholz, and Andrew Ross:
Sustaining innovations are defined by improvements
in product quality measured by familiar standards:
they offer new, better ways to do what customer organization have been doing using previous generations
of technology.9

On the other hand, disruptive innovations “establish a trajectory of rapid performance improvements
that . . . overtakes the quality of the old market-leading
product even when measured by traditional performance standards.”10 In other words, disruptive innovation changes nearly everything about doing business—in this case, the business of war. At the same
time, however, disruptive military innovation must
be always viewed in a relative context—through the
lens of the competitive dimension reflected in the efforts to develop effective counterinnovation strategies
and measures. In such view, military innovation is always contextual, relative, and limited in duration.
Accordingly, a capacity for military innovation
can be conceptualized as an input, process, and outcome.11 Input factors include “hard innovation capa131

bilities”—input and infrastructure factors intended
to advance technological and product development
such as research and development (R&D) facilities,
manufacturing capabilities, access to foreign technologies and markets; and “soft innovation capabilities”—process-related innovation activities, including
political, institutional, relational, social and ideational
factors that shape innovation.12 These are embedded
in defense management processes in the planning,
organizing, and controlling armed forces and their
supporting systems to achieve national security objectives; in the development of advanced, reliable, costeffective defense industrial base capable of producing innovative defense technologies, products, and
services; and ultimately, combat proficiency and capabilities to engage in a range of military operations,
and the potential to integrate and exploit innovative
concepts, organizational structures, and technologies in combat. A capacity for innovation can be then
viewed in the context of strategic, organizational and
operational adaptability—not only in detecting new
sources of military innovation, but more importantly, changing military posture quickly and easily over
time in response to shifts in geostrategic environment,
military technology, the realities of cost, performance,
and organizational behavior and national priorities.13
CHINA’S SEARCH FOR INNOVATION:
HISTORICAL PATH DEPENDENCE
Although military innovation/modernization is
typically a “holistic” event, incorporating technological change with changes in organization, doctrine, and
tactics, technology is still generally the starting-point
for innovation, and therefore it will be central to this
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chapter. The People’s Republic of China has, going
back to its founding, strived to become self-reliant in
the development and manufacture of arms.14 The current phrase to express this desire for autarky in defense production and acquisition is, according to Tai
Ming Cheung, 自主创新, or “innovation with Chinese
characteristics.”15 Bates Gill and Taeho Kim argue that
China’s desire to wean itself off foreign dependencies
for armaments actually goes back more than 150 years,
when the country was too weak militarily to fend off
the encroaching Western powers.16 For most of its history, however, the results of these endeavors have
been decidedly mixed. Even with sizable economic
inputs, access to foreign technologies, and considerable political will, China, up until the late-1990s, experienced only limited success when it came to the local
design, development, and manufacture of advanced
conventional weapons. Most systems were at least a
generation or two behind comparable military equipment being produced at the time in the West or in the
Soviet Union, and problems with quality and reliability abounded. In addition, overcapacity, redundancy,
inefficient production, and, above all, a weak defense
R&D base all conspired to impede the development of
an advanced indigenous arms production capability.
Overall, these circumstances left China in the unenviable position of pursuing great power status with a
decidedly “Third World” arms industry.
To be sure, the Chinese have long been aware of
the deficiencies in their defense technology and industrial base, and they have undertaken several rounds
of reforms since the late-1980s in order to improve
and modernize their military innovation and R&D
processes. Most of these efforts fell well short of their
intentions, however, because they failed to tackle the
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basic if endemic problems facing the defense industry: lack of competition, lack of accountability, excess
capacity, lack of capital, lack of human skills, and a
“statist” corporate culture. These prior failures make
the post-1997 reform efforts even more significant, because they, more than earlier attempts, have tried to
attack the very nature of Chinese arms development,
production, and acquisition. This will enable these
efforts to, first, inject rational, requirements-based
planning into the arms procurement process, and,
second, to spur the defense state-owned enterprises to
act more like true industrial enterprises. These efforts
therefore will: (1) be more responsive to their customer base (i.e., the People’s Liberation Army [PLA]), and
(2) reform, modernize, and “marketize” their business
operations.
These goals in particular are central to the PLA’s
new requirements—as laid out in China’s 2004 defense white paper—for fighting limited local wars
under conditions of informatization.17 This, in turn, is
linked to a “generation leap” industrial strategy when
it comes to armaments development and production—that is, skipping or shortening the stages of R&D
and of generations of weapons systems. This process,
according to You Ji, entails a “double construction”
approach of mechanization and “informatization” in
order to concurrently upgrade and digitize the PLA.18
This “two-track” approach calls for both the near-term
“upgrading of existing equipment combined with the
selective introduction of new generations of conventional weapons”—a so-called “modernization-plus”
approach—together with a longer-term “transformation” of the PLA along the lines of the information technologies-led revolution in military affairs
(RMA).19 Cheung argues that this plan was formalized
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in both the 2006-20 Medium- and Long-Term Defense
Science and Technology Development Plan and the
11th Five-Year Defense Plan, both of which emphasized acceleration of PLA modernization and a new
defense R&D drive.20 Part of this two-track approach
also depends on China’s “latecomer advantage” of being able to more quickly exploit technological trails
blazed by others, as well as avoiding their mistakes
and blind alleys.21
One of the most important developments of late
was the demotion of old Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)
to an ancillary role in coordinating defense R&D, and,
at the same time, creation of a new PLA-run General
Armaments Department (GAD), which was intended
to act as the primary purchasing agent for the PLA,
overseeing defense acquisition and new weapons
programs. As a 2005 RAND report put it, the GAD is
part of a process “to create a system that will unify,
standardize, and legalize the [Chinese] weapons procurement process.”22 As such, the GAD is supposed to
ensure that local arms producers meet PLA requirements when it comes to capabilities, quality, costs, and
program milestones. The GAD was given the authority to implement a “robust” regulatory, standards, and
evaluation regime that would enforce quality control
and performance, and incentivize competition and
innovation.23 More importantly, the establishment
of the GAD exemplified a major change in how the
Chinese approached defense innovation. According
to Cheung, since the mid-1980s, the Chinese military
research, development, and acquisition (RDA) system
has gradually transitioned from a “technology-push”
model (i.e., weapons programs driven mainly by what
the defense industries can deliver) to a “demand-
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pull” type—that is, driven by PLA requirements,
and “ensuring that military end-user needs are being
served.”24 This process was only fully implemented
with the creation of the GAD, which gave the PLA
leading authority over defense innovation and R&D.
In particular, the GAD had the ability to concentrate
R&D funding on “select high-priority projects,” with
the intended effect of injecting a modicum of competition among R&D institutes when it came to winning
R&D work.25 Concurrently, COSTIND’s role in overseeing the defense industrial base was substantially
reduced, basically to “the making and administration
of government policies toward the defense industry.”26
Oversight and administration of the defense industry
enterprises was placed under a new organization, the
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC), which reports directly to the
State Commission (the PRC’s chief administrative
authority). This diminished status was followed by
COSTIND’s eventual demotion in 2008 from a ministerial level entity to a bureau within the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), subsequently renamed the State Administration of Defense
Science, Technology, and Industry (SASTIND).27
Additionally, China in the late-1990s began to seriously pursue the idea of leveraging advanced technologies and manufacturing processes found in the
commercial sector in order to benefit defense R&D
and production. According to many analysts, such
civil-military integration (CMI) is a central feature of
defense industry reform.28 CMI is viewed as a fast (or
at least faster) and ready means to shortcut the R&D
process when it comes to advanced weapons systems; to cherry-pick civilian manufacturing practices
in high-tech sectors (e.g., computer-aided design and
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manufacturing [CAD/CAM], program management
tools, etc.); exploit dual-use technologies (e.g., space
systems for surveillance, communication, and navigation) to support the military; and, in particular, to
take advantage of the latent capabilities found in commercially based information technologies (IT) in order
to harness the IT-based RMA. Such civil technologies
could be both domestically developed or obtained
from foreign sources via joint ventures, technology
transfer, or even espionage.29
This new strategy is embodied in the principle of
“locating military potential in civilian capabilities”
(“寓军于民”), enunciated at the 16th Party Congress
in 2003.30 Subsequently, this strategy has been made a
priority in the last several Five-Year Defense Plans, as
well as the 2006-20 Medium- and Long-Term Defense
Science and Technology Development Plan. These
plans all emphasize the importance of the transfer of
commercial technologies to military use, and they call
upon the Chinese arms industry to not only develop
dual-use technologies, but to also actively promote
joint civil-military technology cooperation. Consequently, the spin-on of advanced commercial technologies both to the Chinese military-industrial complex
and in support of the overall modernization of the
PLA has been made explicit policy.31
The key areas of China’s new focus on dual-use
technology development and subsequent spin-on include microelectronics, space systems, new materials
(such as composites and alloys), propulsion, missiles,
computer-aided manufacturing, and particularly information technologies. Over the past decade, Beijing
has worked hard both to encourage further domestic development and growth in these sectors and to
expand linkages and collaboration between China’s
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military-industrial complex and civilian high-technology sectors. Factories were also encouraged to invest
in new manufacturing technologies, such as CAD,
computer numerically controlled (CNC) multi-axis
machine tools, computer integrated manufacturing
systems (CIMS), and modular construction in shipbuilding, as well as to embrace Western management
techniques. In 2002, for example, the Chinese government created a new industry enterprise group, the
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation,
to promote national technological and industrial developments in the area of defense-related electronics.
Defense enterprises have formed partnerships with
Chinese universities and civilian research institutes to
establish technology incubators and undertake cooperative R&D on dual-use technologies. Additionally,
foreign high-tech firms wishing to invest in China
have been pressured to set up joint R&D centers and
to transfer more technology to China.
“INDIGENOUS INNOVATION” STRATEGY
Over the past decade, China’s military modernization has gradually progressed with the advances in
China’s civilian science and technology base, which
in turn has been increasingly linked to global commercial markets and scientific networks. Technology
transfers, foreign R&D investment, and training of
Chinese scientists and engineers at research institutes
and corporations overseas are part of China’s “indigenous innovation” drive to (1) identify, (2) digest, (3)
absorb, and (4) reinvent select technological capabilities, both in civil and military domains.32 In order to
advance indigenous defense science and technology
(S&T), China has embarked on an aggressive campaign
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to acquire and exploit foreign technologies. According to William Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna
Puglisi, this process of foreign technology acquisition
is part of an unprecedented and aggressive effort, directed by the central Chinese government—a “deliberate, state-sponsored project to circumvent the costs
of research, overcome cultural disadvantages, and
‘leapfrog’ to the forefront by leveraging the creativity
of other nations.”33 China, they assert, is engaged in a
multipronged effort to gain foreign advanced technologies through both legal and illegal means. These include exploitation of open sources, technology transfer and joint research, the return of Western-trained
Chinese students, and, of course, industrial espionage
(both traditional and, increasingly, cyber espionage).
Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi document a number
of cases whereby Chinese intelligence organizations
stole technology and other defense secrets from the
West, and these were ostensibly incorporated (or will
be incorporated) into Chinese weapons systems.34
China’s “indigenous innovation” strategy is embedded primarily in the 2006 National Medium to
Long-term Plan (MLP) for the Development of Science
and Technology (2005-20).35 The MLP is Beijing’s most
ambitious S&T plan to date with special long-term
total funding estimated at 500 billion yuan (U.S.$75
billion). The plan is as a follow-up to the highly acclaimed National High Technology Program (“863”)
launched in March 1986—the most important China’s
civilian-military R&D program next to the “Two
Weapons, and One Satellite” S&T development plan
of 1956-67.36 The 863 Program featured a concurrent
development of dual-use technologies applicable in
both civilian and military domains. The program had
initially focused on developing seven strategic prior-
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ity areas: laser technology, space, biotechnology, information technology, automation and manufacturing technology, energy, and advanced materials. In
the mid-1990s, China expanded these areas in size,
scope, and importance, shifting its trajectory toward
cutting-edge technological products and processes.37
The 863 Program is ongoing, funding projects such as
the Tianhe-1A and Tianhe-2 supercomputers.38 In the
process, China is benchmarking emerging technologies and similar high-tech defense-related programs
in the United States, Russia, India, Japan, Israel and
other countries.39
Central to the MLP are 16 National Megaprojects—vanguard S&T programs—”priorities of priorities”—designed to transform China’s S&T capabilities
in areas such as electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications, aerospace, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, clean energy, and oil and gas exploration. The
megaprojects include both civilian and military areas,
with 13 listed and three “unannounced” areas classified. Indeed, the 16 Megaprojects have been a source
of considerable controversy and debates both in China
and abroad, given the continuing structural, technological, and manufacturing challenges that inhibit
disruptive innovation in Chinese defense S&T system.
The debate has also focused on the three classified
megaprojects. Recent analysis suggests three prime
candidates for the military megaprojects:40
Shenguang Laser Project for Inertial Confinement
Fusion.
The Shenguang (神光 Divine Light) laser project
explores the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) as an
alternative approach to attain inertial fusion energy
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(IFE)—a controllable, sustained nuclear fusion reaction aided by an array of high-powered lasers. The lasers essentially heat and compress pellet-sized targets
typically containing two hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium, sending shock waves into the center and releasing energy that heats the surrounding
fuel, which may also undergo fusion. Shenguang aims
to achieve such “burn”—fusion ignition and plasma
burning—by 2020, while advancing research in solving the complex technological challenges associated
with controlling the nuclear reaction.41
Shenguang’s target physics, theory and experimentation, began as early as 1993. By 2012, China
completed the Shenguang 3 (Divine Light 3), a highpowered super laser facility based in the Research
Center of Laser Fusion at the China Academy of Engineering Physics—the research and manufacturing
center of China’s nuclear weapons located in Mianyang. In this context, Shenguang has two strategic implications: it may accelerate China’s next-generation
thermo-nuclear weapons development, and advance
China’s directed- energy laser weapons programs.42
Second Generation Beidou Satellite Navigation
System.
The second prime candidate for China’s “unlisted”
megaprojects is likely the Beidou-2 Satellite System
(BDS), formerly known as the Compass Navigation
Satellite System (CNSS). According to IHS Jane’s, by
the end of 2012, China had 16 operational Beidou satellites in orbit—six geostationary satellites, five Medium Earth Orbit spacecraft, and five satellites in Inclined GeoStationary Orbits covering the Asia-Pacific
region. By 2020, Beidou 2 envisions a full-scale system
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of at least five geostationary and 30 non-geostationary
satellites providing a global coverage in two modes:
free “open” services available to commercial customers with 10-meter location- tracking accuracy, and restricted “authorized” services providing positioning,
velocity and timing communications estimated at 10
centimeter accuracy for the Chinese government and
military.43
Beidou 2 satellites, developed by the China Academy of Space Technology, are also designed with effective protection against electromagnetic interference
and attack. Notwithstanding its wide commercial
utility, the BDS will enable the PLA to significantly
enhance its global navigation, tracking, targeting capabilities, providing guidance for military vehicles,
ballistic and cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. Most importantly, the BDS eliminates China’s dependency on
the U.S. GPS and Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation systems that could be deactivated in select areas
in times of conflict.44
Hypersonic Vehicle Technology Project.
While data on China’s hypersonic research remains scarce, there are signs that China is developing
conceptual and experimental hypersonic flight vehicle
technologies such as hypersonic cruise vehicles (HCV)
capable of maneuvering at Mach 5 speeds (6,150+ kilometers [km] per hour [/h]), and flying in near-space
altitudes. Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins analyzed China’s Shenlong (神龙 Divine Dragon) spaceplane project, including its apparent test flight in 2011
and noted subsequent profusion of Chinese research
articles on the subject.45 Similarly, Mark Stokes from
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the Project 2049 Institute identified new research institutes focusing exclusively on the design and development of hypersonic test flight vehicles, including the
10th Research Institute (also known as the Near Space
Flight Vehicle Research Institute) under the China
Academy of Launch Technology (CALT)—China’s
largest entity involved in the development and manufacturing of space launch vehicles and related ballistic
missile systems. The Qian Xuesen National Engineering Science Experiment Base in Beijing’s Huairou district is also one of China’s key HCV research centers.46
Taken together, China’s government views “indigenous innovation” strategy as mutually supporting both PLA’s military modernization as well as the
country’s economic future to achieve a long-term
sustainable growth, efficiency and productivity gains,
while mitigating serious problems including labor
shortages, stretched resource supplies, unequal distribution of income, social tensions, and unprecedented
environmental pollution. In October 2010, the State
Council formerly announced its decision to target
“seven strategic industries” for focused development:
(1) energy saving and environmental protection; (2)
new generation information technology (IT); (3) biotechnology; (4) high-end equipment; (5) new energy;
(6) new materials; and, (7) new energy cars.47 These
focus areas are perceived as the forefront of a new
round of information revolution, bringing new and
significant growth opportunities for China’s economy. From 2010-15, China reportedly planned to invest
$1.5 trillion to boost the development of seven strategic emerging industries.48 Inherently, these have the
potential to propel the next wave of China’s military
innovation. Technological breakthroughs in alternative energy sources, nano-materials and new compos-
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ites, propulsion technologies, bio-medicine can fulfil
multiple purposes and have applications in diverse
military domains for the PLA.
ASSESSING CHINA’S CAPACITY
FOR INNOVATION
Today, China’s defense industrial base is certainly
much more capable than it was in the late-1990s. The
weapons systems coming out of its factories and shipyards are vastly superior to what was being produced
less than 15 years ago. Progress in innovation at the
level of defense R&D is undeniable; at the same time,
production facilities are humming, and the defense
industry is turning unprecedented profits. What then
are the keys to China’s recent successes as a developer
and manufacturer of advanced armaments, therefore?
Notwithstanding the range of factors shaping comprehensive innovation capabilities, two factors have
been perhaps the most critical in the developments
of China’s defense, science, technology and innovation (DSTI) system: money and technology. In the first
case, China’s dramatic and continuing expansion in
defense spending has meant more money for innovation, more money for R&D, more money to increase
procurement (and therefore production runs), and
more money to upgrade the defense industrial base
with new tools, new computers, and new technical
skills. China has experienced double-digit real (i.e., after inflation) growth in defense spending nearly every
year since the late-1990s. Even according to its own
official national statistics, which most expert observers believe substantially understate spending levels,
China’s defense budget from 1999 to 2008 expanded
at a rate of 16.2 percent per annum.49 Most recently,
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in March 2013, Beijing announced that it would allocate 740.6 billion yuan, or U.S.$119 billion for defense,
an increase of 10.7 percent over 2012. Overall, since
1997, Chinese military expenditures have increased
at least 600 percent in real terms. As a result, since
the late-1990s, China has moved up to become the
second-largest defense spender in the world, outstripping Japan, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom
(UK); only the United States currently spends more
on defense.
The impact on defense R&D and procurement has
been equally astounding. In real terms, PLA annual
spending on equipment procurement has increased
from around U.S.$3.1 billion in 1997 to an estimated
U.S.$40 billion in 2013. Of this, perhaps U.S.$5 billion
to U.S.$7 billion is dedicated to defense R&D. This
likely makes China the second highest spender in the
world in terms to procurement and perhaps the second or third highest when it comes to defense R&D
spending.50 This upward trend is likely to continue for
some time. In May 2006, for example, Beijing approved
a 15-year national development plan for defense science and technology, with the goal of “transforming
the PLA into a modernized, mechanized, IT-based
force” by 2020.51 This program is intended to boost
military R&D spending, focusing on high-technology
weapons systems (and specifically on “IT solutions”),
supporting advanced manufacturing technologies,
and cultivating collaborative international defense
R&D efforts.52 Arguably, if anything has had a positive impact on the defense industry, it is this explosion
in defense spending—by increasing procurement and
therefore production; by expanding R&D spending;
and by subsidizing the upgrading and modernization
of arms manufacturing facilities. Consequently, Chi-
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na’s defense industrial base is better suited than ever
to absorb and leverage advanced, militarily relevant
technologies and therefore provide the PLA with the
advanced military systems it requires.
In addition to greater resources being made available to underwrite armaments production, the acquisition of new technologies—and especially foreign technologies—has had a significant effect on the growth
and modernization of the Chinese military-industrial
complex. China has undertaken several initiatives in
recent decades to advance its military S&T base. These
include the 863 Program (launched in 1986 to promote
research into such areas as information technologies,
spaceflight, lasers, new materials, biotechnology, and
automation), the Torch Program (intended to commercialize new and advanced technologies, as well
as establish technology incubators and science parks),
and, most recently, the 2006-20 Medium- and LongTerm Defense Science and Technology Development
Plan. Concurrently, it has greatly expanded its S&T
education program, training a new generation of defense scientists, engineers, and technicians.53
Money and technology, of course, go hand-inhand. Ian Anthony once stated that arms production is
a “capital- and technology-intensive industry,” 54 and
capital is a critical enabler of technology acquisition.
Consequently, more than any structural, organizational, or cultural reform initiatives—or even greater
efforts at civil-military integration—China’s success
as an emerging producer of advanced conventional
weaponry is due mostly to a rather traditional, even
prosaic strategy: throwing more money and technology at the problem of military modernization. It may
be less glamorous than radical reform, but then again,
one cannot argue with this approach’s accomplish-
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ments. At the same time, however, critical weaknesses remain. The Chinese arms industry still appears
to possess only limited indigenous capabilities for
cutting-edge defense R&D, and Western armaments
producers continue to outpace China when it comes
to most military technologies, particularly in areas
such as propulsion (aircraft/missile engines), navigation systems and defense electronics, and high-end
composites.
Indeed, the high entry and technological barriers
coupled with technical challenges in acquiring extensive knowledge and experience, as well the limited number of cutting-edge technological enterprises
preclude Chinese defense manufacturers to make
significant strides toward disruptive/revolutionary
innovation. These barriers can be seen in the R&D and
production of select advanced materials and composites, including high-end aluminum alloy products,
aramid fiber, carbon fiber, high performance steel, nitrocell, titanium alloy, and tungsten alloys. Only a few
Chinese companies are qualified suppliers of technologies required for the production of high-performance
materials that are essential for the next generation of
engines, target detection systems, navigation systems,
and many other subsystems used in diverse weapon
platforms. For example, high-end aluminum alloy
products require a large hydraulic press which is both
cost-intensive and difficult to manufacture. Currently,
China only has five domestic companies capable to
make such press machine.55 Similarly, in the production of aramid fiber used in armor plates in tanks or
engine cases on aircraft, China still relies on imports
for roughly 70 percent of its consumption (including
30 percent for defense). Currently, China has only two
domestic makers of aramid fiber (Suzhou Zhaoda and
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Tayho), which commenced production in 2010 and
2011, respectively. China’s most domestic makers of
carbon fiber are also new, without the necessary longterm experience to stabilize product quality.56
Overall, China is still more of a “fast follower,” always playing technology “catch-up,” or else be niche
innovator when it comes to military R&D. Again, this
is not necessarily a bad strategy to pursue. As Hannas,
Mulvenon, and Puglisi put it:
China’s genius, as it were, is in putting together a
system that capitalizes on its practical skill at adapting ideas to national projects, while compensating for
its inability to create those ideas by importing them
quickly at little or no cost.57

Additionally, it may be acceptable to be niche innovator if one’s military is only looking to gain asymmetric niche advantages, such as the PLA using an
antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) to attack aircraft
carriers.
Consequently, China’s capacities to innovate, and
those drivers and enablers of innovation, may not
have to differ much from each other, depending on
the three potential military futures for the PLA, i.e., a
PLA focused on regional issues, a globally expeditionary PLA, or a weakened PLA. To take the last scenario
first, a weakened PLA would most likely continue to
muddle through with its present—and perhaps even
diluted—process of modest, incremental modernization, with a focus perhaps more on innovating mainly
for the sake of a defensive defense posture; such a future would likely witness reduced commitments and
efforts, both technological and funding-wise, than
have been taking place within the Chinese militarytechnological industrial base over the past 15 years or
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so. Instead, given China’s current (ambitious) trajectories when it comes to military R&D and technology, it
is more likely that present innovation capabilities and
activities would more closely match a PLA focused
on a regionalized military capacity. Many of the innovations and military systems coming out of Chinese
armaments enterprises more fit a PLA that is striving
to be an assertive force in and around its near-abroad,
both offensively and defensively (the latter epitomized by its growing anti-access/area denial [A2/
AD] capabilities). In this regard, therefore, the limitations to China’s military-industrial complex, when it
comes to innovation, do not present nearly as great a
challenge. It is only in the case of the PLA attempting
to become a truly globalized and expeditionary that
the Chinese innovation system still lets down the military. The PLA still lacks many of the basic building
blocks of a truly global force (sustained and sizable
power-projection capabilities, long-range strike, global reconnaissance capacities, etc.). To be sure, some of
these requirements are driving innovation in the Chinese military (e.g., hypersonics, satellite navigation,
stealth, etc.), but it will be decades before the Chinese
could obtain such a global operational capacity—and
it may be that China does not even desire such a capacity, in which case the military innovation system
will not be driven to deliver one.
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
The Chinese defense, science, technology, innovation, and industrial base has made undeniable advancements over the past decade and a half in terms
of developing, manufacturing new, relatively modern
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military systems. As long as the defense budget continues to grow and the Chinese continue to be able
to acquire and exploit foreign technologies, this pace
of defense development and production will likely
quicken in the decades ahead. U.S. Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Frank Kendall recently alluded to China’s growing
technological prowess when he testified before Congress that the U.S. military is “being challenged in
ways that I have not seen for decades,” adding that
“technological superiority is not assured and we cannot be complacent about our posture.”58
At the same time, however, it would be premature
to argue that China will catch up to the defense-technological state-of-the-art any time soon. To employ
Tai Ming Cheung’s analytical framework, while the
Chinese defense S&T base is perhaps proficient at the
lower tiers of innovation—i.e., duplicative imitation,
creative imitation, creative adaptation, and incremental adaptation—the higher levels of innovation—architectural innovation, modular innovation, and radical innovation—still eludes it for the most part. To
reiterate, China is still more of a “fast follower,” or,
at best, a niche innovator when it comes to military
R&D. In a sense, therefore, China’s defense innovation system remains stuck in a version of the “pockets
of excellence” conundrum that it suffered through in
the 1980s and 1990s. This time around, however, these
pockets of excellence are not necessarily sectoral (such
as shipbuilding and missiles), but rather promising
breakthroughs in certain technological niches: ASBMs,
stealth aircraft, hypersonics, etc.; even then, most of
these innovations remain at the prototype stage, and
there are no guarantees that they will ever be operationally deployed. Even if some or many of these pro-
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totypes are turned into working weapons systems, it
could still be some time before they deployed in sufficient quantities so as to be military “game-changers.”
Again, however, being a “creative adaptor” or a
niche innovator is not necessarily a bad strategy to
pursue. If China is mostly keen, at this juncture, in
achieving an A2/AD,59 then a vigorous and directed
process of sustaining innovation—what Peter Dombrowski has termed a “modernization-plus” approach—could be sufficient for the PLA to achieve
its operational objectives. Moreover, China’s defense
innovation process has always been less about finesse
than it has been about brute force, i.e., throwing a lot
of resources—especially money and manpower—at a
limited number of programs. This is as true today as
it was in the 1950s and 1960s, when China pursued its
“two bombs and one satellite” project. The primary
difference today is that China possesses the resources
to pursue a broader range of weapons programs. Still,
most of these projects are about catching up or finding
asymmetrical A2/AD counters, rather than engaging
in radical, transformative innovation.
Consequently, it may not take that much innovation for the PLA to pose challenges to the Asia-Pacific
security structure, or the to regional balance of power.
The PLA’s current operational guideline is to fight
“Limited Local Wars Under Conditions of ‘Informatization,’” entailing short-duration, high-intensity conflicts characterized by mobility, speed, and long-range
attack; employing joint operations fought simultaneously throughout the entire air, land, sea, space, and
electromagnetic battlespace; and relying heavily upon
extremely lethal high-technology weapons. PLA operational doctrine also increasingly emphasizes preemption, surprise, and shock value, given that the
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earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war. In this context, China’s long-term DSTI
programs reflect not only Beijing’s scientific aspirations, but also changing strategic priorities and PLA’s
long-term operational requirements embedded in the
concept of “diversified missions” (The Diversified
Employment of China’s Armed Forces) that are vital
to China’s “core interests.” Ever since the late-1990s,
the PLA has been selectively upgrading its existing
weapons systems and platforms, while experimenting with the next generation of design concepts. These
can be seen in the gradual modernization of China’s
nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles, integrated
air, missile, and early warning defense systems, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, submarines, surface combat vessels and the introduction of fourth/
fifth generation of multirole combat aircraft.60 With
the qualitative shifts in “hardware,” the PLA has been
also revamping its “software”—military doctrine, organizational force structure, and operational concepts
that are now focused on “local, limited wars under
informatization.”61
In particular, the prevailing emphasis in Chinese
strategic thought is on “integrated networked attack
and defense” air, sea, land, cyber and space operations
that would amplify PLA capabilities in terms of early
warning, intelligence, and information superiority,
firepower, mobility, and operational reach. By 2030,
for example, Chinese air power doctrine envisions
conducting independent air campaigns within 3,000km radius of China’s periphery—shifting its primary
missions from traditional land-based air defense, interdiction, and close air support operations, toward
deterrence and strategic strike at sea. In this context,
PLAAF’s concept of “integrated attack and defense”—
joint counterair strike campaigns in conjunction with
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the Second Artillery’s ASBM capabilities are seen as
vital in defending China’s territorial and sovereignty
claims, as well as in limiting potential adversaries
(U.S.) strike, access options, and maneuver capabilities. Consequently, in potential future conflict flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula,
East and South China Seas, selected PLA units may be
able to mitigate, at least to a limited extent the traditional operational advantages and unrivaled freedom
of action of U.S. forces in East Asia.
As such, the PLA has acquired or is in the process
of acquiring a number of new high-tech weapons systems, including 4th generation fighter aircraft, large
surface combatants, new nuclear and diesel-electric
attack submarines, precision-guided munitions (including land-attack cruise missiles and supersonic
antiship missiles), airborne early warning aircraft, airto-air refueling aircraft, improved air defenses, and
the like. Moreover, in accordance with the principles
of “informatization,” the Chinese military has put
considerable emphasis on upgrading its command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets—including launching a constellation of communication,
surveillance, and navigation satellites—while also developing its capabilities to wage “integrated network
electronic warfare”—an amalgam of electronic warfare (jamming the enemy’s communications and intelligence-gathering assets), and offensive information
warfare (disrupting the enemy’s computer networks),
and physical attacks on the enemy’s C4SIR network.
In addition, similar to the U.S. Army’s “Land Warrior” program, the PLA is reportedly experimenting
with “digitizing” its ground forces, right down to outfitting the individual soldier with electronic gadgetry
in order to provide him with real-time tactical C4ISR.
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Ultimately, the PLA hopes to turn itself into a
modern, network-enabled fighting force, capable of
projecting sustained power far throughout the AsiaPacific region, and which, in the U.S. Department of
Defense’s (DoD) words, would “pose credible threats
[sic] to modern militaries operating in the region.” But
is what the PLA doing technically a radical process
of transformation? In fact, there is very little evidence
that the Chinese military is engaged in a transformation-like overhaul of its organizational or institutional
structures. The bulk of the PLA ground forces, for example, remain traditional infantry units. The PLA’s
highly hierarchical and top-down command structure
does not seem to have changed, and even the Pentagon acknowledges the PLA’s deficiencies when it
comes to things like jointness. It is also worth noting
that much of the transformational activities being undertaken by the Chinese military are still very nascent
and even experimental, and we possess only a vague
idea as to the PLA’s paths and progress in many areas of informatization, such as information warfare or
digitization, or whether these programs will ever be
effectively implemented.
Moreover, recapitalizing the Chinese military with
modern equipment—and in particular pursuing improvements in C4ISR—does not, in and of itself, constitute an RMA-like transformation; on the contrary,
acquiring these systems makes perfect sense even
without worrying about “transforming the force.” A
military does not need to believe in the RMA in order to appreciate the importance of precision-guided
weapons, modern fighter jets and submarines, and
better intelligence. On the whole, therefore, the PLA
seems to have done a better job adopting the rhetoric
of transformation while pursuing a “modernization-
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plus” approach to transforming itself. China’s current
military buildup is ambitious and far-reaching, but it
is still more indicative of a process of evolutionary,
steady-state, and sustaining—rather than disruptive
or revolutionary—innovation and change. Not that
this is necessarily a wrong path for the Chinese military, nor is it one that should not give other nations
considerable cause for close attention. Perfection, it is
said, is the enemy of good enough, and even absent
a full-blown transformation, the PLA is adding considerably to its combat capabilities. For better or for
worse, the PLA is emerging as a much more potent
military force, and that, in turn, will increasingly complicate regional security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific
and even beyond.
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CHAPTER 6
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY IN 2020-30
FOCUSED ON REGIONAL ISSUES
Bernard D. Cole
The views in this paper are the author’s alone and do
not represent those of the National War College or any
other agency of the U.S. Government.

INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes a Chinese military in the
decade 2020 to 2030 that is focused on regional issues
and prepared for conflict on China’s periphery, particularly its maritime frontier. The People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) budget, organization, doctrines, training
and personnel, platforms, and space-based assets will
be addressed.1
These elements are meaningful indicators of the
PLA’s focus a decade and more hence; in fact, they reflect China’s leaders’ view of the utility of the military
instrument of statecraft. A regionally focused PLA
will require different systems and organization than
will a globally focused military; this chapter argues
that the former overshadow the latter.
That said, the future PLA will address missions
identical in name—deterrence and power projection
for instance—but different in requirements and intention. Missions are not the drivers in military developments, as much as are the intended theaters of operations—regional rather than global.
The “region” in this chapter is defined as the waters lying within the first and second island chains.
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The first encompasses the Yellow, East China, and
South China Seas and is delineated by a line from the
Kuriles through Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and then west through Indonesia. The second
adds much of the Philippine Sea to that previously
mentioned and is delineated by a line from the Kuriles
through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, Palau, and
then west through Indonesia.
THE PLA BUDGET
The assessment period encompasses the 14th and
15th Five-Year Plans (2021-25 and 2026-30) used by
Beijing to evaluate, adjust, and guide its economy.
Although China’s economy is not without potentially
serious problems, continued economic growth is a
viable assumption.
Beijing announced the PLA’s 2013 budget as
720.2 billion yuan (U.S.$114.3 billion), a 10.7 percent
increase from the 2012 budget. Almost all observers
think this is a significantly underestimated figure, but
Dennis Blasko has offered a reasonable conclusion to
the different budget estimates:
Whatever the true numbers may be, the Chinese military has much more money to spend on fewer troops
than it did 15 years ago. At the same time, personnel,
equipment, and training costs for a more modern,
technologically advanced military are significantly
higher than in previous decades . . . the growth of the
defense budget in fact appears to be coordinated with
the growth of the Chinese economy. . . . If need be, the
government could increase spending even faster. . . .2

Increasing military budgets are consistent with
Beijing’s official policy “that defense development
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should be both subordinated to and in the service of
the country’s overall economic development, and that
the former should be coordinated with the latter.”
Thus, PLA budget growth has followed China’s gross
domestic product (GDP) and inflation rate; it has not
diverted massive funding away from important civilian projects necessary for maintaining economic development.3 This paradigm should continue into the
next decade and to mid-century, barring an unforeseen, major national security emergency.
Four factors support a continually increasing Chinese defense budget:
1. President Xi Jinping’s apparent determination to
ensure continued growth and reduce income disparities by maintaining high government spending.4
2. China’s emergence as the world’s second leading economy, increasing global military presence, and
determination to act and gain recognition as a global
power.5
3. Beijing’s actions in support of maritime and insular territorial claims demonstrate its determination
not to waver on sovereignty issues.6
4. The influence of the military commanders,
determined to continue modernizing their forces.
A regionally focused PLA will not require Beijing
to make the large investments demanded for a global
military. It will not change its current modernization
process to try to match the United States ship for ship,
or missile for missile, but will continue focusing on
strategic, essentially defensive capabilities.
A decision to increase, decrease, or maintain the
present percentage of the national budget dedicated
to the PLA will be driven much more by political than
economic concerns. Future military modernization in
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China will not be determined by economic resources,
but by political decisions.
THE REGION
“East Asia” is a description that rolls off the tongue
for an area on which a 2025 PLA would focus, but that
is too easy, just as “Indo-Pacific” is too broad. China’s
current strategic military interests focus on defense of
the homeland, to include all 14 of its land borders, as
well as the vast maritime expanse to its east, into the
Philippine Sea, and to the south, to the Singapore and
Malacca Straits.
The most immediate maritime concern is the “three
seas,” or “near seas,” composed of the Yellow, East
China, and South China Seas, which cover the water
area inside the “first island chain.”7 The island chain
construct is credited to Admiral Liu Huaqing, who in
the mid-1980s described it as bounding an area over
which the PLA Navy (PLAN) should aspire to exert
control by 2020. Liu’s concept of “control” is not the
same as classic Mahanian “command of the sea,” but
aims for the capability to control specific areas for
specific periods of time.
The PLAN did not meet Liu’s 2000 date for controlling the area within the first island chain, but was
close to that goal in 2014, by virtue of its increasingly
sophisticated surveillance capabilities, expanded submarine fleet, and missile arsenal headlined by the
near-initial operating capability (IOC) of the DF21
antiship ballistic missile (ASBM).8 This mix of capabilities, including the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and
Second Artillery, means that the goal of sea control is
not a function of just the PLAN, but of the entire PLA.
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REGIONAL ISSUES
Taiwan’s status was the PLA’s most crucial planning contingency in 2014, but is likely to continue subsiding in crisis intensity, as discussed later. The PLA’s
missions focused on border defense will retain their
priority.9 These are both continental and maritime, extending through the three seas today but out to Liu’s
“second island chain” by 2030. This line defines an
area over which the PLA should aspire to exert control
and includes much of the Philippine Sea, in addition
to the near seas. It is a vast ocean expanse, extending
approximately 1,800 nautical miles (nm) eastward
from the Asian mainland, sometimes described as the
“middle sea.”10
It would also establish an extensive defensive security structure by the 100th anniversary of the founding
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2049.11 The
2006 defense white paper included this goal in a list
of modernization target dates, as “the strategic goal
of building informationized armed forces and being
capable of winning informationized wars by the mid21st century.”12
Military Forces as an Instrument
of Chinese Statecraft.
Beijing has not hesitated to defend national security interests, including its maritime claims. PLAN
ships defeated Vietnamese units to consolidate Chinese control of the Paracel (Xisha) Islands in 1974 and
several Spratly (Nansha) Islands in 1988. Less dramatic PLA engagements in the South China Sea have included the seizure of Mischief (Meiji) Reef in 1995 and
Scarborough Shoals (Huangyuan Dao) in 2012 against
Philippine claims.13
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Chinese government and perhaps commercial
ships under government direction have also confronted other nation’s vessels, ranging from fishing craft to
U.S. survey ships on many occasions. These confrontations have included very aggressive Chinese actions,
resulting in the loss of life and significant damage. In
one incident between China and South Korea, a South
Korean Coast Guard officer was murdered when he
boarded a Chinese fishing boat.
Confrontations involving both civilian-manned
and PLAN craft have become commonplace in the
East China Sea between Japanese and Chinese vessels
and aircraft. No loss of life has occurred—although
the risk may be increasing with each confrontation. 14
The past 4 years’ events in the East and South China
Seas demonstrate Beijing’s use of uniformed and civilian services to enforce its maritime and insular territorial claims. That is not unique to China, of course, but
Beijing’s apparent faith in its ability to control such
incidents and prevent unintended escalation are both
unrealistic and troubling.15
Japan, India, and the United States are viewed as
posing threats of various degrees to China’s national
security.16 The first is both a historic enemy and as a
current contestant to sovereignty and resource issues
in the East China Sea; India’s nuclear arsenal is threatening to Beijing’s ally, Pakistan, as well as to China
itself; while the United States is the only nation with
the economic, political, and military power to frustrate China’s ambitions.
Additionally, Beijing faces an East Asia generally pursuing naval modernization. Japan and South
Korea continue to improve their already formidable
naval and coast guard capabilities, while Vietnam,
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia are
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engaging in long-term modernization of their submarine fleets and other naval units. The Indian Navy
aspires to a very ambitious modernization program
based on a future force of three aircraft carrier battle
groups and nuclear powered submarines.17
President Xi Jinping’s statement that “We are
strongly committed to safeguarding the country’s
sovereignty and security, and defending our territorial integrity” is not just rhetoric, but addresses an
obvious and lasting strategic goal.18
PLA PERSONNEL
PLA Army.
The army (PLAA) dominates the military in terms
of command and numbers. There are indications, however, that this dominance will change by the middle
of the next decade. First, China’s 2004 defense white
paper stated that:
The PLA will promote coordinated development of
firepower, mobility and information capability, enhance the development of its operational strength
with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second
Artillery Force (PLASAF) in order to strengthen the
capabilities for winning both command of the sea and
command of the air, and conducting strategic counter
strikes.19

Second, at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)
Eighteenth Party Congress, in November 2012, President Hu Jintao emphasized that the army would be
yielding influence to the other services. Hu asserted:
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we must make major progress in modernizing national
defense and the armed forces . . ., striving to basically
complete military mechanization and make major
progress in full military IT [information technology]
application by 2020. . . . We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace security . . .
enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of
military tasks, the most important of which is to win
local war in an information age.20

Third, writing about the Decision of the CPC Central Committee . . . at the 3rd Plenary Session of the
18th CPC [Communist Party of China] Central Committee, General Xu Qiliang reported “it is imperative
to . . . lay stress on strengthening the building of the
Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery.”21
Then, in November 2013, a senior Military Region
(MR) commander described a future, more balanced
PLA, with the army being deemphasized in favor
of the navy and air force.22 Finally, in January 2014,
Chinese military analysts described a “new joint command system” reflecting “naval prioritization.”23
The PLA of a half-century ago focused on continental threats and missions; logically, the army dominated. China’s national security concerns in 2014 are
concentrated on the maritime arena, which should
empower the PLAN and PLAAF. It also lends weight
to the Second Artillery’s conventional capabilities. A
maritime, eastern orientation will continue with the
unresolved status of Taiwan, disputes with Japan, and
South China Sea issues.
These indicators mean reduced army personnel
numbers, with increased navy, air force, and Second
Artillery Force manning. It likely will lead to a lessening of army influence and budget allocation, with
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concomitant increases in the other services’ shares of
budget resources and leadership positions. This reorientation, in recognition of 21st century strategic goals,
will allow a reorganization of PLA infrastructure, to
include simplifying the MR structure.
Changes in PLA organization by 2025-30 should
include interservice rotation among many of senior
command positions. For instance, an admiral in command of the Guangzhou MR would recognize the
PLAN’s leading role in confronting South China Sea
challenges. Similarly, a PLAAF or Second Artillery
general in command of the Nanjing and Jinan MRs
would be directly in control of the air- and missilefocused forces responsible for exercising anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) operations within the first island
chain—particularly the East China Sea.
PLA MISSIONS IN 2025
Hence, the PLA in the next decade will reflect a
more balanced personnel and resource structure
among the three primary services, with the navy and
air force gaining at the army’s expense. The Second
Artillery likely will maintain its present position—
with personnel and resources sized only to ensure the
presence of a viable, effective nuclear and conventional deterrent force.
The most important future PLA development will
be continuation of the post-2000 improvements in
personnel management. Professional military education (PME) and training for all ranks will continue to
increase in flexibility and professionalism—maximizing the accuracy and honesty of training and exercise
evaluation and reporting.
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Two important challenges confront the PLA. One is
the elimination of corrupt accession, assignment, and
promotion practices. Second is the PLA’s decade-long
attempt to develop a professional, career noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. The extent of this effort’s
success should be apparent by the mid-2020s.24
China’s working age population—the prime pool
for military entrants—is expected to begin declining
as early as 2015, described as “a drastic decline in the
young labor force,” despite recent decisions relaxing the “one-child policy.”25 However, in view of the
burgeoning need to find more and more jobs for the
country’s increasing work force and continuing conscription means that future manpower resources will
not be a limiting factor on future PLA manning.
Homeland Defense.
Homeland Defense obviously will remain the primary mission for all services and branches. However,
increased attention to developing jointness and the
continued increase in ballistic and cruise missile capability noted earlier may well lead to the establishment
of a separate command responsible for that mission.
This would be a “supported command,” without its
own forces but empowered to secure operational forces from the different services to carry out its mission.
The maritime defense mission will remain primarily a PLAN responsibility, but will require greater
naval aviation capability and coordination with the
PLAAF. The newly organized coast guard forces
will gain in coherence and capability over time and
their operations will be increasingly influenced by
the PLAN. Required defense of China’s recently announced air defense identification zone (ADIZ), the
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acquisition of aircraft carriers and advanced surface
combatants, all with flight decks, will shift more of
this mission to seaborne aviation assets, both rotary
and fixed-wing.
Nuclear Deterrence.
Nuclear deterrence will remain a vital PLA mission, with the Second Artillery in the lead, but with
a division of labor with the PLAN, the service responsible for the actual operation and maintenance
of ballistic missile submarines, and with the PLAAF,
responsible for the actual operation and maintenance
of nuclear weapons-capable aircraft. Second Artillery
control of nuclear-capable intercontinental missiles
will be unchallenged, but as the navy and air force
acquire longer range and more sophisticated conventionally armed cruise and regional ballistic missiles,
Beijing may decide that these weapons embody too
much political impact to be left in the hands of the
individual services. Establishing a more centralized,
joint command and control authority over long-range
missiles would be a logical step.26
Power Projection.
Employing military power to enforce sovereignty
claims includes power projection, a phrase often used
to describe a navy mission. It should more accurately
be defined in whole-of-military terms.
PLA power projection capabilities in 2014 take several forms, including amphibious assault by army or
marine corps troops transported by navy or commercial vessels’ air and missile strikes launched from the
sea or from territorial possessions against a foreign
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force or country, or by the threat of such force being
exercised.
These capabilities will increase, as China continues modernizing its military. PLA power projection
effectiveness will also improve as a result of “lessons
learned” from the more-than-5 years of PLAN deployments to the Gulf of Aden and beyond.27
Presence.
Presence, or employing military forces as a diplomatic instrument, is as old as naval history—the Athenians employed their own and allied maritime forces
throughout the Peloponnesus on this mission. China
has deployed its naval vessels on diplomatic port visits since the mid-1970s, when PLAN ships conducted
port calls throughout Southeast Asia. The pace of
interregional port calls will continue to increase until, by 2025, PLAN warships and support vessels call
routinely in East Asian countries.
PLAN warships joining the large, biannual, multilateral rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in Hawaiian waters in the summer of 2014 were a significant
Chinese demonstration of both presence and power
projection. This major exercise likely signaled a new
naval balance in Asian-Pacific waters for both China
and the United States.28
Maintaining Order at Sea.
This mission has been part of PLAN and coast
guard operations since the organizations were founded. The PRC’s early years included PLA defensive operations against Nationalist raids; seizing islands held
by those forces; fighting piracy and other criminal
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activities in riverine and littoral waters; and enforcing
customs regulations, conducting salvage, navigation,
and safety of life operations. These included participation by the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and other
national agencies, as well as provincial and municipal
authorities.
China’s military and civilian ability to ensure order at sea has been significantly improved. The 2013
reorganization of coast guard-like services has yet
to have a significant impact, but eventually should
provide a rational, effective organization for executing these missions. It also represents a trend of civilmilitary integration that will continue, while the impressive acquisition of ships and aircraft will provide
the platforms necessary to ensure maritime order and
security.
Significant command and control arrangements
were apparently left unresolved by this reorganization. Operational requirements and bureaucratic inertia will continue to drive integration of various “coast
guard” organizations into the administrative control
of a national ministry, while operational control gravitates to the PLAN.29
Nontraditional Missions.
The PLA will increase its participation in “military
operations other than war” (MOOTW).30 These include noncombatant evacuations (NEO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and peacekeeping.
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NEO.
The Libyan NEO in 2012, when 48,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated, was just the latest NEO; between
2006 and 2010, 6,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated
from Chad, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, the Solomon
Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Tonga.31
NEO operations are difficult to predict; Beijing’s
willingness to participate in such operations, perhaps
in cases where no or very few Chinese citizens are
among foreigners threatened in a situation of violent
civil unrest or natural disaster, will likely increase.
Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief (HA/DR).
Hospital ships, large amphibious ships, and large
transport aircraft increase the PLA’s ability to conduct HA/DR missions throughout East Asia and beyond during times of man-made or naturally caused
emergencies to relieve human suffering. The PLAN’s
modern hospital ship, Peace Ark, has by 2014 carried
out long voyages to the Indian Ocean, the Southwest
Pacific, and the Caribbean Sea.32 The ship also is an
ideal platform for Beijing to employ in the event of a
domestic catastrophe in one of its coastal or riverine
provinces.
The PLAN in 2014 deploys just three large amphibious ships, Yuzhao-class landing platform docks
(LPD), named Kunlunshan, Jingganshan, and Changbaishan. At least two or three more of these very capable
vessels soon will join the fleet.33
Expansion of the HA/DR mission for the air force
will be enhanced by acquisition of additional large
cargo aircraft capable of long-range flights. These may
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include additional Il-76 aircraft acquired from Russia,
but are more likely to consist of advanced models of
the Chinese-manufactured Y-20 aircraft.34
China was deficient in HA/DR capability when
the December 2004 tsunami struck Southeast and
South Asia; capacity had improved significantly when
Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in November
2013, but Beijing lacked the political willingness to engage. The two cases are different, but, as of 2014, China
has yet to employ the PLA in providing humanitarian
relief from a disinterested position.
Extensive PLA participation in HA/DR missions
will result from a political decision by Beijing; the military capability is already present. The Chinese government will have to decide that participation in HA/
DR operations, especially those not concerned directly with succoring Chinese citizens, is in the national
interest.
Counterpiracy.
Piracy and other criminal activity at sea and in
coastal areas has historically been a continuing problem in East Asian waters. Much news reporting has
resulted from the PLAN’s deployments to the Gulf of
Aden and beyond since December 2008. This mission
has demonstrated China’s ability to conduct longdistance military operations over an extended period
of time.
Piracy will persist, but is best described in 2014 as
“manageable,” a description that will remain apt in
2030. Its prevalence, however, may rise or decline in
conjunction with rising or falling economic prosperity among professional sea goers, especially in coastal
waters. In any case, these missions in littoral waters
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will decrease for the PLA in the next decade, if the
new coast guard units develop administrative coherence and operational capability in nonmilitary law
enforcement at sea and on regional rivers.
Counterterrorism.
The PAP and Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
civilian police forces have been primarily responsible
for domestic incidents Beijing classifies as terrorism,
although the PLAA may be called upon in extreme
cases.35 Very few terrorism incidents have occurred
at sea; the PLAN would be assigned to resolve such
incidents if beyond the capability of the Coast Guard
or other maritime security organization, but this will
remain a minor mission for the navy.
Maintaining Civil Order.
Societal peace and order is a bottom-line mission
for all Chinese security forces, from local police to the
PLA. This mission ties directly to countering terrorism. The PLA will retain ultimate responsibility for
domestic stability.
Taiwan.
Taiwan probably will not be a primary operational
concern for the PLA by the end of the next decade.
Resolution of the island’s status vis-à-vis the mainland
before 2030 is supported by several factors. One is the
increasingly intertwined economic and social relationship between the island and the mainland.36
Second is the lack of clear sentiment among Taiwan’s population in favor of formally declaring in-

180

dependence.37 This is seen in the Taiwan government
failing since at least 2000 to have made dramatic efforts to improve the island’s military capabilities.
Third is the lack of international support for a
formally independent Taiwan, reflected in the declining number of nations that recognize the Republic of
China.38 Fourth is Taiwan’s inability to gain entry into
international organizations without the support of
the PRC.
Fifth is the de facto decline in U.S. support for an
independent Taiwan, which exacerbates the point
about Taipei’s defense posture referenced previously—relying on Washington to defend the island will
not be an effective policy in the long term.
Three Seas.
The PLA’s headline-grabbing strategic issues of
2014 are unlikely to have been resolved by the middle
of the next decade, including disputed sovereignty
claims over land features and ocean areas within the
East and South China Seas. Very little prospect exists
that China will achieve a settlement with Japan over
their conflicting continental shelf claims in the East
China Sea, although a modus vivendi is possible.
There is even less chance that they will agree on
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sovereignty, an issue that
rests largely on nationalism, although many analysts
view these land features as a crucial part of the first
island chain, serving in Japanese hands to constrain
PLAN operations.39 In both cases, the lack of material benefit will not prevent a military confrontation
between China and Japan occurring during the next
decade and a half, but reduces that possibility.40

181

The South China Sea disputes are more substantive, important, and complex than those in the East
China Sea. The PLA has long been used by Beijing to
enforce territorial claims and expel forces perceived as
encroaching on China’s sovereignty, including 1974,
1988, 1995, 2005, 2007, 2012, and 2013.
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
Organization.
PLA reorganization has received attention in the
wake of the fall 2013 Third Party Plenum, often featuring a reduction in the number of MRs from seven
to perhaps four theaters.41 The navy, with three fleets,
has direct administrative links to just three MRs—Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou. If two or all of these
are combined, presumably their assigned fleets might
be combined into two—a North Sea Fleet focused
on Japan and a South Sea Fleet focused on the South
China Sea.
What will the PLA look like in 2025-30 if the services become “more balanced”? A regionally focused
PLA will not require an army even as large as the 2014
force, absent unexpected conventional warfare on
China’s northern or western borders. The 2014 army
of mixed divisions and brigades will continue reorganizing into brigades, with increased special forces and
aviation units, and reduced headquarters personnel.
A smaller PLAA might well shift at least two more
divisions to a primary amphibious role; its mission in
the maritime arena outlined earlier and the acquisition of more and larger amphibious warships would
enable it to fulfill the adage of “a projectile fired by the
navy.”42 There is no evidence that the current marine
corps of just 12,000 personnel will be expanded.
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PLAAF and Naval Aviation.
A future, regionally focused PLA will deploy enhanced naval and air force capabilities to confront national security concerns about the Diaoyutai, Taiwan,
and the South China Sea.
The air force would realign with a new MR structure. Each associated air force will continue to focus
on defense of the homeland, using a national ADIZ
covering both East and South China Seas. This will
likely be a mission of both the PLAAF and Naval
Aviation, but with a central controlling organization
in each MR, and with cross-MR coordination.
By the middle of the next decade, the PLAAF and
Naval Aviation inventory will include low-observable
aircraft derived from either the J-20 or J-21. Less certain is whether the J-21 is destined to become Naval
Aviation’s primary carrier aircraft. The J-15 is currently filling that role but reportedly is so weight-restricted at launching from the ship’s ski-jump ramp that its
significant redesign or replacement is likely, perhaps
by a version of the Russian-designed Su-33.43
Homeland defense will focus on the maritime theater, the area delineated by the island chains. These
enclose China’s littoral waters, in which a doctrine
of A2/AD would be exercised, requiring increased
numbers of airborne warning and control aircraft
(AWACS), aerial refuelers, cruise missile launching
aircraft, short-range ballistic missiles, and, especially,
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft.
The PLA also is acquiring increasing numbers of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which will play increasingly important roles, particularly in surveillance
and targeting, and which offer significant advantages
when compared to manned aircraft.44 UAVs offer sev-
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eral advantages in reduced procurement and maintenance costs, personnel manning, and even plausible
deniability. They are by themselves, however, suited
to regional rather than global employment.45
PLAN.
One very significant MR realignment would be
combining the Jinan and Nanjing regions, with the
PLAN disestablishing the East Sea Fleet, and the North
and South Sea Fleets dividing the former fleet’s area of
responsibility. As far as force structure is concerned,
the navy would continue its present, impressive pace
of warship construction.
China’s ship building programs support the concept of a regionally focused PLAN. The first aircraft
carrier, Liaoning, provides increased airpower at sea
but with a “ski jump” flight deck is limited in its aircraft capability. China’s indigenously designed and
constructed carriers may have the catapults necessary
for greater airpower generation, which would engender significantly higher costs, in terms both of financial and personnel resources.46 Should China build
larger, flat-deck, catapult-equipped carriers, it would
indicate a more global than regional intent for its fleet
missions. Similarly, the low number of replenishment-at-sea (RAS) ships in the PLAN, currently just
six, indicates regional missions, not involving distant
deployments on a regular basis.47
The 2030 surface fleet will center on three or four
aircraft carriers, all indigenously constructed, 18 air
defense destroyers with Aegis-like anti-air warfare
systems, and 36 frigates and corvettes equipped primarily for ASW, with defense of sea lines of communication their primary mission.48 This major acquisi-
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tion program in a regionally focused PLA reflects
as much national pride as it does national security
requirements.
A force of 50-60 attack submarines will be maintained, not more than ten nuclear powered, but twice
that number equipped with air-independent-propulsion (AIP) conventional power plants. The conventionally powered boats will retain as a primary mission enforcing A2/AD within the first island chain,
but as more AIP submarines join the fleet, the PLAN
will begin extending its operations into the Philippine
Sea, moving toward a goal of regularly patrolling out
to and beyond the second island chain.
Nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are more expensive to build and much more expensive to maintain
and operate than attack submarines; the basic justification for building the former is to assign them to
long-range missions.49 Hence, a regionally focused
PLAN will not require that a significant percentage of
its submarine force be nuclear powered.
The PLAN faces several challenges to improve
its numerically large submarine force’s capability. A
particular challenge for China’s naval architects is to
improve their boat’s covertness; the current fleet of
nuclear powered submarines is surprisingly noisy,
greatly increasing their detectability by opposing
forces.50 Conventionally powered submarines are inherently quieter and more difficult to detect, if their
equipment is properly maintained.51
By 2025, China should be able finally to deploy
nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN),
a goal unfulfilled in 2014, after 3 decades of effort. At
least two or three Jin-class SSBNs are already operating in the South Sea Fleet, but lacking their main battery of JL-2 missiles. Even when successfully tested
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and loaded onboard, these missiles will be incapable
of reaching mainland U.S. targets except from narrow
ocean areas.52
Construction of the major submarine base at Yalong Bay, near the city of Sanya on Hainan Island,
and the existing naval base at Yulin, may indicate that
China will opt for a Soviet-style “bastion strategy” for
operating its SSBNs, once a longer-range missile becomes operational.53 Although locating the SSBNs at
Hainan may just be due to the South China Sea offering the steep sea floor gradient that allows submarines
to submerge into deep, safe waters almost immediately upon leaving the island’s southern ports.
Beijing could have these submarines patrol continuously, as did the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, or they might choose to have
the boats leave homeport for patrol as a signal, during
times of crisis. The maritime element of China’s early
warning infrastructure—especially a seabed listening
and monitoring system—also would play an important role in defending the bastion against intruders.54
ASW capability is key PLAN weakness, while
the U.S. submarine force is its navy’s most lethal element. By 2020, however, the U.S. Navy is predicted to
deploy a total of just 39 SSNs.55
The Second Artillery.
The current arsenal of approximately 72 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is organized into seven brigades, including one DF-4, three DF-5A, one DF31, and two DF-31A units. The older missiles will have
been mothballed by 2030, and the Second Artillery is
likely to deploy only DF-31A or DF-41 brigades.56 The
number of missiles and brigades will remain approxi-
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mately the same, unless Beijing believes that the U.S.
and allied anti-ballistic missile defense structure is
significantly improved.
The size of China’s ICBM nuclear force will continue to be determined by a policy of “credible minimum
deterrence.”57 The 2014 strength of approximately 400
missiles, ranging from the DF-3A to the DF-15, may
remain in 2025-30, but will be affected by at least three
factors. First is Beijing’s confidence in the effectiveness of its missile force; second is its view of the effectiveness of U.S. and other nation’s countermeasures.
Third is Beijing’s evaluation of its security environment; even if regionally focused, the PLA’s missile
inventory will have to recognize India’s potential for
employing nuclear weapons.
The short- and medium-range ballistic missiles inventory is more likely to increase, as are the
air- and sea-launched cruise missiles in which China
“has invested heavily” in a program described by the
Pentagon as “the most active in the world.”58
Systems Improvements.
The PLA is emphasizing cyber operations and
space-based systems, which define the 21st century
command, control, communications, computers, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) environment,
as well as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. PLAN commander Wu Shengli’s insistence in 2008 on access to
space-based systems to support the navy’s deployments to the Gulf of Aden was followed by his 2009
statement that “the Navy will move faster in researching and building new-generation weapons to boost
the ability to fight in regional sea wars under the circumstances of information technology.”59
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Future developments are likely to focus on systems integration to maximize the effectiveness of the
complex system of systems that characterize modern
warfighting platforms. A recent report emphasized
the PLA’s continued difficulties in this area; it decried
the lack of jointness and even teamwork between
units, noting that “without standardization, there is
no informatization” and demanding that “each military branch [must] completely remove its ‘departmental selfishness’ barriers.”60
PLA writings frequently call for greater jointness in
capabilities and doctrine. The need and call for jointness will continue, as the military gains in capability
and expanded mission scope.
Strategy.
Beijing has not issued a “national security strategy,” “military strategy,” or “maritime strategy,” as
such. In each case, however, documents are available
that delineate China’s strategic concerns. The regionally focused PLA of the next decade will be primarily occupied with the maritime concerns mentioned
previously.
Applicable documents include the 1998 National
Ocean Policy of China and the series of biennial defense
white papers, published from 1998 to 2014. The tenets
of maritime strategy discerned in these documents
include developing and defending coastal and offshore economic resources, “reinforcing oceanographic
technology,” and establishing a “comprehensive marine management system.” Other points noted are to
“harmonize national and international law,” integrate
China’s agencies responsible for maritime security,
coordinate traditional and nontraditional maritime
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security concerns, and deploying a navy of “new
types of submarines, frigates, aircraft, and large
support vessels.”61
CONCLUSION
The Dream.
Military modernization has been linked to the
PRC’s 100th anniversary by all three post-Deng
Xiaoping presidents. President Jiang Zemin spoke in
the late-1990s of making important progress in military modernization by mid-century, while President
Xi Jinping has set 2049 for the fulfillment of the “China
dream.” The goal is “to recapitalize China’s armed
forces to achieve mechanization and partial informatization by 2020.” 62
The PLAN and other maritime enforcement agencies should have the capability to confront threats to
China’s claimed fisheries, sea bed resources, and economic interests connected to sea lines of communication by 2025, a significant achievement. At the end
of the next decade, Beijing may believe its naval and
coast guard forces strong enough to control East Asian
regional sea lanes. This would strengthen Chinese
ambitions to turn the “three seas” into a “no-go” zone
if it suits.
The congressionally mandated Office of the Secretary of Defense report on the PLA for 2013 sums up
current and possible near-term developments in China’s military. It states that:
the PRC continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win
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short-duration, high-ntensity regional military conflict, . . . Its military modernization has also become
increasingly focused on investments in military capabilities to conduct a wider range of missions beyond
its immediate territorial concerns, including counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional military operations. . . . These
missions and capabilities can address international security challenges, [as well as] more narrowly defined
PRC interests and objectives, including advancing territorial claims and building influence abroad.63

When—or will—the PLA be able to meet these goals
and control the huge maritime area delineated by the
second island chain?64
While it took the PLA approximately 2 decades
(1996-2014) to close in on the 2000 goal attributed to
Liu Huaqing, that process has engendered a momentum enhanced by the continuing growth of China’s
economy, development of Chinese defense industries,
and the increasing PLA budget. Hence, the ability to
control—or for the PLA to estimate that it can control—the water area delineated by the second island
chain may be effective by 2030. Again, this does not
mean classic “command of the sea,” but the ability
to use a specific area of the sea for a specific period
of time.
A PLA focused on global operations would require weapons systems not necessary for a military
focused on regional issues, especially those inherent
in China’s long maritime frontier. First, the regionally
focused navy will continue to build many more conventionally than nuclear powered submarines, given
the respective ranges of each. Second, fewer replenishment ships are also appropriate to a PLAN focused
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on regional rather than far-sea operations. Third, a
navy built around even three aircraft carriers would
be focused on regional issues, since the conventional
wisdom that three such ships are required to maintain
one in full operational status remains realistic. Another relevant factor is the requirement for two aircraft
carriers to operate together to conduct the 24-hour a
day flight operations typically required in a far-sea
scenario. This implies that a globally oriented PLAN
would incorporate at least six carriers.65 Finally, a significantly increased inventory of heavy-lift aircraft
in the PLAAF would indicate Beijing’s intentions to
operate more consistently at greater distances. None
of these “global” systems appear immediately in
the offing.
Predicting Chinese military capabilities and intentions for a decade or more hence of course is constrained by fundamental unknowns; even a regionally
focused PLA will continue certain out-of-area operations, to include ship visits to Western Hemisphere
and European ports. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean
presence represented by post-2008 counterpiracy
deployments, as well as exercise participation, will
continue.
First, corruption and bureaucratic complexity are
problems hindering PLA effectiveness. In the words
of one observer:
It’s not just corruption. More than three decades of
peace, a booming economy, and an opaque administrative system have taken their toll as well, not to mention that the PLA is one of the world’s largest bureaucracies -- and behaves accordingly.66

Second, the PLA’s position within China’s “national command authority” faces an unknown future. Ellis
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Joffe once said there was no reason why Chinese military officers could not be both professionally competent and politically reliable. Nonetheless, continuing
Mao Zedong’s declaration that “Our principle is that
the Party commands the gun and the gun must never
be allowed to command the Party” remains a concern
of China’s succeeding leaders. For instance, three of
Jiang Zemin’s “Five Sentences on Army Building”
addressed political reliability of the military.67
More recently, President Xi Jinping demanded the
army’s “absolute loyalty, purity and reliability.” The
military, he continued “should absolutely follow the
command of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission at any time and under any
circumstances, . . .”68
The near-complete absence of uniformed personnel in the most senior CCP organs attests to PLA
subservience to civilian leadership, with little significant change from the 2006 observation that “senior
uniformed military leaders are primarily focused on
military issues.”69 The danger of a developing feeling
in the PLA that only it understands what is required
to protect la patria is possible but not on the horizon.
Third and most importantly, future PLA capabilities will be influenced by Beijing views of China’s
strategic situation. The immediate regional concerns
posed by Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South
China Seas greatly outweigh more distant issues,
such as counterpiracy, counterterrorism, NEO, or
HA/DR. Furthermore, the Asian maritime picture
in 2030 will present China with a challenging venue
of capable, modernizing navies. Beijing’s efforts to
build a dominant regional military force are not assured of success. Not only will the Japanese Maritime
and Air Self-Defense Forces continue to acquire and
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deploy state-of-the-art weapons systems and platforms, but even Vietnam, for instance, will have deployed at least six Kilo-class submarines, MiG-29
aircraft, and Russian-designed frigates armed with
modern cruise missiles.
China’s military modernization over the next decade and a half will be impressive. It should not be
constrained by budget or other resource shortages, including personnel availability. However, its political
drivers—national security concerns—logically will be
more regional than global.
A PLA focused on but not necessarily restricted to
an East Asian regional arena will continue modernizing its command and control structure, and will
become increasingly aware of international factors.
Service rivalries will always be present, but PLA jointness will increase both operationally and in military
command positions. As noted previously, MR commanders will quite possibly include navy and air force
officers by the end of the next decade.70
A regionally focused PLA in 2030 will have developed into a smaller, but more professionally competent military. “How effective will it be in combat” is an
impossible question to answer with assurance, but the
PLAN’s increasing operational experience certainly
indicates greater competence, as does the evolving
personnel and unit education and training system.
The question is not one of PLAN versus the U.S. Navy
or the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force but the degree to which Beijing believes its forces must be engaged—to win decisively or to “teach a lesson”—in a
given scenario.
The PLAN and PLAAF will have increased their
share of budget and personnel resources; the Coast
Guard and other ancillary forces will have developed
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into coherent, increasingly competent forces. The
strategic goal of controlling events within the three
seas will be largely achieved and the next goal of controlling events within the second island chain will
have made impressive progress.71 In regional terms,
China will have completed the near-unprecedented
development into both a continental and maritime
military power.
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China’s defined area of concern, out to the second island chain
but again, does not require “command of the sea” in the sense
attributed to Alfred Thayer Mahan. Rather, Beijing intends being able to counter military actions it considers threatening to its
national security interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) has been undergoing a comprehensive
reform process to move from a personnel-heavy, lowtech force designed to expel invaders to one that is
technology-intensive and focused on operating beyond China’s coasts. The PLA is currently focused on
traditional warfighting missions, with an emphasis
on winning local wars under informationized conditions shaping its military preparedness.1 While China’s ability to project conventional military power
beyond its periphery remains limited2 as China gains
greater influence within the international community,
it is becoming increasingly focused on modernizing
its military capabilities to include “a wider range of
missions beyond its immediate territorial concerns,
including counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief (HADR), and regional military operations.”3
Since 2004, China has increasingly focused on coping with nontraditional security threats and safeguarding the state’s development and overseas interests.4
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This has inspired the Chinese military to increasingly
conduct missions beyond its immediate territory, in
particular to handle threats to Chinese citizens and
economic interests abroad.5 Chinese armed forces are
already emphasizing how they would be employed
during peacetime for military operations other than
war (MOOTW) to:
strengthen overseas operational capabilities such as
emergency response and rescue, merchant vessel protection at sea and evacuation of Chinese nationals, and
provide reliable security support for China’s interests
overseas.6

The PLA’s experience to date with such expeditionary operations is limited, but expanding rapidly.
Since 2002, the PLA has undertaken 36 urgent international humanitarian aid missions.7 Chinese naval
vessels have engaged in expeditionary goodwill tours
such as the 2012 voyage of the PLAN ship Zheng He
and the 2010-13 “Harmonious Missions” of a hospital ship to provide medical aid in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America.8 To date, China’s participation in the
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden is the most
notable example of the PLA conducting expeditionary
operations. As one Chinese Rear Admiral notes, the
main point of the operation was not to combat pirates,
as the Chinese navy’s main mission was not to attack
or detain them, but to protect Chinese overseas economic interests.9 The mission began in January 2009
when a Chinese naval flotilla consisting of a replenishment ship and two destroyers arrived in the Gulf
of Aden off Somalia to protect merchant ships from
pirates.10 Over the course of 500 operations, this force
has protected more than 5,000 commercial vessels.11
The humanitarian aspect of the operation allowed the
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PLA to operate outside China and gain valuable deployment experience, without being seen as a threat.12
The amount of resources China dedicates to its
global missions will be influenced by a number of
variables, including the U.S. response to this evolution, and China’s relations with regional states such
as Japan, North Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines. But domestic and international imperatives
could ensure that China develops power projection
capabilities regardless. Furthermore, the Chinese
leadership is likely to believe that the capabilities
necessary for such expeditionary capabilities could
also be employed in regional contingencies, thereby
increasing the political support for their development.
In this chapter, I will outline what doctrine, force
structure, and organization and training would most
likely characterize a globally expeditionary PLA. The
chapter then addresses the implications of a global
expeditionary PLA capable of operating to a limited
degree overseas for regional and global security.
FUTURE NATURE AND DIRECTION OF
CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
A range of domestic and international factors—
from the need to protect overseas Chinese interests
to the status of regional issues—could, by 2025-30,
compel the PLA to act increasingly globally. A global
expeditionary PLA is not inevitable, but one of three
possible scenarios of the PLA’s development covered
in this volume. In this alternative future, by 2025-30
a global expeditionary PLA could be able to project
limited power in a limited area for a short duration
anywhere in the world. This global expeditionary capability will allow China to play a role in peacekeep-
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ing, HADR, and stability operations regionally and
globally. China could also develop capabilities such
as expeditionary strike groups and special operations
to conduct raids, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), security operations, counterblockades,
strikes, and amphibious exercises. If the Party leadership mandates the PLA to modernize and train to
operate beyond the first and second island chain, the
majority of those efforts would be undertaken by the
PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF). This
section addresses the likely developments in doctrine,
force posture, and organization and training of a PLA
capable of projecting power globally.
DOCTRINE, STRATEGIC GUIDELINES,
AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
Doctrinal changes would likely accompany any
changes in the direction and focus of Chinese military
evolution to account for the addition of global expeditionary missions. Since 1949, China’s doctrine has
evolved as the Party leadership’s threat perceptions
and China’s ability to meet them have changed.13 In
this future scenario, the state of the international environment, potential threats to China, the most likely
type of war and the best ways to fight that war will
shift significantly, calling for an addition to the current formulation of “local war under informationized
conditions.” In terms of equipment, integration, and
training, China plans to have the process of mechanization (the deployment of advanced military platforms) and informatization (bringing them together
as a network) completed by 2020. Around this time,
in this scenario, President Xi Jinping would announce
a corollary to local war, win-win global operations,
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asserting that China must also develop the skills and
platforms necessary to project power globally to be
a responsible great power. Within the top echelons
of government, there would be more discussion and
formalization of the basis for MOOTW and a focus
on creating the ability to conduct simultaneous operations in different locations globally, in addition to
joint operations.
Additionally, Chinese operational concepts will
likely evolve to account for shifting priorities and
frequency of certain types of missions. For obvious
reasons, the joint island landing campaign is the most
prominent operation currently found in publicly
available Chinese writings. This campaign objective’s
would be:
to break through or circumvent shore defense, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and
material to designated landing sites in the north or
south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets and/or the entire
island.14

Strategic air raids designed to leverage the PLA’s
asymmetric advantages over potential adversaries
to achieve localized air superiority is another type of
campaign currently at the top of Beijing’s priorities.15
But as the PLA begins to operate farther from China’s
shores, ensuring its own ability to conduct operations may take precedence over capabilities designed
to degrade an adversary’s capability. A reprioritization of campaigns coupled with the addition of new
campaigns could shift the focus from defense-oriented campaigns to security operations and strikes. By
2025-30, Chinese strike capability could move beyond
the Second Artillery to give equal strategic weight to
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strikes conducted by the PLA, PLAN and PLAAF—
a doctrinal change that has institutional and strategic
implications.
Lastly, Chinese leaders would begin to consider
the framework needed to build the type of strategic
partnerships necessary for expeditionary operations.
To date, China has been focused on developing relationships that will help it improve its capabilities and
increase its political power. China has already begun
this process, though to a limited degree. For example,
in February 2014, China signed a security and defense
agreement with Djibouti to promote regional stability in the Gulf of Aden region.16 China participated in
RIMPAC 2014, the biennial naval exercise hosted by
the United States that involves 23 nations. Within the
framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), China and other SCO member states have conducted a total of nine bilateral and multilateral exercises.17 China has also conducted joint exercises with
Thailand, Singapore, Romania, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Belarus, Venezuela, Colombia, Russia, Australia, New
Zealand and Turkey since 2010. 18
While Chinese leaders have been adamantly against
formal alliances, given the operational necessity of
this global expeditionary scenario, a debate could ensue in China about changing its approach, akin to the
way China changed its approach to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. Chinese strategists are currently
ideologically averse to overseas bases partly due to the
national narrative that only hegemonic powers seek
such arrangements.19 Though useful in operations, establishing overseas bases or hubs are in direct conflict
with Chinese foreign policy, defense policy, and military strategy.20 Mutual defense treaties and permanent
bases are therefore unlikely at this stage, but Beijing’s
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ideology is elastic, and could be reshaped to fit pragmatic realities if required. China could begin to pursue
formal treaties to institutionalize arrangements to use
facilities in other countries. To maintain the appearance of consistency, Beijing would retain its rhetoric
against alliances and put forth strategic guidance that
describes these arrangements as win-win agreements
between equal partners seeking to enhance stability
and security in the region. According to one Chinese
naval officer, if China were to go this route, first experts would have to posit and discuss the idea, then
revisions would have to be made to the white paper,
supported by diplomatic efforts. But he noted it was
unlikely China would station troops overseas or operate from overseas bases, because such a change would
require major changes to Chinese defense and grand
strategy, in addition to a major diplomatic undertaking.21 Increased multilateral exercises and operations
would likely follow to reassure countries that China
will not unilaterally pursue changes in the status quo
through the use of force.
FORCE POSTURE
In order to conduct global operations, the PLA
would start to develop the ability to force open denied
air and sea space far from Chinese territory in order to
be able to operate beyond immediate periphery and
in hostile environments away from friendly ports.22
In addition to building the relevant air, naval, and
ground forces, the PLA will prioritize the systems and
skills necessary for joint operations. For any type of
expeditionary operation, conducted in peacetime or in
war, China will need to make major advances in information warfare—space, cyber, and electronic warfare.
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Chinese writings suggest that the PLA believes these
three types of technologies not only enable operations,
but should also be treated as separate domains that
must be seized and denied to an adversary.23
In terms of space assets, China will be able to call
upon communication and navigation satellites, and a
robust, space-based ocean surveillance system in particular for its operations. The PLA also understands
that in order to be effective in modern conflicts and
MOOTW, it must have the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capacity to carry out joint
operations. By 2025-30, a global expeditionary PLA
must have made great strides in C4ISR integration including creating a model system to facilitate interoperability of its information technology systems.24 Digital C4ISR connectivity will revolutionize the PLA’s
ability to conduct modern combined arms military
operations.25 The incorporation of improved C4ISR
networks into training will ensure that the forces are
consistently provided with real-time data transmission within and between units, enabling better command and control during operations.26
Cyber and electronic warfare capabilities will also
enhance China’s ability to conduct global operations,
especially in contested environments. Currently,
China is more focused on cyber warfare as a means to
exfiltrate data from vulnerable networks, to serve as
a force multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks,
and to target an adversary’s networks to constrain
its actions or slow its response time.27 As the Chinese
military begins to operate abroad, cyber warfare will
become a critical tool in gathering intelligence on
potential areas in which the PLA may be required
to operate, known as intelligence preparation of the
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operational environment (IPOE). The PLA will also
work to expand their electronic warfare capabilities,
which consist of technologies that weaken and destroy
electronic equipment and systems and protect one’s
own electronic equipment and systems. During air
operations, these systems would be employed against
communication nodes, radars, command centers, and
air-defense weapon control systems in particular. If
conducting operations at sea, such as a counter blockade campaign, electronic warfare forces would be
used against enemy ships and airborne and sea-based
anti-missile systems. 28
While this section focuses on the assets needed to
sustain operations far from China’s shores, the PLA
will simultaneously continue to improve its warfighting capabilities with a focus on regional contingencies. Current plans suggest that by 2020, China will be
able to employ satellites and reconnaissance drones;
thousands of surface-to-surface and anti-ship missiles; more than 60 stealthy conventional submarines
and at least six nuclear attack submarines; increasingly stealthy surface combatants and stealthy manned
and unmanned combat aircraft; and space and cyber
warfare capabilities. It is also possible that China will
invest in additional aircraft carriers.29 But even as the
PLA prepares to fight local wars under high-tech conditions within the region, it will expand its attention
on expeditionary capabilities in the air, on the sea, and
on the ground.
Air.
China will invest in large fleets of tankers and
long-range large transport aircraft for various missions such as NEOs. China has ordered but not taken
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delivery of four IL-78/MIDAS tankers, but even these
can support at most a squadron of Su-30s in combat
operations, so the PLA would look to use a more advanced platform by 2025-30.30 China will be looking
to expand its inventory of large transport airplanes
capable of carrying large cargo for long-range flights.
This may include more IL-76s from Russia, but more
likely the advanced models of the indigenously manufactured Y-20 aircraft. The Y-20 should give China the
ability to quickly ship troops, vehicles, and supplies
over long distances, though the PLA may need to upgrade the engines at some point for the Y-20 to be able
to do so efficiently.31 The PLAAF will also continue to
progress in its Airborne Early Warning (AEW), Electronic Warfare, and command and control systems,
including significant unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
development.32
In addition to developing and acquiring systems
designed to sustain operations abroad, the PLA will
continue to progress in traditional warfighting capabilities. The PLAAF will likely phase out its aging H6
fleet. 33 The new H-6K, which was unveiled in 2013, is
likely only a stopgap measure. Though China’s intentions are unclear at this point, the PLA will likely have
a stealthier platform by 2025-30.34 The PLAAF’s 202530 inventory will include a low-observable aircraft a
low-observable aircraft derived from either the J-20
or J-31.
UAV development over the next 15 years will be
significant; the PLA will likely have several massive
fleets of mostly cheap drones operated by the ground
forces, the General Staff Department (GSD), PLAN,
PLAAF, Second Artillery, and Coast Guard.35 Each
will bolster the operational requirements of the respective service or unit they serve.36 These assets will
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probably be truck-launched to keep them operationally flexible and survivable, or some could be based
on carriers. While most will be used regionally, larger
drones could serve as long-range reconnaissance platforms or focus on decoy, jamming, and swarming
tactics for penetrating enemy air defense systems in
expeditionary operations. However, China will likely
continue to suffer from a lack of bases outside China.
Sea.
China’s defense white paper articulates the desire
to develop blue water navy capabilities for conducting operations, carrying out international cooperation and countering nontraditional security threats,
and enhancing capabilities of strategic deterrence and
counterattack.37 But currently, strategic sealift beyond
Taiwan is quite limited. China has never possessed a
robust capability to transport and land troops under
combat conditions.38 China has three Yuzhao class
landing platform dock (LPD) ships, each capable of
transporting one battalion of marines and their vehicles and two large multiproduct replenishment ships
that carry fuel, water, ammunition, and other supplies.39 But to be a global expeditionary PLAN, the service will need to increase the number of LPDs as well
as the number of large, multiproduct replenishment
ships to support long-range patrols.40 China would
also have to address the limitations of inadequate air
defense, lack of experience in formation steaming, and
lack of ability and training in cross-beach movement
of forces to enhance its amphibious assault capabilities.41 The Chinese navy may also invest to a greater
degree in a marine corps as an offshore expeditionary force given the increased need to prepare for
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amphibious landings and assaults. China’s marines
will have to expand from the current two brigades
of 6,000 men each, but the ultimate level of forces
depends on the type of amphibious operations the
PLA stresses in 2025-30 and the forces of surrounding
countries.42 China may also put off such investments
given the extraordinarily difficult nature of amphibious operations—at this point, only the United States
has a robust capability. Even now, China currently
has more marines than naval powers such as Australia, Great Britain, and Japan.
Currently the PLAN possesses approximately 77
principal surface combatants, more than 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships and
roughly 85 missile-equipped small combatants.43 The
PLAN would develop the capabilities and assets needed to protect the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
and engage in operations far from its shores. To that
end, the PLAN has already begun the process of retiring legacy combatants in favor of larger, multi-mission
ships, equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and
anti-submarine weapons and sensors.44 China may
also commission more carriers, along with their aircraft and UAVs, with the justification that carriers are
useful in maritime security operations and operations
other than war. These carriers, plus 18 air defense
destroyers with Aegis-like anti-air warfare systems,
and 36 frigates and corvettes equipped primarily for
anti-submarine warfare (ASW), will be tasked with
defending the SLOCs.45
China may expand the number of attack submarines (SSNs) for sustained patrols in distant waters or
to conduct counterblockade operations, though China
will rely heavily on conventionally powered submarines equipped with air-independent-propulsion to
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patrol out to the first and eventually the second island chains. China’s economic growth relies heavily
on its access to natural resources, and its petroleum
comes primarily from the Middle East, which has to
pass through a number of vulnerable chokepoints including the Luzon and Taiwan straits and the Strait of
Malacca and Strait of Hormuz. China currently cannot project naval control over these chokepoints, but
future capabilities may be developed to address this
vulnerability. To date, China has stressed anti-surface
warfare over ASW. But China may start to focus on
developing counterblockade capabilities to protect vital SLOCs, such as more advanced sonar operations
and airborne ASW.
Ground.
As China’s focus expands from homeland defense
to regional contingencies, to global expeditions, the
relative role of the PLA Army (PLAA) with respect to
the other services will decrease. By 2025-30, the number of active and reserve soldiers in the PLAA will
likely be reduced to fewer than two million, unless
there is a conventional flare up with India, Vietnam,
Russia, or instability on the border with North Korea.
The PLAA, however, will still have critical missions
within a global expeditionary PLA. The PLAA is reorienting itself already from theater operations to transtheater mobility focusing on army aviation troops,
light mechanized units and special operations forces
(SOF), and enhancing building of digitized units,
making its units small, modular, and multi-functional
to enhance capabilities for air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults, and
special operations.
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China’s reluctance to get involved globally on
a large scale may translate to a prioritization of development of China’s special operations capabilities.
China created its elite special forces and Rapid Reaction Units (RRU) in the 1980s. Today, their training extends into more unconventional warfighting missions
such as sabotage, and no-contact long range warfare
(indirect attacks against an enemy from beyond the
line of sight), with the United States and Japan as potential enemies. According to the PLA Army Daily:
Special forces warfare includes detailed battle theories, such as special forces reconnaissance, attacks and
sabotage, and comprehensive battle theories, such as
integrated land-sea-air-space-electronic combat, alldimensional simultaneous attacks, nonlinear combat,
no-contact long-range warfare, asymmetrical combat,
large-scale night combat and ‘surgical’ strikes.46

According to On Military Campaigns, one of several
special operations missions include:
raids to kill or capture enemy command personnel (including military and government leaders), or destroy
small units in the enemy’s rear area or key command
and control, intelligence, or logistics systems.47

China’s Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) currently
consist of army special forces, army aviation units,
the marine corps, and airborne troops. They focus
primarily on border defense, internal armed conflict,
maintaining public order, and conducting disaster
relief missions.48 While all “rapid reaction,” the army
special forces and airborne troops would split off and
develop the core SOF mission, while the marine corps
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and army aviation will progress to address more traditional warfighting tasks. Chinese writings suggest a
traditional understanding of SOF in that they would
be used for special reconnaissance, decapitation,
counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and also have a psychological effect that will impose caution by increasing the risk of war.49 Some specific missions include:
“prisoner snatch operations; raids on enemy missile
sites, CPs, and communications facilities; harassment
and interdiction operations to prevent or delay enemy
movements; strategic reconnaissance; anti-terrorist
operations.”50 The PLA may heavily rely on types of
special operations forces to accomplish their goals
overseas partly because of the small footprint, but
primarily because training and readiness of regular
troops will continue to be a weakness of their military
forces.51
By 2025-30, joint use of special forces with the
PLA’s amphibious and airborne forces, expected improvements in sealift and airlift capabilities, coupled
with the increasing mechanization of airborne and
army and marine amphibious units will increase the
reach and effectiveness of these forces. By the end of
that decade, PLA forces may be capable of capturing
ports and airfields in neighboring states, leading to a
victorious campaign on land.52
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND LOGISTICS
Reforms beyond hardware in terms of organization, training, and readiness must be undertaken as
well for the PLA to expand its operational reach. First,
China will need to improve the movement of military units within China. The PLA still conducts long
distance maneuver training at speeds measured by
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how fast the next available cargo train can transport
its tanks and guns forward.53 To improve its air and
sealift, China will have to mobilize the civilian sector, especially in the area of aviation. Furthermore,
the Chinese Communist Party will have to move to
strengthened interior ground, air, and waterway lines
of communication. The PLA will also have to consider
the logistics needed to deploy globally and sustain
operations abroad. A reorganization of the current
Military Region (MR) system is a necessary step to improve mobility. Since 2010, the PLA has attempted to
improve its trans-MR maneuvers by carrying out a series of campaign level exercises and drills, codenamed
Mission Action.54 China could reduce the number of
MRs from seven to perhaps four and implement a
joint operational command structure.55 Given the new
importance of the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery, another major step toward “jointness” would
be assigning a navy or air force officer as an MR
commander.56
The PLA will have to consider how to fit global
logistics into this MR system; given its diverse set
of tasks and missions, the PLA will need to improve
its logistical system so that it is flexible, distributed,
and nimble.57 Analysis of past operations such as the
PLAN’s deployment to the Gulf of Aden demonstrates
that the issue of preparedness during emergency, the
problem of preserving consumables over long periods of time, and the lack of nearby Chinese facilities/
bases to which it can send vessels for maintenance and
repair continue to plague long-distance PLAN operations.58 Because the PLA’s ability to force open denied
air and sea space far from Chinese territory will likely
still be constrained in 2025-30, it will still be challenging to operate beyond its immediate periphery and
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in hostile environments away from friendly ports.59
Bringing along military supply ships with 3 months’
worth of fuel, food, fresh water, and spare parts, as
China did in the Gulf of Aden, will not be a viable
strategy if China is to conduct larger, more prolonged,
or contested, operations.60 Overseas bases may be the
only way for China to be able to deploy and fight on
the high seas; the lack of such resources is one of the
major differences between major and minor naval
powers.61 China may need them as forward operating
bases and logistics platforms, as well as to conduct
amphibious assaults.62
Some believe that China wants to build a series
of bases in the Indian Ocean to support naval operations along the routes linking China to Persian Gulf
oil sources. There, Beijing can pursue access in countries such as Oman, Pakistan, and Burma that are
politically insulated from Indian and U.S. pressure.
Others believe that the PLAN only wants to have
places in the Indian Ocean where it can restock and
refuel, rather than its own bases.63 The latter is probably the more likely scenario, especially given the lessons learned from the Soviet Union’s overextension,
and the priority of concerns closer to home.64 Leaving
aside China’s ideological aversion to overseas bases,
it is also important to keep in mind that in these areas, facilities are difficult to defend and host nations
may not be sufficiently stable to support operations.65
Given these obstacles, for China to start prepositioning supplies overseas or establishing institutional arrangements to allow operations from other countries,
the driver would have to be more than just the need
to operate escort vessels like in a Gulf of Aden type of
operation.66
The PLA will need to improve training to enhance the ability to conduct multiple joint operations
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simultaneously. China currently conducts exercises
frequently; for example, during the month of January
2014, a three-ship flotilla from the Nanhai Fleet began
combat exercises in the West Pacific Ocean and East
Indian Ocean.67 Additionally, nearly 100,000 Chinese
soldiers and thousands of vehicles from the 16th and
39th Army Groups of the Shenyang MR mobilized for
a winter exercise to prepare for a potential crisis over
the Korean peninsula.68
However, despite the scale and frequency of these
exercises, PLA individual and unit training standards
remain low, and are improving only gradually. Currently, PLAAF pilots typically get less than 10 hours
of flight time a month and only last year began to submit their own flight plans.69 China’s naval infantry and
other amphibious warfare units train by landing on big
sandy beaches, an unrealistic environment to train for
conflict over disputed islands.70 Moreover, in recent
exercises, PLA troops have lacked the emotional fortitude to succeed in high-pressure situations, possibly
one of the reasons for President Xi Jinping’s focus on
enhancing combat readiness among the PLA.71 Therefore, Chinese exercises will need to become larger and
more complicated coupled with training that is more
frequent, intense and realistic for the PLA to become a
global expeditionary force by 2025-30.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This chapter presents how the PLA may evolve
with respect to doctrine, force structure, organization,
and training if it were to transition to a force capable
of conducting global expeditionary operations. However, such new and expansive PLA capabilities will
have significant implications for China’s willingness
to use force as well as regional stability.
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Propensity to Use Force.
The breadth of capabilities the PLA would acquire
to conduct global expeditionary operations could also
augment Beijing’s options in resolving both global
and regional disputes. Augmented sea and airlift, advanced SOF capabilities, a greater number of surface
vessels and aircraft, and most significant, operational
experience for its forces, could encourage China to
expand the scope of its interests and willingness to
use force to protect those interests. China could become more forceful, confident in its ability to achieve
its objectives by support alone with the backing of
its people.
While China may currently have no intention of
becoming a global hegemon, the introduction of new
capabilities in turn could drive changes in Chinese
grand strategy away from limited regional aims. Chinese strategists and netizens have already launched a
debate about whether China should aspire to become
a global military power. Currently, those debates are
couched in discussions about how China should approach its territorial disputes, especially in the East
and South China Seas.72 But influential thinkers such
as Colonel Liu Mingfu, a former professor at the PLA
National Defense University, writes in his book China
Dream that China should aim to surpass the United
States as the world’s top military power.73 In a March
2010 newspaper poll, 80 percent of respondents responded positively to the question, “Do you think
China should strive to be the world’s strongest country militarily?” However, less than half of respondents approved of a policy to publicly announce such
an objective.74
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Stability and Balance of Power.
Even if this future scenario spurs a growth in traditional power projection capabilities or increased use
of force abroad, the implications for the United States
and its regional allies and partners are uncertain. This
could create balancing backlash in Asia and instability
as incentives for preventive war increase with the rapid shifts in the regional balance of power. However,
this future scenario could also create a more assertive
China that is positioned to provide public goods to the
international community and region, further enmeshing Beijing into the current world order, and reducing
the incentives to use force to resolve disputes.
Globally, increased expeditionary capabilities
could increase the potential for Chinese interference
in issues in which the United States may prefer China’s traditional hands-off approach. Chinese interests in the Middle East, Africa, and South America,
as well as Beijing’s preference for stability over other
factors such as human rights, may clash with those of
the United States. With increased capabilities, China
may take actions in countries around the world that
have negative second order effects for U.S. national
interests. Furthermore, because Chinese actions are
not transparent, Washington has limited sense about
what exactly China is doing. This makes it difficult
for the United States to adjust its policies accordingly
to minimize any potential damage to U.S. interests
and maximize its ability to achieve its foreign policy
goals.75
A number of factors could divert the PLA from developing a global expeditionary force. For example, if
China were to engage in a war, even a limited one,
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retrenchment and rebuilding may follow, delaying
the unfolding of this scenario. Furthermore, flareups closer to home or the emergence of significant
threats to its near-seas interests may make it difficult
for Beijing to sustain far seas operations.76 But as long
as China continues to spend a double-digit percentage of GDP on defense spending, and GDP growth
continues, even on a more conservative level, China
should be able to simultaneously develop traditional
warfighting capabilities to address regional challenges and global expeditionary capabilities to confront
threats farther from home. In this way, flare-ups or
resolutions of persistent regional issues may delay or
accelerate this future scenario, but not necessarily prevent it.
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CHAPTER 8
CHINA’S MILITARY FORCE POSTURE UNDER
CONDITIONS OF A WEAKENED
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY:
ALTERNATIVE MILITARY FUTURES, 2020-30
Daniel Gearin
Erin Richter
The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’
alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Department of Defense or any other element of the
U.S. Government.

This chapter examines an alternative future in
which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is weakened. We first describe what a weakened PLA might
look like; then consider circumstances under which
the PLA might become weaker, of which economic
factors are treated as the most critical; examine the
missions of the PLA; and study the force postures of
the PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air
Force (PLAAF), and Second Artillery Force (SAF). The
chapter concludes with a discussion of implications of
a weakened PLA.
WHAT IS A WEAK PLA?
The PLA described here is one that either struggles
with or is incapable of fulfilling its military missions
due to a necessary shift in national economic and security priorities from their current trajectory. One or a
combination of drivers force Beijing to make tradeoffs
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in budgeting and force employment to better address
more pressing concerns which may include domestic
stability and economic development needed to maintain party control. While China will be able to field the
majority of equipment and execute force restructuring planned through 2020, new priorities may require
the PLA to slow development and production of new
combat systems, refocus training, extend maintenance
cycles, and make unplanned force reductions. Over
time these factors will leave the PLA with a reformed
organizational structure and more modern order of
battle, but with declining troop proficiency and combat readiness. The PLA will remain capable of prosecuting limited military operations to defend China’s
sovereignty and territorial claims, but unable to effectively respond to military contingencies outside of
China’s immediate periphery.
PATHS TO A WEAKENED PLA
There are many potential factors that could lead to
a future where China’s military is left weakened. We
chose to focus on economic and domestic factors as the
primary drivers, as we view them to be the most plausible, but provide brief consideration to a few others.
A military conflict, which involved significant losses
for the PLA or caused Beijing to radically change its
perceptions of the international security environment,
could result in a weakened PLA. Although the recent
tensions among China and its maritime neighbors certainly increase the possibility of accident, inadvertent
escalation and the use of force, neither China nor the
other maritime claimants appear likely to purposefully initiate a military conflict in the near term.1 Thus we
assume that any military conflict between now and
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the early-2020s would likely be limited in scope and
unlikely to significantly alter the trajectory of the PLA.
A resolution to one or all of the various territorial disputes would also likely alter Beijing’s security
calculus and impact force allocation decisions. However, recent trends suggest that tensions surrounding
these disputes are exacerbating rather than trending
toward resolution. Furthermore, successful resolution on a bilateral basis (China’s apparent preferred
method) would unlikely change Beijing’s perception
that the United States intends to contain China’s rise,
and China would continue to field a military capable
of projecting power around its periphery.
Alternatively, a more prosperous and confident
China could lead Beijing to shed the deep-seated sense
of historical victimization and national grievance.
Such a change in leadership perception could lead
to a more relaxed and nuanced approach to foreign
relations, thus no longer requiring as much military
might. However, rhetoric of the current administration (which will be in power into the 2020s) inextricably links the vitality of the country with the vitality of
the military, suggesting that as the country continues
to grow, so too will the military along with it.2
Primary Driver.
The most compelling causes for concern for the
future of China’s military are domestic ones, particularly an economic downturn and the social instability that would like result. While the PLA will have
achieved substantial progress in the realm of military
modernization into the beginning of the 21st century,
we argue that long delayed and much required economic reforms initiated in the mid-2010s will bring

237

about an economic slowdown, inhibiting additional
increases in defense expenditures and exacerbating
internal stability problems. In the following decade,
Beijing would likely begin a series of structural adjustments to realign elements of the Chinese armed
forces to better address their most pressing concerns,
emphasizing border defense, police, civil engineering,
and emergency response missions.3
Under these conditions, it is likely that faced with
declining military budgets, the production of new
combat systems will be slowed or halted, maintenance
cycles extended, and maintenance intensive legacy
weapons systems purged. The numbers of live training exercises will be reduced and PLA units will increasingly rely on virtual training systems to maintain
operational proficiency. The PLA will remain capable
of prosecuting limited military operations to defend
China’s sovereignty and territorial claims, but overall
combat readiness will decline. Operational planning
will emphasize domestic stability, border defense,
and anti-access operations and increasingly rely on
its “assassin’s mace” systems to ensure territorial
sovereignty. These changes will impact the various
missions assigned to China’s military.
China’s Military Missions.
China’s official defense white papers state that
China’s military is tasked with safeguarding national
sovereignty, maintaining social stability, accelerating
the modernization of the armed forces, and maintaining world peace and stability. Safeguarding national
sovereignty is in many ways the most challenging requirement for China’s military due to the large number of unresolved sovereignty issues ranging from
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Taiwan, various maritime claims, and the border with
India. China’s various territorial claims span a geographically enormous and diverse area, requiring the
Chinese military to be able to move troops across great
distances and operate in a wide range of conditions.
If the perception of a PLA with declining combat
capability takes hold, regional claimants may attempt
to take advantage of the situation by altering the status quo and bolstering their territorial claims. Conversely, if Beijing perceives that its military capability
to enforce a territorial claim is in decline, China may
attempt a military resolution to a dispute before their
chances of success further deteriorate.
Maintaining social stability includes a variety of
tasks such as ensuring continued support for the ruling government, preventing widespread domestic
unrest,4 counterterrorism, and disaster relief. While
many of these tasks are also managed by paramilitary and civilian organizations (People’s Armed Police [PAP], Ministry of Civil Affairs, etc.) they remain
major missions for the PLA. If, due to economic and
social pressure, widespread domestic unrest threatens
perceptions of regime survival, social stability missions will take priority over all other requirements
and the military will be expected to play a larger role
than it might otherwise have been expected to.
China’s goal of accelerating the modernization of
the armed forces is in part driven by the desire to have
a military commensurate with its overall status in the
world. Faced with the choice between the preceding priorities and continued military modernization,
China is likely to shift resources away from military
modernization in order to address more urgent needs.
The relegation of national defense to the “fourth
modernization” in 1978 provides precedent for such
a decision.
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Lastly, the goal of “maintaining world peace and
stability” can be viewed as China’s desire for its
military to engage with and influence the rest of the
world. Although the PLA remains a largely regional
military, over the years it has increased its visibility on
the global stage through counter piracy missions, support to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations,
navy hospital ship deployments, and various other
activities.5 These activities remain largely symbolic,
and China currently has no significant global military
capability. A PLA faced with declining resource and
expanding domestic requirements would be unlikely
to expand upon these current efforts and may even
curb such activity if it were viewed as too costly.
These four broad categories cover a large number
of various goals and expected tasks for China’s military. They also demonstrate the relative importance of
each category. National sovereignty and social stability are inherently linked to the survival of the regime.
As a result, the military will be unable to shed these
requirements, regardless of its actual capability to
fulfill them. Conversely, military modernization and
engagement with the wider world are natural choices
for a country seeking to become a global power, but
luxuries when faced with political defeat.
The PLA Army.
The PLA Army (PLAA) is tasked to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity
by executing mobile operations and multi-dimensional offense and defense.6 Core missions include executing offensive and defensive operations and support
to military operations other than war (MOOTW).7
Recognizing the diverse and complex security situa-
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tions the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is likely to
face at home and abroad in the coming decades, the
PLAA has focused on restructuring and equipping its
ground forces to provide flexible military responses to
accomplish a wide variety of military tasks.
By 2020, the PLAA will be completing a transition
to an army with advanced weapons systems and a
modular organizational structure capable of task-organizing units to execute mobile warfare, special operations, and amphibious and airmobile operations.8
Increased production of attack and transport helicopters,9 new armored and motorized weapons systems,10
and a decade of training emphasizing combat readiness, strategic maneuver, and civil-military integration will increase the speed with which the PLA can
mobilize and deploy ground units for contingencies.11
Coupled with improved artillery, air defense, and
electronic warfare capabilities supported by a command and control system which enables a common
operating picture and real-time data transmissions
between units, the ability of PLA ground forces to execute rapid precision-strike operations will be greatly
enhanced.12
In spite of advanced systems, the PLAA will continue to face major challenges in the human domain
of warfare. At this time, with its continued reliance on
conscripts and a developmental noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, the PLA will probably continue to
struggle with attracting sufficient numbers of enlisted
personnel capable of operating the numerous high
tech systems the PLA’s “new type combat forces”
rely on.13 Force restructuring in the latter half of the
2010s will likely require several years of training by
commanders and staffs before these modular forces
can be employed effectively in large joint force opera-
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tions due to the diverse missions and tasks to which
they may be assigned.14 In addition, corruption and
nepotism will continue to hinder the professionalization of the PLA since the majority of PLA officers will
continue to serve in one unit for the majority of their
career.15 Promotions will likely continue to be heavily determined by relationships, and officers will have
little opportunity for career broadening, likely reducing the flexibility of PLA force employment.
The conditions under which the PLA becomes
weak may not have a significant impact on PLA
ground force organization and capabilities in the near
term, but long-term changes in mission priorities and
requirements could dramatically alter the shape of the
force by 2030. Even after significant personnel reductions likely to take place in the late-2010s, the ground
forces will continue to represent approximately 70
percent of total PLA strength. In addition to its role
in offensive military operations, the PLA principally
shoulders the task of deterring foreign aggression, ensuring internal stability, and supporting humanitarian
assistance and disaster response operations. In most
scenarios, leadership concerns about public opinion,
nationalism, and domestic satisfaction mean that the
PLA will not be able to cut ground force personnel
drastically in order to shore up funding shortfalls or
focus all available funds on a warfighting mission,
should one arise.16
Major changes in the international security environment could relieve the PLA of some missions and
thereby cost savings. For example, in the event of a
rapprochement with Taiwan, the PLA would be relieved of the requirement to execute large scale amphibious landing operations, though maintaining a
small number of amphibious capable forces on the
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eastern seaboard might remain a priority if Japanese
relations sour further or Beijing perceives an increasing threat of war on the Korean Peninsula.17 In the unlikely event of a reunification on the Korean peninsula
with a friendly government in Seoul, Beijing may be
comfortable with moderate ground force reductions
in northern China, particularly of armored units.
More likely is that the deterioration of the domestic
security environment will compel Beijing to reapportion forces to better respond to internal security and
natural disaster contingencies. The trifecta of a lasting economic, environmental, and health crisis compounded by systemic corruption and persecution of
ethnic minorities have the potential to push China’s
population into widespread unrest. In China’s growing urban centers, these effects would be particularly
pronounced and threatening to party elites. Under
such conditions, the PLA could become decisively
engaged in supporting PAP riot control, conducting
counterterrorism, and providing humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, it is likely that a portion of PLA
ground force units would be transferred to the PAP to
enhance security in eastern China.
Increased threats to China’s border security such
as an influx of North Korean refugees or successful
infiltration of foreign-trained Uyghur terrorists could
draw operational forces away from training for offensive missions in order to reinforce border defense forces. Major domestic security concerns could also prevent the PLA reorganization from seven MRs to three
or four joint theaters.18 While an outwardly focused
PLA would benefit from the consolidation of military
capabilities under a joint command headquarters to
execute regional operations, an inwardly focused PLA
would require more responsive localized military and
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internal security responses for which the seven MR
system was essentially designed.
If the PLA’s main operational forces are committed to internal contingencies, it is possible that PLA
leaders will be less likely to execute large scale military operations which require significant commitment on the part of ground forces, like compelling
Taiwan reunification through invasion. In such cases,
the PLA would likely rely on precision strike assets
and naval platforms to coerce its adversaries. Under
these circumstances, it is possible that PLA ground
force will deemphasize training for many offensive
tasks and that readiness of armor, artillery, electronic
warfare, and point air defense systems will deteriorate as maintenance cycles are extended to preserve
operating budgets.
The PLA Navy.
The PLAN is tasked with safeguarding China’s
maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of
its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and
interests.19 The PLAN has focused on extending its
area of operation over the previous decades, moving
from a primarily “brown-water navy” to an increasingly “blue-water navy.” Owing in part to China’s expansive maritime claims, the PLAN greatly expanded
its presence within the “first-island chain” during the
21st century, and began participating in a growing
number of global deployments under the auspices of
counterpiracy, UN peacekeeping, and good will visits. As the service with the most interaction with foreign militaries, the PLAN also serves as the “face of
China’s military.”
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By 2020, the PLAN will have a largely modern
force more numerous than at any time since the earlyto-mid-1990s with significantly enhanced weapons
systems.20 The PLAN will field next generation surface
combatants, submarines, and naval aircraft with longrange anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and sensors
to enable the PLAN to achieve sea dominance across
the “first island chain.” A small number of amphibious ships, one to two aircraft carriers, and carrierbased fighter aircraft will enhance PLAN capabilities
to assert and defend China’s territorial claims, and
combined with a modest replenishment capability, to
conduct a greater diversity of out-of-area missions.
The PLAN will also achieve a near continuous at-sea
nuclear deterrent capability through the deployment
of five JIN Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) armed
with JL-2 nuclear capable intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).21 Future
modernization programs will continue to focus on
weapons systems and C4ISR to enhance the PLAN’s
capabilities to safeguard China’s maritime security
and conduct international cooperation farther afield.
Considering China’s role as both a continental
and maritime power and its heavy dependence on
the sea to fuel economic growth and domestic consumption, there are few conditions under which the
Beijing would consciously choose to sequester PLAN
equipment development and operational modernization. Major changes in the regional security environment resulting in significantly closer ties with China’s
maritime neighbors, while highly unlikely, could lead
to reductions in the PLAN’s budget and reduce the
priority of future weapons development programs.
It is also possible that political infighting, a major naval defeat by a regional neighbor, or PRC leadership
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perceptions of overly aggressive and uncontrolled
PLAN operations could result in a decision to curtail
PLAN future capabilities, particularly the continued
development of aircraft carriers and SSBNs. However, the most likely circumstances under which the
PLAN would become significantly weaker are major
domestic instability requiring a dramatic shift in military resources or a financial crisis which necessitates
significant and long-term military budget reductions.
Under conditions of severe domestic upheaval,
PLAN operations are likely to be curtailed for the duration, though it is likely that PLAN vessels will continue to be deployed to defend against intervention
or opportunistic behavior by regional actors. Barring
a major political shift upon the conclusion of the crisis, PLAN regional operations would likely continue
though future naval modernization could be curtailed
depending on the long-term economic effects of such a
crisis. Long-term disruptions to PLAN budgets could
severely hinder programs to develop capabilities to
equal or defeat other regional naval actors.
Considering the high cost associated with a number
of platforms of limited value for the PLAN’s traditional security missions of near-seas defense, the PLAN
may slow or delay the construction of new high-end
platforms for blue water power projection, most notably the construction of additional aircraft carriers
and associated air wings and future variants of ballistic and attack submarines and destroyers. Additional
cost savings may be achieved through reductions in
operating expenditures and cuts to maintenance and
fleet modernization programs.
Under these conditions, outdated platforms could
be cut from the force to reduce costs including outdated frigates, patrol craft, and submarines. The PLAN’s
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overall operational tempo could decrease with less
out-of-area naval operations and large scale exercises.
Maintenance cycles will likely be extended and system upgrades delayed. If operating or maintenance
costs are severely cut, the PLAN may have to reduce
the number and frequency of patrols to its more distant territorial claims like the Spratly Islands which
will likely be routine by 2020.
Long-term reductions in training may have a detrimental effect on the proficiency of PLAN officers and
crews as the training and evaluation cycle it depends
on to modernize and refine operational capabilities
will slow. This is likely to frustrate PLAN goals of improving the integration of naval air, surface, and subsurface capabilities through combined operations and
the fusion of information systems as well as overall
PLA efforts to fully integrate these systems in support
of joint operations. It is possible; however, that funding for improved maritime surveillance and targeting systems and the production of more precise long
range precision strike weapons may be sheltered from
budget cuts in order to maintain credible regional
deterrence in light of a weakened fleet.22
With a weaker navy, Beijing may become less confident in its ability to forcefully coerce its maritime
neighbors into recognizing the primacy of its territorial claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea.
It is possible in such a case that Beijing would alter its
approach toward regional claimants to appear more
conciliatory, cooperative, or legalistic. At the same
time, Chinese reaction to security threats to overseas
interests will be to employ a combination of diplomacy and economic coercion rather than to commit military forces. In addition, China’s leadership may be unwilling to provide significant support to international

247

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions
that further strain military budgets and domestic perceptions of military priorities.
The PLA Air Force.
The PLAAF is China’s mainstay for air operations,
responsible for territorial security and maintaining
a stable air defense posture nationwide. In line with
strategic requirements for conducting offensive and
defensive operations, PLAAF modernization has focused on strengthening the development of the combat force structure that focuses on reconnaissance and
early warning, air and missile defense, and strategic
projection.23 In addition, the PLAAF has prioritized
development of weapons and information systems
to effectively conduct long range precision strike operations.24 Basic PLAAF wartime missions are to destroy enemy air and air defense forces; weaken enemy
ground forces; strike key communication, transportation, political, military, and economic targets; defend
against enemy air raids; and to safeguard important
targets.25
By the early-2020s, the PLAAF will likely have
fielded 4th generation,26 multirole fighters and fighterbombers, and barring a major disruption in China’s
military aircraft production industry, will be in the
late stages of operationalizing 5th generation fighters.27 They will have achieved nascent but credible
strategic force projection capabilities in the forms of
Y-20 large transport aircraft,28 aerial refuelers29 and
refuelable combat aircraft, and an upgraded bomber
fleet capable of carrying new longer range missiles.30
China’s integrated air defense systems will remain
formidable and will likely be fortified through the
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acquisition of the Russian S-400 surface to air missiles31 and improvements to reconnaissance, data relay, navigation, and communication systems, both air
and spaced based. Improvements in electronic warfare, low observable materials, and unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) technologies will further enhance both
PLAAF offensive and defensive capabilities.32
In order to streamline air operations from training
to mission execution, by 2020 the PLAAF will complete its force realignment to modular brigade and
base structures enabling greater integration of air force
capabilities and interoperability in joint formations.33
As the PLAAF transitions to more capable aircraft,
this brigade structure will likely allow a PLAAF-wide
reduction in the total number of flying squadrons and
a more optimal balance of support personnel to aircraft. Reforms to the PLAAFs training, education, and
NCO programs will have achieved some success in
improving the quality of pilots and technical personnel, though there will continue to be a high ratio of
officers to NCOs in technical specialties as the recruitment and development of NCOs will remain a work
in progress.34
If the PLA experiences major budget reductions
PLAAF leaders may need to make hard decisions of
how to best balance military capabilities and equipment development. If the cuts occur after 2020, it is
possible that PLAAF restructuring programs already
carried out could enable moderate savings in operating and training costs and significant personnel savings without major disruption to core warfighting
capabilities. Under such conditions, the PLAAF may
choose to accelerate the retirement of older aircraft
and equipment to include its J-7 and J-8 fighters, cutting the number of aircraft in the PLAAF by nearly
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half with corresponding cuts to associated personnel
and infrastructure.35 Reductions to air defense and
surface-to-air missile units are less likely as they will
be required to extend coverage to compensate for the
loss of combat aircraft. The PLA could also choose to
decrease pay and benefits for its officers and NCOs,
however, this would likely exacerbate the problems
it is already having in recruiting and retaining high
quality technical personnel and risks deteriorating
operational readiness over the long term.
A sudden reduction in the number of older aircraft maintained by the force may allow the PLAAF
to preserve modernization programs and continue
personnel training and retention initiatives, however,
it would likely require significant adjustments to PLA
planning for major contingencies. It is likely that as the
PLA increases the precision of its weapons systems,
any military operation against Taiwan will require
less combat aircraft for air interdiction and strike missions. Such a dramatic reduction in force will limit
PLAAF capabilities to support multiple air campaigns
which may be required in high-end contingencies.36
The PLAAF’s ability to support counterintervention,
anti-air raid, and border-defense operations effectively could be seriously degraded.37
Factional disputes, political infighting, or corruption could also disrupt PLAAF modernization, particularly under conditions of retrenchment. Those acquisition programs championed by the best connected
and therefore best resourced officials may receive
preference over others regardless of their strategic
value. Competition between PLAAF and PLAN officials over missions and budget allocations could also
affect production and fielding priorities, particularly
for surface strike systems. If PLAAF acquisition and
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development slow significantly, the cost per platform
would likely increase, negating the value of these
measures while degrading air capabilities over the
long term in relation to regional competitors. These
variables could be mitigated through foreign sales,
however, if the economic issues disrupting PLA modernization are related to a global or regional economic
crisis, this may not be an option.
It is possible that under these conditions, the
PLAAF may argue for more aggressive policies toward regional competitors in order to showcase newly developed offensive air capabilities and attract patronage of PRC political elites. This could increase the
risk of conflict within the region as PLAAF commanders may request and authorize less restrictive rules of
engagement as they become anxious to demonstrate
the value of their service to China’s overall national
defense. Such activities could include more aggressive ISR collection and air intercepts, harassment, and
active jamming.
Another possible future, particularly under fiscal
constraints, is to shift equipment development programs toward more efficient systems with greater
average value. The PLAAF may increase the development of unmanned aerial systems and deemphasize platforms which require trained pilots and flight
crews. Without the limitations of human pilots, the
PLAAF would be able to develop a wider variety of
high altitude, long duration, and hypersonic systems
which could provide strategic strike capabilities, potentially at a reduced overall cost.38 In addition, significant saving could be achieved in personnel costs,
since such platforms would likely require less manpower for operations and maintenance.
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The long-term transition of the PLAAF toward
predominantly unmanned offensive strike platforms
would necessitate additional structural and personnel
reforms as the training and management requirements
differ from the current force. Such a force would also
demand major enhancements to PLA C4ISR and data
fusion systems as well as signals encryption in order
to control multiple platforms effectively in combat
with confidence, manage airspace in both peacetime
training and during wartime operations, and integrate
joint fires at the campaign and strategic levels.
Major changes in international security environments could also greatly impact PLAAF modernization priorities and related resources. One unlikely
scenario would be a relatively benign security environment in which the air force concentrates on air
defense and ISR missions to maintain security along
China’s periphery and reduces overall investments
in precision strike to a minimum credible deterrence
capability.39 Another scenario is that the Taiwan issue
becomes resolved, which would allow the PLAAF to
cut the number of fighters in its inventory, particularly
dedicated to short range air-to-air missions. While an
uncertain regional security environment would still
require significant air force capability, contingency
planning and platform development could concentrate more on counterintervention capabilities.
Another scenario would involve a major deterioration in China’s relationship with Russia before China’s defense industries are able to complete transition
to domestic production of critical airframes, engines,
and components. This scenario would be characterized by a major disruption in trade between the two
countries rather than heightened military tensions.
Loss of Russian support for the maintenance of air
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and air defense systems and Russian manufactured
engines could degrade PLAAF readiness, particularly
if it occurs in the near term or China fails its longterm efforts to develop jet engines independently for
military applications.40
The Second Artillery Force.
The SAF is responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, carrying out nuclear counterattack if deterrence fails, and
has the mission to conduct precision strikes with conventional missiles.41 The SAF is the primary operator
of China’s nuclear arsenal, with the PLAN having a
relatively smaller, but growing role in nuclear deterrence. The SAF’s primary conventional mission likely
involves gaining air and information superiority over
Taiwan, either as a coercive tool to deter Taiwan independence or as part of a larger military operation
against the island. The SAF also serves as the key
operator of asymmetric conventional systems meant
to deter the United States from intervening in any
conflict involving the PLA.
Under conditions of PLA retrenchment, the SAF is
the least likely to be affected by force reductions as the
utility of the missile force will experience a relative
increase due to the deterioration of the wider military.
By 2020, the mission and doctrine of the SAF nuclear
force will largely resemble what it is today, absent significant changes in the global nuclear force posture.
The SAF nuclear force will remain small in number
relative to the United States and Russia, however,
the gap will have narrowed with the fielding of additional systems, while the United States and Russia
attempt further reductions. It is unlikely China would
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revise its “No First Use” (NFU) policy in these circumstances, as NFU is politically advantageous, and
China’s nuclear force posture makes the feasibility
of a disarming first strike difficult to impossible. Significant advancements in U.S. ballistic missile defense
systems, or precision long range conventional strike
systems are possible factors that would alter the SAF
nuclear force posture. Either scenario would likely
lead to increases of the SAF nuclear force numbers
and survivability, as well as domestic BMD and new
conventional missile technologies.
The SAF conventional force will remain the primary coercive tool to deter Taiwan independence and
third party intervention into a conflict with Taiwan.
With the deteriorating ability of the PLAA to conduct
a large scale amphibious invasion, the SAF importance
in contingency plans against Taiwan will increase and
the likelihood of employing the conventional force in
demonstrative launches similar to those seen in the
mid-1990s will increase. Lastly, declining budgets will
mean that the SAF is unable to field conventional systems capable of striking out to the second island chain
and a full suite of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs).
Expected modernizations to the nuclear force will
be delayed in recognition of the high cost of these
systems and the unlikelihood of a nuclear conflict.
China will likely complete enhancements to its silobased intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force,
as these systems offer the best rapid response times
for China’s nuclear force. The SAF will likely deploy
additional road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 2 nuclear ICBMs,
the most modern road-mobile and survivable nuclear
ICBM. But the expected follow-on road-mobile ICBM
system, capable of carrying multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicles, will likely be postponed
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in recognition of the cost and difficulty of continued
research and development of this system. Absent significant changes in the nuclear forces of the rest of the
world, combined with the continued low probability
of a nuclear conflict, Beijing will likely delay additional investments into their global nuclear strike capability.42 For the regional nuclear force, the SAF will likely
opt to retain legacy CSS-5 Mod 2 nuclear MRBMs as
their primary regional deterrent and slow the operational testing and deployment of more accurate and
survivable follow-on system.
In 2020, the SAF conventional short range ballistic
missiles will be more accurate, survivable, and multirole than the earlier generation systems, providing
China with the capability to cripple key targets across
the strait in the early stages of a conflict. The medium
range conventional land-attack and anti-ship ballistic
missile systems, the CSS-5 Mod 4 and CSS-5 Mod 5,
respectively, will remain China’s primary systems for
targeting regional military targets and carrier battle
groups. Under conditions of PLA-wide retrenchment,
the SAF will likely retain a larger inventory of missiles
in order to mitigate the loss of regional strike capabilities cause by PLAAF downsizing. This will likely
require a significant reduction in the number of live
fire training exercises in order to avoid added production costs.43
Longer range conventional systems with the capability to strike as far as the second island chain will
be fielded in limited numbers, but the prospects for a
large ramp-up in the number of these systems is less
likely given the associated costs. Thus, the SAF will
have a limited capability to strike U.S. military bases as far as Guam, but will lack the ability to sustain
strikes for a prolonged period of time.44
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The SAF’s experience with road-mobile missiles
and strategic systems make it the most likely operator of China’s road-mobile ASAT systems. However,
like the longer range conventional systems, the ASAT
will only be fielded in limited numbers due to cost
considerations. The system will serve as a conventional deterrent, providing the threat of escalating a
conventional conflict to the space realm and deterring
destruction of China’s growing satellite constellation.
IMPLICATIONS
In this scenario, while China will be able to field
the majority of equipment and execute force restructuring planned through 2020, new priorities may require the PLA to slow the development and production of new combat systems, refocus training, extend
maintenance cycles, and make unplanned force reductions. Over time, these factors will leave the PLA with
a reformed organizational structure and more modern
order of battle, but with declining troop proficiency
and combat readiness. The PLA will remain capable
of prosecuting limited military operations to defend
China’s sovereignty and territorial claims, but unable
to effectively respond to military contingencies outside of China’s immediate periphery.
Barring reunification, Taiwan will remain the primary strategic direction for Beijing.45 Concerned that
the readiness and proficiency of China’s military has
declined to a state where it would be incapable of
conducting a large scale military campaign that spans
the strait, Beijing will rely on coercive plans of action
which seek to deter Taiwan from declaring independence. Although Beijing recognizes that its military
capability to compel the reunification of Taiwan will
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be in decline, the risks associated with a large scale
conflict, with the possibility of third party intervention, outweigh the calculation that China should
utilize their military might before it faces further
deterioration.
The perceived significance of sovereignty disputes
in the maritime realm will not change in the eyes of
Beijing, but their ability to enforce their claims will diminish. The PLAN patrols will be sporadic and more
reactive in nature.46 With the declining ability of the
PLA to patrol these areas routinely, the various maritime claimants in the region will be left emboldened
and encouraged to take advantage of the situation,
making the prospects for conflict more likely.
The weaknesses of the PLA will be most apparent
in areas beyond China’s periphery, and particularly
beyond the second island chain. Despite having air
and naval systems that are capable of conducting military operations far from shore, the PLA will remain
chained to China’s periphery for the host of reasons
described above. The United States will remain the
preeminent military power in Asia, but China will retain a substantial ability to challenge the United States
militarily if a conflict were to break out. Furthermore,
China will grow increasingly sensitive to U.S. presence
within the second island chain in light of its declining military prestige and the belief that Washington is
encouraging various countries in the region provoke
Beijing over maritime claims.
Faced with a future in which they will be unable to
achieve the strategic goals of “being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century,”
Beijing will likely conclude that the “strategic period
of opportunity” has closed.47 How China will respond
to this perception is unclear, however, if past is prece-
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dent, Beijing’s self-perception as a victim of the machinations of Western powers will prevail. Having failed
to close the gap with the United States, Beijing will
continue to press Washington to accommodate its rise
and put the impetus for stable relations on the United
States. Beijing’s suspicions of U.S. intentions to “contain” China would likely persist, with accusations that
Washington was responsible for and benefitted from
the end of the “period of opportunity.”
Such a situation bodes ill for any effort to “manage” China’s rise and encourages it to become a more
responsible stakeholder in the region. With its ambitions slighted and position vis-à-vis the United States
in a worse state than Beijing had desired, China would
be less likely to take on greater responsibility in the
region arguing that its domestic problems take precedent. While this is not an argument that a stronger
China would result in a more responsible stakeholder
and positive influence in the region, it does suggest
that a China in decline would be no more willing to
accommodate on the issues that are currently of greatest sensitivity (maritime claims, Taiwan arms sales,
sensitive reconnaissance operations, etc.).
With respect to Chinese military aggression in general, under conditions of a weakened PLA two possibilities exist. China may accept the new status quo in
the short term in order to maintain or regain party control and domestic stability and will have no appetite
for external conflict. Under such conditions, Beijing
would likely respond to security threats to overseas
interests by employing a combination of diplomacy
and economic coercion rather than to commit military
forces. Direct threats to China’s sovereignty and territorial claims, however, may draw more aggressive
demonstrations of controlled military deterrence and
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counterintervention up to and including offensive cyber and counterspace operations.
Alternatively, a strong sense of grievance and offended nationalism may drive China to become more
hostile toward the outside world. Perceiving threats
on all fronts and blaming foreign powers for its internal chaos, Beijing may be more willing to respond
to perceived threats with military force in an effort
to shore up its perception as a global power at home
and abroad. Under such circumstances, Beijing may
further expand territorial claims and execute limited
offensive operations against regional actors with a
limited ability to contain escalation.
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CHAPTER 9
REGIONAL DYNAMICS IN RESPONSE TO
ALTERNATIVE PLA DEVELOPMENT VECTORS
Michael McDevitt
INTRODUCTION—CHINA’S STRATEGIC
APPROACH TO ITS NEIGHBORHOOD
In October 2013, a high-level policy symposium
was held in Beijing on the topic of China’s peripheral
region. For the first time, all the political bureau standing committee members attended along with the leadership of China’s foreign policy establishment. President Xi Jinping chaired the meeting, and in a speech
sketched out a peripheral strategy that combined
elements of the past 2 decades approach, focused on
economic integration, along with some new ideas. He
made the point that the strategic objective remains
the same—a stable and peaceful periphery to pursue
economic development and his “China Dream.” He
did make one important caveat directly relevant to
the question this chapter is addressing. He said China
must also maintain its national sovereignty, security,
and economic development interests. In other words,
maintaining a stable and peaceful periphery should
not come at the expense of China’s broader interests.1
This suggests that China has concluded that it has
no need to compromise on fundamental (core) interests with its neighbors because its comprehensive
national power is adequate to maintain “peace and
stability” on the periphery, despite the existence of
maritime sovereignty disputes. It implies that Beijing
can and will exercise a combination of hard and soft

269

power with its neighbors, depending upon what interests are involved. In cases of sovereignty disputes with
its neighbors, China will seek peaceful outcomes, but
will not compromise on its claims, and, as necessary,
be willing to use some aspect of coercion (diplomatic,
economic, constabulary, or military) to strengthen its
claims while weakening the ability of its neighbors to
mount an effective defense.2
FRAMING THE ANALYTIC APPROACH
With this appreciation of China’s likely approach
to its neighborhood as context, when forecasting east
and south Asian regional responses in 2025 to different People’s Liberation Army (PLA) development
objectives, it is important to bound the analyses. This
chapter will not address the countries that share a border with China: Russia, Mongolia, the Central Asian
states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Afghanistan. Nor will it address Bhutan and Nepal. It
will not consider China’s two closest friendly bordering states, North Korea and Pakistan; although, in the
case of North Korea, the behavior of Kim Jong-un in
the December 2013-January 2014 time frame implied
a less than collegial relationship between Pyongyang
and Beijing.3 It is altogether imaginable that by 2025,
the “Young General” may have been consigned to
the dustbin of history and a regime more inclined to
follow Beijing’s advice takes its place; or North and
South Korea are engaged in some sort of reunification
dialogue.
Of China’s remaining bordering neighbors: India,
Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, this exploration will
look more closely at Vietnam and India. While Thailand does not directly border China, it is close enough
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to the Chinese frontier to be extremely attentive to its
relationship with Beijing. All five countries face the
difficult strategic reality that because the PLA can
either walk or drive to their frontier no matter what
vector the PLA takes in the future, these nations face
a threat of invasion that cannot be ignored. India and
Vietnam have experienced this since 1950. It seems
probable that in 2025 Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and
Vietnam will continue to be very careful about taking
any action that would so provoke Beijing that China’s
leaders would feel compelled to “teach them a lesson.”
In the case of India, a nuclear weapons state that
has been reasonably clear that a portion of its nuclear
capabilities target Chinese cities, New Delhi should
have less reason to be concerned about a Chinese invasion, and hence less anxiety about PLA developments.
In fact, however, the development of a global expeditionary PLA is likely to cause considerable anxiety
in New Delhi, a response that will be addressed in
more detail.
For China’s neighbors fortunate enough to be
separated from China by some expanse of ocean, specifically South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Australia,
the primary threat from the PLA, no matter what form
its developmental vector takes, is its naval (including
amphibious assault capabilities), air, and conventional missile capabilities. These Chinese capabilities
currently far outmatch the defenses of all of the aforementioned states except Japan, and that gap is closing.
It goes without saying that China’s nuclear weapon
capabilities threaten all, and provide China with clearcut escalation dominance against any nation that does
not have a formal alliance with the United States that
includes an extended deterrence guarantee, or like
India, has its own ability to retaliate in kind.
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Finally, when forecasting the responses of China’s
neighbors to all circa 2025 PLA developmental vectors,
some assumptions have to be made about how the
ongoing sovereignty disputes between China and its
neighbors have played out between today and 2025. If
there were violent confrontations between China and
one or more of its peripheral states, the neighborhood
response to a circa 2025 PLA would almost certainly
be very different from a situation where force has not
been used. As a working assumption, this chapter
posits that the sovereignty and maritime demarcation disputes that have heretofore defied resolution
will remain unresolved by 2025. Unresolved does
not necessarily mean that today’s tensions will persist a decade hence, co-development schemes and a
live and let live approach could make these disputes
less dangerous. In any event, for the purposes of this
chapter, the analysis assumes that none of the tension
producing maritime claims will have been settled by
the overt use of force, mainly because China is likely
to have systematically altered the status quo through
nonviolent measures.
THE NEAR NEIGHBORHOOD RESPONSE
OF CHINA’S GROWING POWER—
NORTHEAST ASIA
South Korea.
In 2025, it seems probable that the Republic of
Korea (ROK) military will still be postured against
a North Korean invasion, but the ROK navy and air
force will also have to consider its powerful neighbors, China and Japan.4 The U.S.-ROK alliance will remain in place, and operational command transfer will
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have been put on hold permanently as long as Seoul
and Washington judge that the North Korean threat
remains credible.5
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to speculate
about the state of North-South relations, except to note
that U.S.-led efforts to halt and then roll back North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program will not have succeeded by 2025. As a result, the South Korean and,
for that matter, Japanese defense budgets, continue
to invest heavily in missile defense. South Korea will
have joined U.S.-led efforts to integrate U.S.-JapaneseROK missiles defenses, much to China’s displeasure
because this missile defense organization could also
mitigate the effectiveness of China’s nuclear posture
against Japan and the United States. But because this
is driven by North Korea, Beijing’s displeasure has
been quietly ignored by Seoul.
In general, Seoul and Beijing have remained on
good terms, and the only major security issues South
Korea has with China are, first, its continued support
of North Korea, which keeps the Kim, or a successor regime, afloat which prevents progress toward
reunification.
South Korea does have one other issue with China and that revolves around disputes in the Yellow
(West) Sea because the overlapping South Korean and
Chinese economic exclusion zones (EEZ) have not
been reconciled. Both China and South Korea claim
the submerged Iedo/Suyan/Socotra Rock, which
is located closer to South Korea in its EEZ, but it is
also within China’s claimed EEZ. South Korea has
raised China’s ire by building a maritime research
laboratory on the reef.6 In addition, Chinese fishermen
continue to venture into South Korean waters. South
Korea continues to ask China to respect the median
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line between the two countries in the Yellow Sea and
restrict fishing to the Chinese side of the median until a permanent settlement of overlapping EEZs can
be reached. Throughout the decade low-level skirmishing between South Korean coast guardsman and
Chinese fishermen has continued. These differences
with China, however, pale in comparison to the historic animosity between Korea and Japan which has
grown over the years as South Korea has emerged as a
vibrant well-to-do democracy.
Finally, Seoul’s ambitions to be perceived as a
global player7 have created the political space for more
naval shipbuilding. By 2025, the ROK Navy will be
a medium sized highly effective hybrid navy; hybrid
in the sense that it combines coast defense missions,
especially a renewed focus on shallow water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) against North Korea, with very
credible blue-water capabilities such as around 10 AEGIS equipped destroyers and 18 frigates. By 2025, the
submarine force will have over 40 years’ experience
and employ around 18 modern conventionally powered submarines. In private conversations with senior
ROK navy officers, they make clear that they see the
development of a credible navy as a hedge against
Japan.8
Whether the poisonous atmosphere between Japan
and Korea will persist through the decade leading to
2025 is hard to predict, but South Korea’s historic antipathy toward Japan is currently getting worse, not
better; while thanks to its growing economy, burgeoning South Korean self-confidence feeds an urge
to settle scores.
Finally, the ROK has a powerful incentive to develop blue water naval capabilities regardless of what
trajectory the PLA takes. It is very dependent upon
international trade, which creates an imperative to
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protect its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) with
significant naval capabilities. The best example of
Seoul’s concerns with sea lanes is its active participation in international maritime peacekeeping such as
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden where they
are current working with China, Japan and India in
organizing convoys through higher threat areas. Like
the Chinese, the anti-piracy mission has provided the
ROK navy with the first out-of-area mission in its history. The ROK navy has learned how to sustain warships halfway around the world while conducting
sustained operations with other major navies.9
Japan.
Japan is the country in East Asia most affected by
China’s military modernization, no matter what vector the PLA takes. Today’s PLA is daunting enough
for Japan, the PLA Second Artillery Force can reach
out and touch Japan with both conventionally armed
ballistic missiles, long-range land attack cruise missiles, and of course, with nuclear armed ballistic missiles. China’s large submarine fleet poses a really severe threat to Japan’s sea lanes. This is not an abstract
problem for Tokyo, they lived it during 1944-45.10 The
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is introducing modern jet aircraft at a rate which that will, on paper, shift the air
balance of power to China. Finally, and most strategically important to Japan, is the fact that China area denial and anti-access (what the PLA refers to as counterintervention) capability is becoming more credible
by the day; which means that the United States may
not be able to fulfill its alliance defense responsibilities
because the PLA could keep American reinforcements
from arriving from the west coast of the United States
in time to be effective.11
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Clearly, a PLA that in 2025 has continued to improve its regional capabilities means that its “counterintervention” capabilities have been strengthened
to the point that Tokyo would have serious doubts
regarding the operational credibility of Washington’s
extended conventional deterrent. From Tokyo’s perspective, the ongoing capabilities completion between
Washington and Beijing that pits anti-access versus
assured access is one that Japan and the United States
have to win. For Japan, Washington’s ability to solve
this problem, with support from Japan because of revised roles and missions, will be an important factor
in Japanese calculations regarding building its own
second strike nuclear weapons force.
Japan has the third largest economy in the world,
so it has the financial resources necessary to afford
all the capabilities it needs to be able to defend all of
Japan’s home islands, including the entire Ryukyu
chain. By 2025, Japan will have completed its current
shift of strategic focus to the southwest. That will include fielding a regimental sized amphibiously qualified army force specially trained to either defend, or
retake any small islands that border the East China
Sea. By 2025, the Air Self-Defense Force should have
replaced its F-4 Phantom fleet and some of the older F15s with modern next generation fighters (F-35A and
F-15Js) The Japan Air Self-Defense Force will also have
to expand its training syllabus, and weapons delivering capabilities in order to support operations by the
new Japanese marine force. These plans will continue,
no matter what vector the PLA takes. Japan is likely
to continue to improve its already world-class ASW
capabilities in response to the number of modern submarines the PLA Navy (PLAN) order of battle is likely
to have by 2025.12
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Japan cannot neglect the problems posed by North
Korea and, as already mentioned, it will continue to
develop its ballistic missile defense capabilities. Having a redundant capability versus North Korean missiles is an important strategic issue for Tokyo. It seems
likely that over the next decade, Japan will also develop or buy land attack cruise missiles it can fit on its
submarine force. This will provide a limited capability
to deal with North Korean missiles before they can be
launched.
In short, Japan has strategic issues with the PLA
modernization no matter what vector the PLA takes.
Clearly, the vector characterized as a “weakened PLA”
would probably not be seen by Tokyo as a weakened
PLA, rather it would be seen in mere slowing of PLA
modernization, which obviously could lessen the urgency to improve the self-defense force. But since a
“weakened PLA” is not losing capability, it has just
stopped adding it as fast, it seems more likely that Japan will continued to be concerned about living in the
shadow of a militarily imposing China.
A Japan-Inspired Multilateral Response?
An expeditionary PLA implies that China would
be able to interdict Japan’s sea lanes anywhere in the
world, not just in the waters around Japan. Tokyo is
hedging against an expeditionary PLA by working
diligently to improve its military relations with India
and Australia. Since all three of these countries would
have strategic equities at risk by an expeditionary
PLA, it seems plausible that military relations and cooperation between India, Australia, and Japan in 2025
will have developed beyond today’s nascent stage. If
the PLA continues on the expeditionary vector, some
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sort of Indo-Pacific multilateral response fostered by
Japan and Australia is likely to emerge.13
Taiwan.
Currently, Taiwan is in a terrible position when it
comes to the military “imbalance” across the Strait.
The PRC has the ability to bombard the island with
hundreds of missiles, followed by fixed-wing aircraft
attacks, and create all sort of mayhem for Taiwan’s
economy through cyber attacks and expropriation of
Taiwanese assets on the mainland. As in the case of
Japan, the trajectory of PLA modernization is essentially immaterial to Taipei. The PLA already has what
it needs to “punish” Taiwan; and Taipei can do nothing to reverse this situation. Again, as in the case of
Japan, the ability of the United States to deal successfully with China’s “counterintervention” capabilities
has major implications for Taiwan’s security. Where
Taiwan still has military leverage lies in the fact that
so long as the will to resist exists in Taipei, the PLA
faces the daunting task of successfully crossing the
100 miles of ocean between the mainland and Taiwan,
landing on a defended beachhead, and successfully
effecting regime change by invasion.
Taiwan is currently in the midst of a very expensive shift to an all-volunteer force that hopefully will
yield a smaller but more effective army that would be
able to prevent the PLA from gaining a foothold on
the island. An agile army armed with Apache gunships, combined with shore based anti-ship cruise
missiles, and fast-attack craft would form a credible
anti-invasion capability. Even though the prospect of a
Chinese invasion attempt is extremely remote, having
this mix of capabilities does introduce an element of
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deterrence by denial into PLA calculations. Of course,
Taiwan totally depends on arms purchases from the
United States for those items it cannot produce itself.
Over the course of the next decade, both Washington and Taipei will face difficult decisions regarding
the modernization of Taiwan’s air force. Meanwhile,
Taipei is poised to begin the development of its own
conventionally powered submarine force. This will be
difficult and expensive, but if current plans actually
pan out, by 2025, the ROC navy would have a valuable new capability in its anti-invasion arsenal.14
THE FAR NEIGHBORHOOD RESPONSE
TO CHINA’S GROWING POWER
—SOUTHEAST ASIA
PLA modernization over the next decade is likely
to provoke the same reactions that have characterized Southeast Asia’s response to China’s growing
power over the past 10 years. They will continue to
have a close relationship with America, but they will
be careful to try and avoid to be perceived by Beijing
as becoming part of an anti-Chinese coalition. The objective is to hedge or balance their relations between
Beijing and Washington. China is the largest trading
partner of each of its near neighbors, and none of them
wants to upset the economic relationship with China.
Yet, they look to Washington for moral and security
oriented support where they have disagreements
with China. In this regard, the reaction of Southeast
Asian nations to the disputes in the South China Sea is
instructive.15
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations
and Multilateralism.
China’s neighbors to the Southeast can be broadly divided into three camps: those on the front lines
of the sovereignty issue, especially Vietnam and the
Philippines; those with significant interests in the outcome of the territorial disagreement (specifically, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei); and those
inclined to accommodate China, including Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. This division was on
full display during the November 2012 East Asia Summit, which President Barack Obama attended. The
end result of the summit was a split between six countries (the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Vietnam, and Brunei) that favored broader discussion
of the SCS, and four (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and
Thailand) that did not. Countries without sovereignty
disputes with China do not wish to anger China.16
The result is that it is unlikely that the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) inspired multilateral institutions with a security focus, such as the East
Asia Summit (EAS) or the ASEAN Defense Minister
Meeting (ADMM+), are likely to be unable to reach
a consensus that could be construed as being antiChinese. Unless China is particularly maladroit in its
regional diplomacy this is likely to be the case in 2025.
Many Southeast Asian countries are counting
(hoping) the U.S. rebalance strategy will act as a brake
on Chinese assertiveness.17 As a result, when forecasting 2025, the past is likely to be a prologue. Each
ASEAN member will continue to carefully hedge its
relationships between Beijing and Washington. Examples of this behavior abound, in April 2012, for
instance, U.S. ally Thailand elevated its bilateral rela-
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tionship with China to “strategic partnership,” and in
July 2012, it dispatched a senior military delegation to
visit China as a minister of defense counterpart. More
recently, Thailand opted to include the PLA as a participant in the 2014 Cobra Gold exercise. Vietnam, as a
frontline state in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes,
has been careful to avoid making its relationship with
China any worse, and has seemingly “walled off” its
SCS disputes from broader Sino-Vietnam relations.
That policy may be revised in the wake of the nasty
May 2014 dispute with China over oil exploration in
Vietnam’s EEZ.
Malaysia and Indonesia have also been careful to
balance their engagements with Washington and Beijing. Malaysia held its first bilateral “defense and security consultation” with China in September 2012 and
agreed to strengthen military exchanges and cooperation, while, in April 2014, agreed to a “comprehensive
partnership” with Washington.18 Jakarta, for its part,
values its “comprehensive partnership” with Washington, but also emphasizes developing good defense
relations with China. In August 2012, an agreement
was reached with China that permitted Indonesia to
produce China’s C-705 anti-ship cruise missile under
license.19 Indonesia has also embarked on a gradual
military modernization based on co-production understandings so that over time it will create an indigenous defense industrial base.20 This includes a submarine procurement from South Korea, which would
be a very relevant capability if the issue of China’s
SCS nine-dashed line overlapping with Indonesia’s
Natuna gas field becomes militarized.21
Singapore plays an important role in enabling
Washington’s rebalance strategy, by agreeing to permit four U.S. Navy warships to be stationed rotation-
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ally in Singapore. This gives the United States easy
naval access to the SCS, and suggests a more or less
permanent U.S. naval presence in the SCS. That said,
Singapore is very careful to remain neutral between
China and the United States; it rationalizes its 2-decades-old security relationship with the United States
as a hedge against Indonesia and Malaysia.22 At the
same time, Singapore is improving its ability to look
after its maritime interests. The Republic of Singapore
navy is already the best equipped navy in Southeast
Asia. It is an example of a how a small navy can transcend its physical limitations and make an important
contribution to regional and international security.23
The fact that Singapore’s modernization is not directly driven by China is an important point. Simply
put, Southeast Asia military modernization is not all
about China. Regional rivalries are alive and well.
Submarine procurement is a good example: Singapore,
Malaysia, and Indonesia are embarked on submarine
programs that are as much about keeping-up with one
another as patrolling their respective EEZs. Nonetheless, submarines like most modern weapons systems
are inherently multimission; provided these countries
are able to properly maintain them and operate them
professionally they also provide an important capability for Malaysia and Indonesia to use in defending
SCS claims against Chinese assertiveness. It is worth
keeping in mind that by 2025, the SCS, a relatively
confined body of water, will be the area where an impressive number of submarines from the littoral states
plus China and the United States will operate. Developing some sort of water space management scheme
could become a significant ASEAN issue.
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The Philippines.
The Philippines is a front-line state in the confrontation with China over SCS sovereignty disputes. Not
surprisingly, the government of the Philippines has
warmly embraced Washington’s rebalance strategy; it
has had to. The April 2012 standoff with China over
Scarborough Shoal highlighted the fact that it is virtually defenseless at sea or in the air. Because of their
security incapacity, the Philippines will hardly notice
the difference between a regional PLA, an expeditionary PLA, or a PLA whose modernization momentum
has slowed. No matter what the vector the PLA takes,
the Philippines will remain woefully overmatched.
Moreover, Manila cannot afford a major increase in
defense expenditures. As a result, Manila has sought
to ensure its security through developing a close security relationship with the United States, and in April
2014, signed an agreement that will allow U.S. military
access to five former U.S. bases in the Philippines for
the next 10 years.24 This was the culmination of over
2 years of increased periodic presence of U.S. naval
ships, submarines, and aircraft. Particularly important
to both parties will be access to the former Cubi Point
Naval Air Station in Subic Bay, which will facilitate
aerial reconnaissance over the SCS.25
However, the U.S.-Philippine security relationship
is susceptible to the ebb and flow of Philippine public
opinion regarding the “return” of a U.S. military presence versus how assertive Beijing is in its dealings with
Manila. Beijing is not happy with Manila’s decision to
challenge its claims in the SCS at the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea. Whether that unhappiness
will persist over next decade, is difficult to predict. It
is not difficult to anticipate, however, that as long as
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Manila encourages or facilitates an improvement in
U.S. military posture along the SCS littoral, that the
Sino-Philippine relationship will be difficult.
It is reasonable to expect that, over the next 10
years, the Philippines’ maritime and aviation capability will show incremental improvements; but not to
the extent that Manila could ensure the security of its
maritime claims on its own.
Vietnam.
Vietnam’s defense budget has grown by over 80
percent over the first decade of the 21st century. Much
of this growth was due to purchases that contribute to
its ability to defend its EEZ and disputed claims in the
SCS: specifically naval ships and submarines, coastal
defense cruise missiles, and surveillance. At the urging of the leadership, the Vietnam People’s Army
(VPA) has embraced the idea of defense dialogues,
strategic partnership agreements, and practical bilateral military cooperation, and has placed a priority on
cultivating defense links with neighbors and developing Vietnam’s role in multilateral organizations as a
critical component of national defense.26
Vietnam has not issued a maritime strategy, but
Hanoi did publish a defense white paper in 2009,
in which the navy’s responsibility was described as
strictly managing and controlling “the waters and
islands in the East Sea under Vietnam’s sovereignty”
to include maintaining maritime security, sovereignty and sovereign rights, jurisdiction, and national
interests at sea.27
Vietnam’s most newsworthy purchase related to
SCS defense has been the six Kilo-class submarines ordered from Russia in 2009, the first of which arrived in
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January 2014. Professor Carlyle Thayer, a specialist on
the Vietnamese military at Australia’s Defense Force
Academy, reported in 2009 that Vietnam was seeking a credible deterrent against China, hoping to defend its own claims to the SCS. “It’s a very bold step,”
Thayer was quoted as saying. He continued:
It has been apparent for some time now that Vietnam’s
sovereignty is under threat in the South China Sea, and
that is something that is painfully felt in Hanoi. Hanoi
knows it could never hope to match the Chinese Navy,
but it can at least make them think very hard before
any attempt to, for example, drive Vietnam off some
of their Spratly Islands holdings. Even a few Kilos
makes that a very complicated business, indeed, you
suddenly have to factor in losing ships.28

The May 2014 deployment of a mobile drilling
platform by China’s National Off-shore Oil Company
to an area within Vietnam’s EEZ and on its continental
shelf has infuriated Hanoi, and is likely to reinforce
the need to be able to defend its off-shore resources.29
Vietnam has not just acquired submarines. It also has
ordered four Russian-built Gepard-class corvettes.
Vietnam is also producing under license at least 10
550-ton fast-attack craft that are fitted with anti-ship
cruise missiles. These will be combined with the socalled Bastion Coastal Defense System, also from Russia, which consists of truck-mounted anti-ship cruise
missiles, along with its 20-odd Su-27/30 aircraft that
are capable of maritime strike; and four very modern
Dutch corvettes of the SIGMA class. Altogether, Vietnam is putting into place a formidable off-shore naval
force.30
All these off-the-shelf purchases must still be knitted together into an integrated force, with effective
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surveillance and command and control, but Hanoi’s
intent is clear. There is little question that Chinese
naval capability is the focus of these procurements.
Vietnam wants to make certain that it can defend its
maritime claims, and that it will avoid a replay of
the 1988 South Johnson Reef clash with the PLAN, in
which two Vietnamese landing craft were sunk, a third
was badly damaged, and more than 70 Vietnamese
were killed.
As in the case of Japan, Vietnam is intent on improving its capabilities no matter what vector the PLA
takes over the next decade. Vietnam has centuries of
experience in dealing with China, including repeated
invasions, but dealing with China in the maritime domain is a novel experience for Hanoi. By 2025, most
of the ongoing procurements should be in place. This
should provide Hanoi with a very reasonable maritime access denial capability. Again, as in the case
of other neighbors of China, Vietnam is likely to do
what it can to modernize its military no matter what
developmental vector the PLA takes. The confrontation that started in May 2014 over drilling for oil in
Vietnam’s EEZ, and subsequent outburst of public anger at China, has undoubtedly reinforced the need for
Vietnam to be able to defend its interests in the South
China Sea.
INDIAN OCEAN STATES RESPONSES
—AUSTRALIA AND INDIA
Australia.
In 2009 Australia issued a defense white paper that
announced plans to add significant capabilities to the
Australian Defense Force. It rationalized this across
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the board modernization plan by offering a somewhat
pessimistic picture of Australia’s future strategic environment and the potential negative consequences
of China’s military modernization. It was straightforward:
China will also be the strongest Asian military power,
by a considerable margin. Its military modernisation
will be increasingly characterised by the development
of power projection capabilities. A major power of
China’s stature can be expected to develop a globally
significant military capability befitting its size. But the
pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause
for concern if not carefully explained, and if China
does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans. . . . If it does not, there is
likely to be a question in the minds of regional states
about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernisation
appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what
would be required for a conflict over Taiwan.31

Today, Australia’s problem is how to align a very
ambitious force structure plans with shrinking, or at
least stagnating, defense budgets. The 2013 white paper changed the strategic narrative by sounding more
optimistic about China’s rise. It did not, however,
change the planned force structure. Instead, it deeply cut the defense budget. The reason for this about
face, according to a senior analyst at the Australian
Strategy Policy Institute is:
It is not that Australia has suddenly felt more secure.
If anything, events in the region have elevated fears
that the rise of China will upset the strategic stability upon which Australia’s prosperity is built. Nor is
there any sense that Australia can relax because the
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United States has reasserted its commitment to the
Asia-Pacific. Rather the recent retrenchment in Australian defense spending is largely the result of domestic
politics. The Australian polity has an acute aversion to
deficits and debt.32

Upon taking office in October 2013, Prime Minister
Tony Abbott vowed to restore defense spending to
2 percent of gross domestic product from its current
1.59 percent over the course of the decade, conditioned
by the caveat that the increase would be subject to
economic conditions.33
Meanwhile, all of Australia’s services are pressing on, within budgetary limits, with modernization
plans. The Australian army is restructuring the regular army into three multirole combat brigades, one of
which is currently designated to be the backbone of a
new amphibious capability. The new capability will
be centered on two large, Spanish designed 27,000-ton
landing helicopter docks, the Canberra class. These
two ships are under construction, and will be the largest ships ever in Australia’s inventory.
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) also aims
to procure a range of highly sophisticated new aircraft. The original plan to acquire 100 F-35A’s from the
United States will be cut to 72. The former Gillard government also decided to purchase 12 F-18 Growlers,
the electronic attack version of the F-18 along with 24
F-18E/F, these are going forward. If these decisions all
reach fruition, by 2025 the RAAF would emerge with a
second-to-none air combat capability in its immediate
neighborhood, and certainly be able to overmatch any
PLAN aircraft carrier based expeditionary air power.
The RAAF also intends to introduce a new maritime
patrol aircraft, the P-8A Poseidon, as well as the new
C-27J strategic airlift.
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Its submarine force is a key to Australia’s strategy
for defending its maritime approaches. The current
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Collins class submarines
have been an operational disappointment; plagued
with reliability problems. There has been considerable
debate whether to give up on the Collins class and
start a new submarine program, or to make a serious
attempt to fix what ails the class and put off starting
the new class of 12 submarines to several years in the
future. It seems probable that the budgetary situation
will dictate that the start of a new submarine program
will be delayed. At the same time the RAN also plans
to replace its aging ANZAC-class frigates. Moreover,
the government has raised the possibility of building a
fourth air warfare destroyer as a means to save the domestic shipbuilding industry from losing ship building expertise because of insufficient orders.
Working on assumption that the Abbot government’s next Defense Capability Plan will generally
sustain Australia’s current modernization direction,
by 2025, Australia will remain technologically far superior to any Southeast Asian country, and buttressed
by its alliance with the United States, will be confident
about its security situation vis-à-vis a Chinese expeditionary capability.
India.34
India faces a two-front strategic problem with China. It has a disputed frontier that has already been the
cause of a ground war and continues to be the trigger
for ground and air force posture improvements for
India’s armed forces. Recent Chinese “provocations”
have highlighted the fact that China can mobilize
a very large force in Tibet. As a counter, New Delhi
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decided to establish an 80,000-man mountain strike
corps in Panagarah, West Bengal, with supporting
air power. The stated objective of this force is to deter a serious PLA incursion.35 Should deterrence fail,
and India and China come to blows on the Northeast
frontier, Indian defense officials believe India’s geographic location, astride the Indian Ocean sea lanes
that China relies upon, is an asymmetric advantage.36
It provides a way to inflict pain on China that it cannot easily counter. The Indian belief is that its submarine force, land-based air power and surface navy
has the ability to create a serious sea lane problem for
China.37
But Indian strategists worry that this advantage
may be short-lived. The main problem is that Indian’s
sclerotic procurement process will ensure that India
will be out-built, and as a result, perhaps as soon as
2025, the PLAN will be able to turn the tables on India. The PLAN will have the capability to interdict the
sea lanes which bring oil and other resources from
the Persian Gulf and East and West Africa that India
needs for its economic development. As the PLAN
just demonstrated in late-2013, one of its nuclear attack submarine (SSN) could operate with virtual impunity against India in the Arabian Sea.38
The Indian naval view is that, piracy or no piracy in
the Gulf of Aden, China is in the Indian Ocean region
(IOR) to stay.39 Piracy provided a chance for China to
build its navy and its profile. But, from India’s perspective, there is a clear logic governing China’s interest in the IOR and, without piracy, the Chinese will
find some other reason to justify their presence there.
In short, India is very conscious of the implicit
threat posed by across the board Chinese military
modernization. They are also very aware of the short-
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comings associated with their own procurement processes.40 Should the PLA embark on the expeditionary
vector and begin to operate routinely more substantial
forces in the Indian Ocean region, India may be forced
to come to terms with its internal defense procurement problems. It will also have to decide how far it
wants to move internationally in aligning itself with
western democratic sea powers like the United States,
Australia, and Japan. Moving further away from its
cherished nonaligned (strategic autonomy) heritage
would be politically difficult, and is likely to be decided upon only if New Delhi is persuaded its position in
the Indian Ocean region is in jeopardy.
What about an Indo-Pacific Multilateral Response
to a PLA Expeditionary Capability?
Over the last decade, a number of initiatives have
been explored by official government suggestions, as
well as research centers in the United States, Japan,
Australia, and India suggesting some sort of maritime coalition. For example, the Japanese suggested in
2004 a maritime coalition of democracies in Asia. At
the tactical level, this has been manifested by inviting
one another to participate in well-established multilateral maritime exercises. The governments in all four
countries have taken only hesitant steps in the direction of formalizing such an arrangement because they
did not want Beijing to conclude that some sort of an
anti-China alliance was forming. However, over the
next decade, these nascent steps could become more
formal if China pursues an expeditionary emphasis in
PLA modernization while continuing its disturbingly
assertive approach to dispute settlement with neighbors whose sovereignty claims conflict with China’s
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view of its territory.41 As its power continues to grow,
will China take a similar approach to other neighborhood disputes, ignoring established rules and established dispute mechanisms, while attempting to rewrite or ignore rules that do not favor its interests?
The combination of these factors could easily trigger a
multilateral hedge against China.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
China is not starting with a blank slate when it
comes to PLA military capabilities. Beijing already
possesses very capable systems that can “reach out
and touch” all of its neighbors. This has already triggered reactions by most of its neighbors to improve
their security by modernizing their militaries, moving
closer to the United States, or both. As a result, a series
of security related decisions from regional countries
are already in progress that will be relatively unaffected by whatever modernization vector the PLA
pursues.
Anxiety regarding China’s military modernization
is directly related to how China behaves diplomatically, economically, and politically toward its neighbors. Despite the cautions of strategists and military
planners to focus on PLA capabilities and not on Beijing’s political intentions, which can change in an instant. The reality is that good relations tend to greatly
reduce anxiety about military modernization. How
China interacts with its neighbors will have major
implications on how nervous they become if the PLA
proceeds along one of the postulated vectors focused
on enhancement.
Obviously, the vector that has the PLA slowing
the pace of modernization, if combined with art-
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ful Chinese “smile diplomacy,” will have the greatest influence on lessening the urgency its neighbors
demonstrate in addressing their own modernization
programs. But, since many of these programs are well
underway today, it seems unlikely that the political
establishments in the capitals of China’s neighbors
would simply halt those plans in the face of a more
regionally benign China.
For Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the
efficacy of their defense treaties with Washington
will continue to be questioned in the face of an everimproving PLA, particularly one that is focused on
regional security. South Korea does not share Japan’s
or the Philippines’ sense of insecurity when it comes
to China. Many South Korean security analysts think
that a united Korea could comfortably co-exist with a
powerful Chinese neighbor. The major problem Seoul
has with Beijing is China’s support for North Korea.
EEZ demarcation and fishing disputes are issues that
can be managed by both capitals.
Japan, on the other hand, has few choices other
than the United States to ensure its security. However,
it is important to keep in mind that very bad relations
have not been the post-World War II norm for SinoJapanese relations and by 2025, they could be better.
But Japan’s growing sense of insecurity in the face of
PLA capabilities that has the potential to ruin Japan’s
economy has finally persuaded Tokyo that China is a
long-term threat. If Tokyo’s decisionmakers come to
believe that the U.S. alliance does not have the capability or political will to underwrite Japan’s security, it
seems likely it will develop its own nuclear deterrent
in the face of a PLA that continues to grow and overmatch Japan’s conventional forces.
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Further afield, an expeditionary PLA will cause
Australia and India to look very closely after their
own defenses, and spur multilateral approaches as a
hedge against Chinese power. In Australia’s case, security based on confidence in U.S. alliance rests on a
much firmer foundation than the U.S.-Japan alliance
because of the realities of geography.42 Australia is
far enough away from the locus of Chinese power
to make PLA area denial a not particularly credible
threat. India faces the threat from both a regional PLA
on its northern frontier as well as an expeditionary
PLA in the Indian Ocean. This may convince Indian
strategic planners it is surrounded, confronted with a
two-front, or if Pakistan is involved, a three-front security challenge.
Finally, I believe that the PLA will continue to improve its regional capabilities as well as improve its
expeditionary forces; they are not mutually exclusive
and that, at least in the Indo-Pacific region, we will
see a PLA well-poised to defend China and its territorial claims; as well as one, that, for the first time since
Ming Dynasty’s Admiral Zheng He, be able to project
power in pursuit of limited aims anywhere along the
Indo-Pacific littoral.
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To analyze China’s potential role in the 2025 international system under the three alternative futures
considered in this volume, it is first necessary to describe the key elements of the current international
system and assumptions about what that system will
look like in 2025. China will influence the evolution of
the future international system, but Beijing is unlikely
to have either the power or the ambition to overturn
the current international system and replace it with
one that fully matches its interests. China is best understood as a “moderately revisionist” power that
will seek reforms that increase its influence within
the international system and adjustments of some international rules and norms to better match Chinese
preferences.
This chapter begins with a brief description of the
current international system to provide a baseline assessment for analysis. The second section describes
China’s relationship with the current international
system and examines Chinese debates about where,
whether, and how China should push for change in
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international rules and norms. The third section considers potential changes in Chinese international behavior under three alternative futures: 1) a People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) focused on regional issues;
2) a global expeditionary PLA; and 3) a weakened
PLA. The conclusion seeks to identify common behavioral elements across the alternative futures and the
most important drivers of Chinese behavior toward
the international system and regions outside Asia. It
also notes the interconnected nature of Chinese bilateral, regional, and global policy and the challenges in
assessing any single area in isolation.
THE CURRENT AND FUTURE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Today’s International System.
The current international system includes a number of formal governance structures, most of which are
parts of the United Nations (UN) system established
after World War II. The UN General Assembly and
subsidiary UN bodies are important in terms of global
political governance, and the UN Security Council is
the closest thing to an authoritative global security institution, albeit one where permanent Security Council
members have veto power. In economic governance,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank play important roles in maintaining financial
stability and fostering economic development, while
the World Trade Organization (WTO) defines, and
seeks to enforce, global trade rules. Multilateral organizations such as the Group of Seven (G-7), the Group
of Twenty (G-20), and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), although not
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formally part of the UN system, have become important vehicles for coordinating policy among major
global economies. UN institutions are supplemented
by international treaties and international law which
prescribe rules of conduct in various functional areas
and sometimes establish institutions to encourage cooperation and compliance.
In addition to global institutions and treaties,
groups of states in different regions have established a
variety of regional institutions. Examples include the
European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the
Organization of American States, and a range of AsiaPacific institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), and others. Regional institutions vary widely
in the extent to which their member states accept formal commitments and rules, with the EU perhaps
the strongest example of an institution where member states have given up significant sovereignty to a
supranational organization. In most cases, regional
organizations have a relatively limited ability to bind
their member states.
While most global organizations and many regional ones establish formal rules and norms of behavior,
the anarchical nature of the international system can
make enforcement problematic, especially when powerful states are involved. Global and regional institutions structure interactions between sovereign states
and provide incentives that shape state behavior, but
their ability to constrain powerful states is finite. As a
result, patterns of international behavior reflect both
formal rules and norms and the calculations of individual states about when to adhere to norms and
when to violate them.1 Powerful states like the United
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States, Russia, China, and major European countries
are often reluctant to accept hard limits on their ability
to wield power, preferring looser rules and norms that
give them greater ability to use their superior power
to shape or dictate outcomes. Powerful states can also
often choose which of several overlapping global and
regional organizations (or potential new ones) will
best serve their interests in particular cases.
One important constraining factor is that powerful
states would be much worse off in a world of pure
anarchy, where states are so concerned about relative power and security that they are unwilling to engage in much mutually beneficial cooperation (such
as trade). Even powerful states are therefore usually
careful to preserve existing institutions even if those
institutions do not perfectly serve their interests.2
States are also sometimes willing to accept and adhere
to rules that limit their individual power (what John
Ikenberry calls “binding”) in order to produce cooperative outcomes that advance their broader interests.3
The institutions, rules, and norms of today’s international system were heavily shaped by the United
States, the most powerful country by far after the end
of World War II.4 Since its establishment, the postWorld War II international system has been affected
by several important developments. One was the
post-war economic reconstruction of Japan, Germany,
and Western Europe, which strengthened the West
in Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. A
second was decolonialization in the 1950s and 1960s,
which dismantled European colonial empires and
greatly increased the number of sovereign states in
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. A third development was the collapse of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, which ended Cold War
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economic and political divisions and gradually integrated Eastern Europe and former Soviet states into
a global economy. A fourth significant development
is the EU institutionalization and geographical expansion into an organization that can give European
countries a greater collective voice on some issues.
The net result has been a reduction in the U.S.
preponderance that existed after World War II, a
dramatic improvement in global living standards as
countries took advantage of development opportunities in a globalized economy, and a redistribution of
global power as rapid and differential growth rates altered the relative power of major states. Germany and
Japan were the principal beneficiaries in the 1960s and
1970s, followed by other East Asian countries in the
1980s and China from the 1990s to the present. Major
developing countries such as India, Brazil, and Indonesia have become regional powers with aspirations
to global power status. It is important to note that the
growth of all of today’s major powers has required
greater integration into the global economy to acquire
needed capital, technology, and resources and to take
advantage of international markets and the benefits of
participation in production networks. Today’s major
powers can use economic power as leverage to achieve
political or security ends, but would make themselves
worse off if such efforts destroy or severely damage
the foundations of the global economy.
Within the current system, the United States is still
the most powerful actor, but has become less willing
to bear the burdens and costs associated with global
leadership. These costs not only include the U.S. role
in maintaining global security, but also U.S. willingness to serve as the “lender of last resort” and to provide market access to keep the global economy func-
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tioning.5 U.S. allies in Europe and Asia helped support
the dominant U.S. economic and security role via joint
action and participation in institutions such the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the OECD, and
the G-7. However, the post-Cold War international
system also includes powerful countries such as Russia and China that do not share U.S. values or support a permanent U.S. leadership role. Rapid growth
in large developing countries such as Brazil and India
coupled with Japan’s economic stagnation and the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on the United
States and Europe has reduced the relative power of
those states supporting U.S. international leadership.
The result is a significant reduction in U.S. global authority and ability to dictate outcomes. This reduction
is symbolized by the shift from the G-7 to the G-20 as a
more inclusive (and hence more legitimate) venue for
global economic decisionmaking.6
In analyzing the three alternative futures, this
chapter draws upon the assumptions about the international system and global technology in 2025
presented in Chapter 2.
CHINA’S CALCULUS OF CHANGE
Over the last 20 years, China has benefitted more
than any other country from access to the global economic and governance institutions created and sustained by the United States. These institutions (and
a receptive U.S. attitude toward Chinese economic
development) have permitted unprecedented rapid
growth which has raised living standards, helped sustain the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic
power, and transformed China’s position within the
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regional and global power structure. Although Chinese leaders may have initially hoped to use the international system solely as a means to increase China’s
national power and automony, China has become increasingly dependent on the functions performed by
international institutions in order to sustain economic
growth.7 U.S. policymakers have called upon China
to become a stronger supporter of the current international system, most notably in Deputy Secretary
of State Robert Zoellick’s 2005 call for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international
system.8
Chinese leaders disclaim any intent to challenge
the U.S. leadership role in the international system or
any aspirations to replace the United States in that role.
Yet, given China’s vulnerability to U.S. power, they
are reluctant to endorse any steps that will strengthen
the foundations of U.S. hegemony or endorse a special leadership role for Washington. Chinese dependence on the United States for critical functions such
as protection of China’s sea lines of communication
constitutes a significant strategic vulnerability. Most
Chinese analysts (and policymakers) believe that the
United States is committed to maintaining its dominant position and therefore will inevitably seek to
constrain China’s rise.9
Chinese officials and analysts believe that China
benefits from a global trend toward multipolarity (defined as power distributed more evenly among the
major states and increased willingness of major states
to act independently of the United States).10 Multipolarity gives China more diplomatic freedom to maneuver and makes it less vulnerable to hostile action
by the United States, which is still the most powerful
actor in the international system and the most able to
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facilitate or obstruct Chinese goals. Chinese scholars
often note that the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
was not a full participant in the construction of the
post-World War II international order and that current international rules are not necessarily optimal for
Chinese interests.11
Chinese official policy statements seek to reassure
the United States that China has neither the capability nor the intent to challenge U.S. dominance. Several
studies argue that there is little evidence that China
seeks fundamental changes in the current international system, and that the current system serves China’s
most important interests.12 Academic studies of Chinese compliance with existing international rules and
norms generally find a record of increasing compliance, albeit with exceptions in some areas.13 Chinese
officials and scholars argue that China only seeks reforms in global governance that will make the current
system fairer.14 At the same time, China regularly calls
for creation of a more just international economic order (which implies significant changes to current rules
and norms and a reduction in U.S. global influence).
The People’s Bank of China has publicly supported a
reduction in the U.S. dollar’s role as the global reserve
currency, which would weaken the foundations of
U.S. financial power.15
Chinese scholars and officials have articulated a
range of areas where China seeks modifications in international rules and norms. One study identifies three
areas where there is widespread Chinese support for
change: 1) ensuring that China and other developing
countries have more influence in global institutions;
2) increasing the degree to which the United States is
constrained by global rules and norms; and 3) reducing the role of U.S. alliances and military deployments
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that might constrain China.16 Chinese complaints are
usually couched in terms of the need for fairness for
developing countries and increased “democracy” in
international relations, but the underlying demand is
for a Chinese seat at the table and a greater role for
Beijing in shaping international rules and norms.
China benefits from its privileged position as a
veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council and has resisted efforts to allow countries such as Japan and India similar status. Given
Beijing’s structural power as a permanent member
of the UN Security Council, it is not surprising that
China emphasizes the centrality of the UN in global
security governance. In practice, China regularly uses
its veto power to encourage resolution of conflicts via
dialogue, to limit the role of sanctions, and to restrict
the ability of the United States and other major powers to use force. Chinese leaders regularly emphasize
the importance of respecting national sovereignty and
opposing interference in internal affairs and seek to
delegitimize military interventions not authorized by
the UN.17 Under the rubric of “respecting choices of
development paths,” China seeks to reduce the role
of democracy as a precondition for participation in
global and regional institutions such as the OECD and
the International Energy Agency.18
China historically has been suspicious of multilateral institutions due to the potential for others to
gang up against a weaker China. Chinese leaders
have gradually recognized multilateral organizations as important venues for world politics and have
learned to effectively synchronize their bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy.19 China generally prefers institutions where it enjoys formal (via veto power) or
informal (via consensus decisionmaking) blocking
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power, which gives Beijing a degree of control over
both agenda and outcomes. In regional diplomacy,
China appears to have a preference for institutions
such as ASEAN+3 where the United States is not represented, and China has greater influence. However,
multilateral organizations which exclude the United
States are not a viable option for most global issues.
China has supported the establishment of some alternative global institutions, such as the BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) group. However, the conflicting interests of the members, and the
fact that they all have equally important relationships
with the United States, has limited the influence of
such alternative institutions.
China and other powers not fully satisfied with the
current international system have a range of potential
responses. These include:
1. Accept existing rules even if not optimal.
2. Selective noncompliance.
3. Adjust existing rules to better reflect their
interests or carve out exemptions.
4. Create alternative institutions with different
rules (SCO, BRIC cooperation, regional trade blocs,
regional organizations, etc.).
5. Challenge current leader of the international system in order to replace current institutions and rules
with new ones.
The first three responses involve working within
the current international system, often while seeking
to mitigate its negative aspects (via noncompliance or
exemptions) or pressing for reforms to disadvantageous rules. The fourth response involves setting up
a “parallel universe” of alternative institutions with
more favorable rules, norms, and membership. Such
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parallel institutions would compete with and (if successful) potentially replace existing institutions. Only
the fifth option entails a direct and explicit challenge
to U.S. leadership of the current international system,
a challenge sometimes referred to as a “power transition” and often accompanied by a war between the
established hegemon and the rising challenger.20 Chinese leaders have explicitly disclaimed any intention
to challenge U.S. leadership even as China becomes
more powerful; such assurances are a critical part of
the proposal to build a “new type of major country
relationship” between a dominant United States and
a rising China.
China has employed the first four responses to
different degrees in different issue areas (e.g., global
security governance; international trade; international
finance; regional security). These four options potentially can be combined or employed to different degrees in different areas. Efforts to change international
institutions or rules in one area need not be part of a
comprehensive challenge to the dominant power; significant changes are possible without hegemonic war.
Some rules have explicit mechanisms that respond to
changes in relative power (for example, World Bank
and IMF voting shares are a function of the percentage
of capital that a country contributes). Others respond
to changes in relative power in a de facto manner (for
example, increasing Chinese influence within the UN
Security Council and General Assembly).
China is not the only country interested in changing international rules. This can either encourage or
discourage Chinese attempts at change. If China can
build a coalition of powerful, like-minded countries to
change international rules, then the costs of pushing
for change are shared and therefore reduced.21 Some
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argue that the BRICS countries22 or other groups of developing countries could form such a coalition.23 On
the other hand, change produced through a coalition
effort implies goals acceptable to all members; in such
circumstances China may not be able to dictate new
rules that best match its interests. Moreover, many
countries benefit significantly from the current international system and may not support Chinese efforts
at reform that might disrupt the functioning of current
international institutions.24
China is best understood as a “moderately revisionist” power that seeks to reform the international
system and adjust international rules and norms to
better suit Chinese interests. Chinese support for the
current international system is contingent on the costs
and benefits of seeking adjustments in global rules and
on China’s willingness to bear the burdens of a larger
leadership role. A stronger China may be inclined to
seek more significant revisions of global rules and
norms, either on its own or in conjunction with others. However, many Chinese scholars who argue for
modest revisions to the current international order
cite China’s reluctance to take on more international
responsibilities, concerns about provoking a confrontation with the United States, and China’s lack of sufficient power to remake international rules to better
accord with its interests.25
Although Chinese leaders will almost certainly
continue to try to avoid a direct challenge or a military
confrontation with the United States, the more China’s
relative power approaches U.S. power, the more likely Beijing is to push for adjustments in international
rules and norms. Beijing’s reluctance to take on what
Robert Sutter calls “costs, risks, and commitments”
will be a constraint on Chinese ambitions to push
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for more radical change.26 Although current Chinese
leaders proclaim a willingness to make more global
contributions, in practice China has been reluctant to
take on binding commitments. Moreover, in times of
crisis Chinese leaders often fend off international demands for action by describing their most important
responsibility as managing the Chinese economy and
the welfare of 1.3 billion Chinese citizens.27
Another factor in the Chinese calculus is the degree of confidence Beijing has that China can achieve
its national goals within the structure of current international institutions and rules. If China is prospering, more confident and secure Chinese leaders may
feel less need to push for changes. On the other hand,
a China that is faltering economically and facing internal turmoil will have a greater stake in defending sovereignty and pushing for international rules
(on issues such as Internet security and control of
information) that enhance the leadership’s ability to
maintain control.
China’s historical experience with imperialism has
led it to adopt foreign policy principles that emphasize respect for sovereignty and noninterference in the
internal affairs of other countries. Yet, the exigencies
of pursuing access to natural resources and protecting
concrete Chinese interests overseas have led to deeper
Chinese involvement in domestic politics in Burma,
South Sudan, and elsewhere.28 Some Chinese analysts
are critical of the ways in which China’s policy of noninterference has hindered diplomatic effectiveness in
advancing Chinese economic and strategic interests.29
As Chinese dependence on imports of energy and raw
materials increases and the Chinese overseas “footprint” in terms of investments, construction projects,
and Chinese nationals working abroad expands, there
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will be domestic pressure for China to take a more active and assertive international role.30 China is likely
to maintain its formal policy of respect for sovereignty
and noninterference, but these policies may be interpreted more loosely if significant Chinese economic
and strategic interests are threatened by instability or
by political forces hostile to Chinese interests coming
to power in important countries.
THREE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
Alternative Future 1: A PLA Focused on
Regional Issues.
In this future, the PLA’s primary mission remains to
prepare for conflict on China’s periphery, particularly
its maritime frontier along the southeast coast and,
in particular, to fight a high-intensity war against
U.S. military forces intervening on behalf of Taiwan,
Japan, Vietnam, or whoever else China is fighting.
The Taiwan issue has not been resolved to China’s
satisfaction, or some other issue has loomed as large
as Taiwan was before. The Chinese government has
its internal issues well enough in hand to continue
prioritizing and funding military modernization. The
PLA is not confident that its modernization through
2020 was sufficient to meet the U.S. threat, and outof-region missions continue to take a back seat as
the PLA responds to the previously-unexpected increase in U.S. military capabilities. Regional conflict
remains the central focus of PLA military modernization through 2030, and its ability to project power to
other regions of the world increases only as an adjunct
to developing combat capabilities out to the second
island chain.30a

This future implies a China that is doing reasonably well economically, that is strategically focused
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on maritime territorial and political disputes in Asia
(including Taiwan’s unresolved status), and that has a
much more competitive relationship with the United
States and with U.S. regional allies. Competition will
be most intense within the Asia-Pacific region, which is
where China’s most important interests are located.31
Intensified regional competition with Washington
will also color China’s broader approach to the international system and its ties with other powers outside
Asia. A key question for this chapter is the extent to
which U.S.-China competition can be contained within Asia, or whether it expands to an intensified zerosum competition at the global level.32 Under these circumstances, Beijing is likely to pursue an incremental
approach to changes in the international system.
China would likely seek to balance intensified regional competition with Washington with a degree
of cooperation outside the region in order to avoid a
confrontation with the United States. Beijing would
not challenge the U.S. global role directly, but would
continue to promote multipolarity, look for strategic
partners among other developing countries and major powers, and seek opportunities on the margin to
work with others to weaken the U.S. long-term power
position (or at least limit U.S. efforts to entrench its
dominance). This would include efforts to work with
other developing countries to adjust global trade and
finance rules in order to better serve the interests of
developing countries. China would continue to promote increased use of the RMB as a settlement currency for international trade (thus increasing its international economic influence and reducing the U.S.
dollar’s global role). Economic tensions between the
United States and China and the increasing economic
power of major developing countries are likely to
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make further multilateral trade liberalization difficult
at the global level. Trade action may be more intense
at the regional level, where China is likely to promote
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) as an alternative to the U.S.-backed TransPacific Partnership (TPP). (However, some Chinese
economists have warmed to TPP recently, viewing
it as akin to WTO entry as a mechanism for forcing
China to undertake necessary but politically difficult economic reforms.) China would likely increase
its foreign aid, investment, and economic cooperation activities within the Asia-Pacific to increase its
regional influence.
China would seek opportunities to demonstrate
its contributions to global stability in order to offset
the tensions its actions in Asia are producing.33 This
might include a greater willingness to work with
Washington on areas of mutual interest, such as
nuclear nonproliferation, energy security, sea lane
protection, counterpiracy, and other global issues.
China’s willingness to cooperate with Washington in
the UN Security Council would depend on the nature
of the issue, with Beijing blocking actions that might
adversely affect its important interests, but compromising or acquiescing on other issues where its stakes
are lower. China would be reluctant to authorize any
U.S. military interventions for fear of setting negative
precedents.
Because China would be concerned about limiting
the U.S. ability to intervene in its territorial disputes
and on sovereignty issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and
Xinjiang, it would continue to emphasize the importance of UN authorization for military interventions
and to highlight respect for sovereignty and nonintervention as the dominant norms of international
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behavior. This would be in greater tension with China’s expanding overseas economic footprint in terms
of trade, investment, and construction projects. Beijing
may become more involved in the domestic politics of
resource-rich countries when critical Chinese interests
are at stake, but Chinese leaders will try to maintain
the fig leaf of noninterference in such cases.
Political instability in individual countries and
broader transnational threats such as terrorism and
piracy are likely to put Chinese global interests at
greater risk than they are today. Despite its focus on
the Asia-Pacific and its limited power projection capabilities, China might increase its contributions to UN
peacekeeping missions and its cooperation in capacity building efforts with regional organization such as
the AU and the SCO. These are measures that might
help increase stability in regions outside Asia (thereby
protecting Chinese interests), but which would not require large increases in Chinese resource or military
commitments.
China would be somewhat deferential to the security interests of major regional powers outside Asia so
long as it can maintain the economic access it needs
within their regions. (Although other regional powers
will likely not have as much influence within their regions as Russia does in Central Asia, the way China has
pursued its economic and energy interests in Central
Asia, while paying lip service to Russian prerogatives,
may be a useful model for Chinese behavior.) China
will cooperate with some major regional powers within global institutions to advance common interests of
developing countries (sometimes at the expense of the
United States and the West) and within regional institutions to maintain stability in key resource-rich countries. China will rely primarily on economic and dip-
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lomatic means to pursue its interests outside Asia, but
arms sales, security assistance, intelligence relations,
and technology transfer are likely to play more prominent roles than in the past. Using these and other tools,
China will continue to be willing to cultivate ties with
countries that have hostile relations with Washington
when this advances concrete Chinese interests. SinoIndian relations would be something of a wild card
in this future, with some possibility of China trying to
resolve the border dispute and pursue closer ties so as
to keep India out of Washington’s orbit.
Alternative Future 2: A Global Expeditionary PLA.
The PLA’s primary focus has shifted to military power
projection beyond China’s maritime periphery, whether because regional tensions have faded, because the
PLA has satisfied Chinese leaders that it has achieved
what needs to win regional conflicts, or because unexpected events elsewhere in the world have raised
Beijing’s sense of urgency about protecting Chinese
interests farther afield. The government has internal
issues under control and can afford the required new
military capabilities. For most of the decade between
2020 and 2030, the PLA focuses on power projection,
the details of which we leave to other contributors to
explore.33a

This future implies a China that is doing well
economically and that has resolved tensions with its
neighbors, either because it has established clear regional dominance through economic attraction and
selective military coercion or because maritime disputes have been resolved peacefully or set aside in
favor of economic development. Chinese regional
dominance implies a United States with a weakened
or dysfunctional regional alliance system and reduced
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military presence and political influence in Asia. This
could produce different U.S. responses, depending
on the underlying causes. If this outcome is the result
of a lagging U.S. economy and reluctance to sustain
U.S. commitments to Asia (e.g., a more isolationist
U.S. mood), then U.S. policymakers may encourage
greater Chinese contributions to the stability of other
regions of the world to make up for reduced U.S. resources and engagement. This implies the potential
for greater U.S. cooperation in other regions with a
more confident and more capable China. On the other
hand, if this outcome is viewed as the product of U.S.
policy failure, a rancorous partisan political debate
over “who lost Asia” could produce a much more suspicious U.S. attitude toward an expanded and more
active Chinese presence in other regions. Significant
PLA Navy (PLAN) progress toward blue water navy
capabilities—including frequent deployments outside
Asia—would also aggravate these concerns. If maritime disputes are resolved peacefully or fade in political importance, then regional developments have
no particular implications for U.S. power relative to
China. This could be consistent with “peaceful co-existence” between a relatively strong United States and
a stable and more confident China.
Chinese leaders enjoying a stable regional security environment, economic growth, and few internal
challenges would be relatively confident about the future and have a broader range of choice about their international ambitions. China’s success under prevailing international rules and norms might decrease the
perceived benefits of pushing for changes in the international system. Even within current rules, China’s
improved power position will yield greater influence
within most international institutions and increased
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status and prestige at both the regional and global levels. U.S.-China disputes over military activities within
China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Chinese
efforts to advance maritime territorial claims would
not generate the current level of bilateral tensions and
strategic suspicions, either because the United States
was not conducting such activity or because the two
countries had worked out a modus vivendi, perhaps
based on more parallel and routinized patterns of
surveillance.34
Much would depend on how Chinese leaders
choose to use their increased power to advance (rather
than just protect) China’s global economic and political interests. China might be willing to take on more
international responsibilities (accepting costs, risks,
and commitments) and make more contributions to
the functioning of the international system. Chinese
leaders would expect—and likely receive—a greater
voice and more influence in exchange for greater contributions. Alternatively, Beijing might make more
active efforts to use its increased power to reshape
international rules to better serve its interests, which
would produce significant friction with Washington.
Even if the gap between U.S. and Chinese power narrows significantly, Chinese leaders are unlikely to
seek fundamental changes in the international system
both due to the risk of a confrontation with the United
States and because a dominant leadership role would
require China to assume significant costs and risks
both to change the international system and to keep it
running.35 Such a decision would be inconsistent with
Chinese practice in avoiding major long-term costs
and commitments and Beijing’s narrow focus on obtaining concrete benefits for China.
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Accordingly, China is likely to seek evolutionary changes in the international system that increase
China’s influence or advance specific Chinese interests without a direct challenge to Washington. Beijing
will promote multipolarity, look for partners among
other developing countries and major regional powers to support its desired changes, and decline to
shore up U.S. global leadership or support U.S. efforts to improve its long-term power position. China
might make more active efforts to defend the rights
of foreign countries to choose nondemocratic systems
of government and seek to limit political and human rights criteria for international assistance. China
would cooperate with other powers to advance common interests of developing countries within global
institutions. The net result might be to weaken the
economic and political foundations of U.S. leadership, potentially producing a “G-Zero” world without
a clear international leader.36 China will continue to
proclaim norms of sovereignty and nonintervention
even as its economic interests lead to much deeper
involvement in the domestic politics of resource-rich
countries in other regions.
A more powerful and confident China might also
be less deferential to the political and security interests of major regional powers outside Asia, especially if instability in their regions threatens Chinese
investments, citizens, and access to natural resources
and markets. The current liberal international order
facilitates Chinese access to resources and markets in
other regions, but major regional powers such as Russia, India, and Brazil might well seek to limit China’s
access to regional resources. More likely, a reduction
in the willingness of the United States (and limited
capacity of great powers and major regional powers)
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to intervene to resolve civil wars or domestic insurgencies may produce greater instability in countries
important to Chinese economic interests.
China will employ a range of instruments to protect its interests outside Asia, including arms sales,
deployment of peacekeeping troops, extensive security assistance and military training programs, and
intelligence cooperation, especially in politically unstable countries that have critical resources or which
host large Chinese investments. In cases of domestic
instability, China’s initial response will be to work
with the host government to improve its capacity to
maintain order (and thereby protect Chinese interests). In this alternative future, China’s ambassador,
defense attaché, and Ministry of State Security station
chief may be more important than their U.S. counterparts in most developing countries, and better able to
deliver significant resources to help host governments
maintain stability. In cases where governments are
unable to maintain order, the PLA would help conduct noncombatant evacuation operations to rescue
Chinese citizens. If the frequency of such operations
increased dramatically, the PLA might become a supporter of greater Chinese political or military involvement to produce stability. The same might be true of
counterpiracy or counterterrorism operations. ThenPLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde suggested as
much in a May 2011 speech, when he cited the strains
counterpiracy operations were placing on the PLAN
and noted that solving the piracy problem required
action on land rather than at sea.37
China will become a more important military and
diplomatic player in global and regional efforts to
respond to regional crises, and may be willing to act
outside the UN framework when significant Chinese
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interests are at stake. (The evolution of the SCO toward norms of “mutual assistance” and periodic multinational counterterrorism exercises might provide a
preview of this aspect of China’s role.) However, Beijing will still be very selective about when and how
it supports outside intervention and which interventions it participates in. In this alternative future, there
will be some examples of Chinese-led intervention to
restore stability in internal conflicts, usually under a
fig leaf of invitation from the UN, a regional organization, or the host government and sometimes as part
of an international coalition. However, Chinese political and military leaders perceive U.S. interventions
in Afghanistan and Iraq as a significant drain on U.S.
wealth and national power, and are therefore likely
to be highly selective in where they choose to act and
seek to limit the length of any military operations.38
Alternative Future 3: A Weakened PLA.
Chinese leaders are overwhelmed with China’s internal problems and the resources available for military
modernization have dropped sharply. The PLA has
failed to achieve the development it intended, and the
decade through 2030 is consumed in a protracted effort to achieve capabilities relative to the United States
that it intended to achieve by 2020. Internal missions
including disaster relief, internal security, and assistance to civil authorities consume a great deal of the
PLA’s time. The external situation remains tense, the
possibility of conflict has not diminished, and Chinese
interests remain threatened in other parts of the world,
But the PLA does not have the time or resources to address those challenges as well as it would wish.38a

This future implies a China doing poorly economically (and environmentally), with a leadership focused
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primarily on maintaining domestic control. The ambitious economic reform agenda announced in the November 2012 plenum will have failed to reverse slowing growth. China may become caught in a “middle
income trap” where rising costs make labor intensive
products less competitive, but where Chinese companies lack the innovation and management skills to
produce more advanced products that are competitive
in a global marketplace. While a gradual slowdown in
growth is the most likely scenario, a major domestic
financial crisis could cause a dramatic recession and
sudden, widespread economic dislocation, casting
doubt on CCP performance in managing the economy.
Environmental problems caused by resource intensive growth and poor enforcement of environmental
standards will worsen. The Chinese government will
have fewer resources available to mitigate the effects
of air and water pollution and may be more reluctant
to enforce regulations that raise costs and aggravate
employment problems by slowing growth. Flagging
political support due to faltering performance will
make CCP leaders more paranoid about external support for Chinese activists and democracy advocates.
Internal problems will likely heighten concerns
about separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang. There may
be more incidents of political violence or domestic
terrorism directed against local CCP officials and
against Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Chinese
businessmen, and Chinese citizens abroad. The PLA
will face increasing demands to help local authorities
and the People’s Armed Police maintain order and to
demonstrate the party’s ability to respond to natural
disasters and other emergencies. This will absorb an
increasing share of flat PLA budgets, and may also
interfere with current military modernization efforts
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by increasing demand for ground troops and derailing attempts to reform the military region system to
support advanced joint operations.
In this future, China still has significant tensions
with the United States and its regional allies, but Chinese leaders are more focused on defensive goals (such
as preventing Taiwan independence and maintaining
territorial claims) than on achieving unification or consolidating control over disputed territories. Chinese
leaders would be more open to managing maritime
territorial disputes through a modus vivendi or joint development arrangements, but would also be willing to
use demonstrations or limited force to deter challenges
or when they feel provoked. China’s evident domestic problems, slower growth rate, and more restrained
military modernization program would ease regional
and global concerns about an aggressive China. They
may also ease the over-confidence that has supported
more assertive Chinese security and sovereignty policies and fueled nationalist calls for China to punish
the United States and other countries for transgressions against Chinese interests.
Within global institutions, China would be prickly
and defensive, with narrower goals of fending off external interference (on issues such as human rights,
environmental standards, or Internet freedom) that
might complicate efforts to maintain control. China
would also resist more intrusive economic rules and
enforcement of existing rules that might aggravate domestic economic challenges. China would emphasize
the importance of sovereignty and noninterference and
make common cause with other authoritarian governments and developing countries to protect those interests. Chinese leaders would continue to view the
United States as ideologically hostile and rooting for
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China to fail, but this suspicion will not greatly limit
Beijing’s willingness to cooperate on common interests. Chinese leaders might blame “hostile foreign
forces” for domestic problems, but they are unlikely
to use territorial disputes or external conflicts (e.g.,
diversionary war) to build internal unity or distract
attention from domestic challenges.
China’s more constricted global and regional diplomatic agenda would help ease U.S. concerns about
China as a rival and open the possibility of broader bilateral cooperation, especially outside Asia. However,
China will have fewer concrete things it can deliver,
either in economic or military terms. China would be
somewhat more deferential to the security interests
of the United States and other major regional powers in the hopes of maintaining the economic access
it needs and winning assistance in protecting PRC
citizens and interests. Beijing would cooperate within
global and regional institutions to maintain stability
in key resource-rich countries, although it will remain
reluctant to authorize military intervention for fear of
setting adverse precedents.
China would increase bilateral intelligence and security cooperation with Turkey, Russia, and the Central Asian members of the SCO to help manage separatist threats. Heightened concerns about such threats
may increase bilateral tensions with Pakistan if Islamabad is unwilling or unable to crack down on training camps and insurgent activity. Beijing has strong
incentives to resolve the border dispute with India in
order to gain New Delhi’s cooperation in managing
the Tibet issue and resisting Islamic separatists.
Slower economic growth would help ease Beijing’s
current obsession with access to energy and natural
resources, as Chinese demand growth slows. China
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would rely primarily on economic and diplomatic
means to pursue its interests outside Asia, but will
be more resource constrained than at present. Less
expensive security tools such as arms sales, security
assistance, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer will play more prominent roles than they do today. Beijing would make efforts to ensure that these
activities are coordinated in support of national interests, but low-level economic incentives may produce
a return to the days of unauthorized arms sales and
proliferation activities. Beijing would be somewhat
more sensitive to the concerns of the United States and
major regional countries when making foreign policy
decisions on issues outside Asia.
CONCLUSION
As a “partial power,” China will have significant
limitations on its ability to project economic, military, and ideational power outside Asia and to force
major changes in international rules and norms on a
reluctant United States by 2025, even under the most
optimistic assumptions about alternative futures.
The ability of the U.S. to maintain its own economic
growth, continue technological innovation, support
a capable modern military, and continue to play its
post-World War II international role will have a major
influence on China’s international opportunities and
constraints. However, a full assessment of the likely
role of the United States in 2025 is beyond the scope of
this chapter.39
Common elements across all three alternative futures include the importance of economic growth in
driving the expansion of China’s international economic ties (and associated interests), China’s desire to
avoid a military confrontation with the United States,
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and the importance of domestic and regional stability
in enabling or constraining a more ambitious Chinese
international role. The assumption that China will
maintain a narrow focus on what is good for China
and will lack the ideological appeal needed to build
lasting international coalitions will continue to constrain China’s ability to build an enduring support
bloc across a range of issue areas even if Beijing is
more powerful. When the United States seeks to build
a coalition for a positive goal, it starts with treaty allies
and countries with whom it has cooperated regularly
and successfully in the past. There are not many examples of coalitions led by China; the few that exist tend
to be coalitions opposing international action (e.g.,
on human rights or intervention) rather than those
catalyzing positive change. Beijing lacks experience in
exerting international leadership for positive goals; if
Chinese leaders choose to try, they may discover that
China is not very good at it.
One major challenge is the interconnected nature of
the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, the increasingly
competitive U.S.-China relationship in the Asia-Pacific, and China’s role as a global power that cooperates
with Washington on many issues and simultaneously
seeks to weaken U.S. power. Examining any single
aspect in isolation is likely to produce a misleading
picture, yet the connections between the bilateral, regional, and global levels are not fully understood.40
Given the impossibility of analyzing all the interactions within the available space, this chapter has focused on the connections judged to be most important in understanding China’s relationship with the
international system in the three alternative futures.
A fuller answer must draw upon the other chapters to
draw out the connections between drivers of Chinese
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policy, future PLA postures, and the implications for
future Chinese behavior at the bilateral, regional, and
global levels.
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CHAPTER 11
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA
STRATEGIC DYNAMICS
Robert Sutter
I would like to thank Lincoln Hines of National Bureau
of Asian Research, who provided effective research assistance for this article.

INTRODUCTION
Prediction of future U.S.-Chinese relations over
the course of 15 years requires prudence to avoid
gross miscalculations. Prudence requires a close look
at what can be learned from the development of the
relationship up to the present. Careful examination
of the recent context of U.S.-Chinese relations highlights factors that determine recent behavior. These
determinants have a long history. The likelihood that
they will be upset in future years is offset by several
realities: the United States and China are very large
countries—the largest in the world; their leaders have
long-standing priorities; and they exert great and often dominant influence as they interact with lesser
powers. The latter countries like Japan, India, Taiwan,
and North Korea plausibly could take actions that
upset the recent trajectory of U.S.-Chinese relations,
but it is more likely that much stronger America and
China will shape those lesser powers. Extreme developments such as regime disintegration, international
economic collapse or major war also could seriously
disrupt U.S.-Chinese relations, but chances seem
much more probable that relations will be governed
by factors that have shaped them up to now.
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FRAGILE BUT ENDURING STRATEGIC
EQUILIBRIUM
The end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War destroyed the strategic framework for the Sino-American
cooperation initiated by U.S. President Richard Nixon
and Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong. Sometimes dramatic crises since that time have seen policymakers,
strategists, and scholars in both the United States and
China register concern and sometimes alarm over
potential conflict. Major turning points included:
•	The multiyear virulent popular and elite American opposition to Chinese leaders responsible
for the crackdown against demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
•	The face-off of U.S.-Chinese forces as a result of
the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-96.
•	The crisis in 1999 prompted by the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and
resulting mass demonstrations and destruction
of U.S. diplomatic properties in China.
•	The crash in 2001 of a Chinese fighter jet and
a U.S. reconnaissance plane over international
waters near China and the resulting crisis over
responsibility for the incident and release of the
American crew and damaged plane that made
an emergency landing in China.
•	The explicit and growing U.S.-Chinese competition of influence in Asia featuring U.S. President Barack Obama administration’s so-called
pivot or rebalancing policy to the Asia Pacific
coincident with greater Chinese assertiveness
in dealing with differences with the United
States and its allies and associates over issues
of sovereignty and security along China’s rim.1
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In 2012, growing Chinese-U.S. competition in Asia
headed the list of issues that challenged the abilities
of Chinese and American leaders to manage their differences, avoid confrontation, and pursue positive
engagement. Competition for influence along China’s
rim and in the broader Asia-Pacific region exacerbated
an obvious security dilemma featuring China’s rising
power and America’s reaction, shown notably in the
two sides’ respective military build-ups.
Hyperbolic attacks on Chinese economic and security policies were features of the Republican presidential primaries. President Obama also resorted to harsh
rhetoric, calling China an “adversary.” He highlighted his administration’s reengagement with countries
in the Asia-Pacific region as a means to compete with
China in security, economic, and other terms.2
China demonstrated state power, short of direct use
of military force, in response to perceived challenges
by U.S. allies, the Philippines, and Japan, regarding
disputed territory in the South China Sea and the East
China Sea. Top Chinese leaders criticized American
dealing with the disputed claims and also highlighted
regional trade arrangements that excluded the United
States, seeking to undermine the American-led TransPacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact.3
Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi highlighted pervasive and deeply rooted distrust between the two
governments.4 David Shambaugh concluded that the
overall U.S.-China relationship was “more strained,
fraught and distrustful.” Intergovernmental meetings meant to forge cooperation were becoming more
pro-forma and increasingly acrimonious, he said.
The two sides wrangle over trade and investment issues, technology espionage and cyber hacking, global
governance challenges like climate change an Syria,
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nuclear challenges like Iran and North Korea, and
their security postures and competition for influence
in the Asia-Pacific.5
Unexpectedly, increased competition and tension
in Sino-American relations in 2012 was followed by
the California summit in June 2013 and an overall
moderation in Sino-American differences. These developments supported conclusions regarding realities
seen by a number of American and Chinese experts
as defining the current overall strategic equilibrium in
the relationship. The experts averred that the equilibrium was characterized by many areas of convergence
and divergence amid changing calculations of interests influenced by changing circumstances. Nonetheless, prevailing trends including the constraints on
both powers explained below, showed that avoiding
serious confrontation and endeavoring to manage
differences through a process of constructive engagement remains in the overall interests of both countries.6
There are three general reasons for this judgment:
1. Both administrations benefit from positive engagement. It supports stability in the Asia-Pacific, a
peaceful Korean peninsula, and a peaceful settlement
of the Taiwan issue. It fosters global peace and prosperity, advances world environmental conditions,
and deals with climate change and nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
2. Both administrations see that ever growing China-U.S. interdependence means that emphasizing the
negatives in their relationship will hurt the other side
but also will hurt them.
3. Both leaderships are preoccupied with a long list
of urgent domestic and foreign priorities; in this situation, one of the last things they would seek is a serious
confrontation in relations with one another.
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Looking out, few foresee the Obama administration well served, with a more assertive U.S. stance
leading to a major confrontation with China. Indeed,
the U.S. Government reached out to President Xi Jinping and the new Chinese leadership in holding the
California summit and seeking greater engagement
through senior level interchange in cabinet-level visits and structured dialogues. Its criticism of Chinese
economic practices adverse to American interests remains measured. It has responded firmly when Chinese actions over disputed territory along its maritime
rim escalate tensions and endanger stability, underlining America’s commitments to regional stability and
the status quo. Its posture on the preeminent issue of
Taiwan has been supportive of Taiwan President Ma
Ying-jeou’s reassurance of and greater alignment with
China.7
Comprehensive treatment requires consideration
of possible serious shifts in American policy leading
to greater tension in U.S.-Chinese relations. Those possibilities are considered below, but they seem much
less likely and important than the more immediate
consequences of China’s growing assertive role in the
Asia-Pacific and what that means for U.S.-Chinese cooperation or conflict. As argued in the next sections,
such Chinese assertiveness will remain troublesome
but probably will be held in check, allowing pragmatic U.S.-Chinese engagement to endure for the period
of this assessment.
CHINA’S TOUGHER STANCE
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
China’s tough stand on maritime territorial disputes evident in the 2012 confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea and with Japan in the
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East China Sea has endured through China’s leadership transition and now marks an important shift in
China’s foreign policy with serious implications for
China’s neighbors and concerned powers, including
the United States.8 China’s success in advancing its
claims against the Philippines and in challenging Japan’s control of disputed islands head the list of reasons why the new Chinese policy is likely to continue
and perhaps intensify in the future.
Concerned governments recognize that China’s
“win-win” formula emphasizing cooperation over
common ground is premised on the foreign government eschewing actions acutely sensitive to China
over Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and that the scope
of Chinese acute sensitivity had now been broadened
to include the maritime disputes along China’s rim.
They have been required to calibrate more carefully
their actions related to disputed maritime territories. Unfortunately, the parameters of China’s acute
concerns regarding maritime claims remain unclear.
Meanwhile, the drivers of China’s new toughness on
maritime disputes include rising patriotic and nationalist sentiment in Chinese elite and public opinion
and the growing capabilities in Chinese military, coast
guard, fishery, and oil exploration forces. The latter
are sure to grow in the coming years, foreshadowing
greater Chinese willingness to use coercion in seeking
advances in nearby seas.
For now, a pattern of varied regional acquiescence,
protests, and resistance to China’s new toughness
on maritime claims seems likely. It raises the question about future Chinese assertiveness, challenging
neighboring governments with disputes over Chinese
claims, and challenging American leadership in promoting stability and opposing unilateral and coercive
means to change the regional status quo.
340

There are forecasts of inevitable conflict between
the United States and China as they compete for influence in the Asia-Pacific or of a U.S. retreat in the
Asia-Pacific in the face of China’s assertiveness.9 Such
forecasts are offset in this writer’s opinion by circumstances in China and abroad that will continue to
constrain China’s leaders. The circumstances are seen
to hold back Chinese leaders even if they, like much
of Chinese elite and public opinion, personally favor
a tough approach in order to secure interests in the
Asia-Pacific.
CONSTRAINTS ON CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS
There are three sets of constraints on Chinese
tough measures in foreign affairs related to the United
States that are strong and are unlikely to diminish in
the foreseeable future.
Domestic Preoccupations.10
The Chinese leaders want to sustain one-party
rule, and to do so, they require continued economic
growth which advances the material benefits of Chinese people and assures general public support and
legitimacy for the Communist government. Such economic growth and continued one-party rule require
stability at home and abroad, especially in nearby
Asia where conflict and confrontation would have a
serious negative impact on Chinese economic growth.
At the same time, the need for vigilance in protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains among
the top leadership concerns as evidenced by the long
and costly build-up of military forces to deal with a
Taiwan contingency involving the United States and
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more recent use of various means of state power to advance territorial claims in nearby disputed seas. There
is less clarity as to where Chinese international ambitions for regional and global leadership fit in the current priorities of the Beijing leaders, but there is little
doubt that the domestic concerns get overall priority.
Domestic concerns preoccupying President Xi
Jinping leadership involve:
•	weak leadership legitimacy highly depends on
how the leaders’ performance is seen by popular and elite opinion at any given time;
•	pervasive corruption viewed as sapping public
support and undermining administrative efficiency;
•	income gaps posing challenges to the Communist regime ostensibly dedicated to advancing
the disadvantaged;
•	
social turmoil reportedly involving 100,000200,000 mass incidents annually that are usually directed at government officials and/or aspects of state policies; managing such incidents
and related domestic control measures involve
budget outlays greater that China’s impressive
national defense budget;
•	highly resource intensive economy (e.g., China
uses four times the amount oil to advance its
economic growth to a certain level than does
the United States); enormous and rapidly growing environmental damage results;
•	need for major reform of an economic model in
use in China for over 3 decades that is widely
seen to have reached a point of diminishing
returns.
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The Chinese leadership set forth in November
2013 an ambitious and wide ranging agenda of economic and related domestic reforms. How more than
60 measures set forth for reform will be implemented
and how they will be made to interact effectively with
one another are widely seen to require strong and
sustained efforts of top Chinese leaders, probably for
many years.11 Under these circumstances, those same
leaders would seem reluctant to seek confrontation
with the United States. Xi’s accommodation of President Obama in meeting in California in 2013, and his
leadership’s continued emphasis on the positive in
U.S.-China relations in seeking a new kind of major
power relationship underlines this trend. Xi has presided over China’s greater assertiveness on maritime
territorial issues that involve the United States, but,
thus far, the Chinese probes generally have been crafted to avoid direct confrontation with the superpower.
Strong Interdependence.
The second set of limits on Chinese tough measures
leading to serious tensions with the United States involves ever growing interdependence in U.S.-Chinese
relations. At the start of the 21st century, increasing
economic interdependence reinforced each government’s tendency to emphasize the positive and pursue
constructive relations with one another. A pattern of
dualism in U.S.-China relations featured constructive
and cooperative engagement on the one hand, and
contingency planning or hedging on the other. It reflected a mix of converging and competing interests
and prevailing leadership suspicions and cooperation.
Reflecting the dualism, each government used engagement to build positive and cooperative ties while
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at the same time seeking to use these ties to build interdependencies and webs of relationships that had
the effect of constraining the other power from taking actions that oppose its interests. The Council on
Foreign Relations was explicit about this approach in
a book entitled Weaving the Net, arguing for engagement that would over time compel changes in Chinese
policies in accord with norms supported by the United
States. While the analogy is not precise, the policies of
engagement pursued by the United States and China
toward one another featured respective “Gulliver
strategies” that were designed to tie down aggressive, assertive, or other negative policy tendencies of
the other power through webs of interdependence in
bilateral and multilateral relationships.12
Chinese leaders also are seen as continuing to
hedge their bets as they endeavor to persuade the
United States and other important world powers of
China’s avowed determination to pursue the road of
peace and development. New Chinese diplomatic and
international activism and positivism not only foster
a positive and beneficent image for China; they serve
an important practical objective of fostering norms
and practices in regional and international organizations and circumstances that create a buffer against
suspected U.S. efforts to “contain” China and to impede China’s rising power. Roughly consistent with
the image of the “Gulliver strategy” noted earlier,
they foster webs of interdependent relationships that
tie down and hamper unilateral or other actions by
the U.S. superpower that could intrude on important
Chinese interests in Asian and world affairs.13
Both sides have become increasingly aware of how
their respective interests are tied to the well-being and
success of the other, thereby limiting the tendency of
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the past to apply pressure on one another. In effect,
interdependence has worked to constrain both sides
against taking forceful action against each other.
China’s Insecurity in the Asia-Pacific.
China’s insecure position in the Asia-Pacific region
poses the third set of constraints on Chinese tough
measures against the United States. Nearby Asia is the
world area where China has always exerted greatest
influence and where China devotes the lion’s share of
foreign policy attention. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g., Taiwan) of top importance. It is
the main arena of interaction with the United States.
The region’s economic importance far surpasses the
rest of the world (China is Africa’s biggest trader, but
it does more trade with South Korea). Stability along
the rim of China is essential for China’s continued economic growth—the lynchpin of leadership legitimacy
and continued Communist rule. Given the previous
discussion, without a secure foundation in nearby
Asia, China will be inclined to avoid serious confrontation with the United States.14
Among Chinese strengths in the Asia-Pacific
region are:
•	China’s position as the leading trading partner
with most neighboring countries and the heavy
investment many of those countries make in
China;
•	China’s growing web of road, rail, river, electric
power, pipeline, and other linkages promoting
economic and other interchange with nearby
countries.

345

•	China’s prominent leadership attention and active diplomacy in interaction with neighboring
countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally;
• China’s expanding military capabilities.
Nevertheless, these strengths are offset by various
weaknesses and limitations. Some Chinese practices
alienate near-by governments, which broadly favor
key aspects of U.S. regional leadership. Leadership
in the region involves often costly and risky efforts to
support common goods involving regional security
and development. Chinese behavior shows a well-developed tendency under the rubric of the ubiquitous
“win-win” formula to avoid risks, costs, or commitments to the common good unless there is adequate
benefit for a narrow win-set of tangible Chinese interests.15 A major reason for China’s continued reluctance
to undertake costs and commitments for the sake of
the common goods of the Asia-Pacific and broader
international affairs is the long array of domestic challenges and preoccupations faced by Chinese leaders.
Chinese assertiveness toward several neighbors
and the United States have put nearby governments
on guard and weakened Chinese regional influence.
They have reminded China’s neighbors that the 60year history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
has, much more often than not, featured China acting
in disruptive and domineering ways in the region.16
China’s success in reassuring neighbors and advancing influence in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold
War period—a period now extending almost 25 years
—is mediocre. China faces major impediments, many
home grown. China’s long-standing practice of building an image of consistent and righteous behavior in
foreign affairs blocks realistic policies, especially when
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dealing with disputes and differences with neighbors
and the United States. Most notably, the Chinese government has the exceptional position among major
powers as having never acknowledged making a mistake in foreign policy. As a result, when China encounters a dispute with neighbors, the fault never lies with
China. If Beijing chooses not to blame the neighbor,
its default position is to blame larger forces, usually
involving the United States. Adding to this peculiar
negative mix, Chinese elites and public opinion remain heavily influenced by prevailing Chinese media
and other emphasis on China’s historic victimization
at the hands of outside powers like the United States,
Japan, and others. They are quick to find offense and
impervious of the need for change and recognition of
fault on their part.17
Arguably Asia’s richest country and the key ally of
the United States, Japan heads the list of China’s most
important relationships in the Asia-Pacific. The record
shows relations seriously worsened to their lowest
point amid widespread Chinese violence, extra-legal
trade sanctions, and intimidation well beyond accepted international norms over territorial and resources
claims in the East China Sea.18 India’s interest in accommodation with China has been offset by border
frictions, and competition for influence among the
countries surrounding India and in Southeast Asia and
Central Asia.19 Russian and Chinese interest in close
alignment has waxed and waned and has appeared
to remain secondary to their respective relationships
with the West.20
Relations with Taiwan changed for the better with
the election of a new Taiwan government in 2008
bent on reassuring Beijing. The government was reelected in 2012, but the political opposition in Taiwan
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remained sharply critical of recent trends and improved its standing with Taiwan voters.21
South Korean opinion of China declined sharply
from a high point in 2004, despite close Sino-South
Korean economic ties. China’s refusal to condemn
North Korea’s sinking of South Korean warship and
North Korea’s artillery attack on South Korea in 2010
strongly reinforced anti-China sentiment. Chinese efforts to improve ties with a new South Korean president in 2013 became sidetracked by provocations from
North Korea and Chinese advances in disputed territory claimed by South Korea.22
South China Sea disputed claims are seriously complicating developing Chinese relations with Southeast
Asian countries. China’s remarkable military modernization raised suspicions on the part of a number of
China’s neighbors, including such middle powers as
Australia.23 They endeavored to build their own military power, and work cooperatively with one another
and the United States in the face of China’s military
advances.
Beijing has depended heavily on the direction and
support of the Chinese government to advance its
influence on the post-Cold War period. Nongovernment channels of communication and influence have
been limited on account of China’s repeated aggression against neighbors during the Cold War. So-called
overseas Chinese communities in southeast Asian
countries have represented political forces supportive
of their home country’s good relations with China, but
those same communities have a long and often negative history in southeast Asian countries.24
The areas of greatest Chinese strength in Asia—
economic relations and diplomacy—also have shown
limitations and complications.25 As half of Chinese
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trade is conducted by foreign invested enterprises in
China, the resulting processing trade sees China often add only a small amount to the product; and the
finished product often depends on sales to the United
States or the European Union. A Singapore ambassador told Chinese media in August 2013 that 60 percent of the goods that are exported from China and
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
are ultimately manufactures that go to the United
States, Europe, and Japan. Only 22 percent of these
goods stay in the China-ASEAN region.26 These facts
seemed to underscore Chinese interdependence with
the United States and allied countries. Meanwhile, the
large amount of Asian and international investment
that went to China did not go to other Asian countries,
hurting their economic development. What is known
shows that actual China’s aid (as opposed to financing
that will be repaid in money or commodities) to Asia
is very small, especially in comparison to other donors, with the exception of Chinese aid to North Korea
and, at least until recently, Myanmar. The sometimes
dizzying array of agreements in the active Chinese
diplomacy in Asia did not hide the fact that China remained reluctant to undertake significant costs, risks,
or commitments in dealing with difficult regional
issues.
North Korea is a special case in Chinese foreign relations. China provides considerable food aid, oil, and
other material support. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner and foreign investor. China often
shields Pyongyang from U.S.-led efforts at the United
Nations to sanction or otherwise punish North Korea
over its egregious violations of international norms.
Nevertheless, North Korea repeatedly rejects Chinese
advice and warnings. At bottom, Chinese leaders are
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loath to cut off their aid or otherwise increase pressure
on North Korea for fear of a backlash from the Pyongyang regime that would undermine Chinese interest
in preserving stability on the Korean peninsula.27
U.S. Leadership and China’s Rise.
Comparing the previously mentioned Chinese
strengths and limits with those of the United States
listed here underlines how far China has to go despite
over 2 decades of efforts to secure its position in Asia.
Without a secure periphery and facing formidable
American presence and influence, China almost certainly calculates that seriously confronting the United
States poses grave dangers for the PRC regime.28
The foreign policies of the George W. Bush administration were very unpopular with regional elites and
public opinion, weakening the U.S. position in the
Asia-Pacific region. As the Obama administration has
refocused U.S. attention positively on the region, regional concerns shifted to worry that U.S. budget difficulties and political gridlock in Washington seemed
to undermine the ability of the United States to sustain
support for regional responsibilities.
The following factors provide the main U.S.
strengths in the Asia-Pacific region:29
•	Governments are strong and viable in most of
Asia; they make the decisions that determine
direction in foreign affairs. In general, the officials see their governments’ legitimacy and success resting on nation-building and economic
development, which require a stable and secure international environment. Unfortunately,
Asia is not particularly stable, and most regional governments privately are wary of and tend
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not to trust each other. As a result, they look to
the United States to provide the security they
need. They recognize that the U.S. security role
is very expensive and involves great risk, including large scale casualties if necessary. They
also recognize that neither China, nor any other
Asian power or coalition of powers, is able or
willing to undertake even a fraction of these
risks, costs, and responsibilities.
•	
Support for the nation-building priority of
most Asian governments involves export-oriented growth. The United States has run a massive trade deficit with China, and a total annual
trade deficit with Asia valued at over $350 billion. Asian government officials recognize that
China, which runs an overall trade surplus,
and other trading partners of Asia are unwilling and unable to bear even a fraction of the
cost of such large trade deficits, that nonetheless are very important for Asia governments.
•	Effective in interaction with Asia’s powers was
a notable achievement of the Bush administration. The Obama administration has built on
these strengths. Its emphasis on consultation
and inclusion of international stakeholders
before coming to policy decisions on issues of
importance to Asia and the Pacific has been
broadly welcomed. Meanwhile, U.S. military
security and intelligence organizations have
grown uniquely influential, with wide ranging
webs of security and intelligence relationships.
•	Reinforcing overall U.S. influence are uniquely
powerful and long-standing American business, religious, educational, media, and other
nongovernment interactions. Almost 50 years
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of generally color-blind U.S. immigration
policy since the ending of discriminatory U.S.
restrictions on Asian immigration in 1965 has
resulted in the influx of millions of Asia-Pacific
migrants who call America home and who interact with their countries of origin in ways that
undergird and reflect well on the American position in the region.
•	The success of U.S. efforts to build webs of
security-related and other relationships with
Asia-Pacific countries has to do in part with active contingency planning by many Asia-Pacific governments. As power relations change in
the region, notably on account of China’s rise,
regional governments generally seek to work
positively and pragmatically with rising China
on the one hand; but on the other, they seek the
reassurance of close security, intelligence, and
other ties with the United States amid evidence
that rising China shifts to more assertiveness.
The U.S. concern to keep stability while fostering economic growth overlaps constructively
with the priorities of the vast majority of regional governments.
A CLOSER LOOK AT CHINA’S CURRENT
CHALLENGE TO THE UNITED STATES
The Obama administration has more than 5 years
of experience dealing with rising China. The experience shows that U.S. expectations of significant breakthroughs in the relations are justifiably low. The Chinese have proven to be difficult partners. Worst case
thinking about U.S. intentions is married with mediapropaganda campaigns establishing China’s identity
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as resisting many aspects of American leadership. The
government-sponsored outlets provide an array of information that demonizes American intentions while
reinforcing Chinese self-righteousness.30
As Chinese capabilities grow, Beijing is likely to
take actions that will further challenge the international order supported by the United States.31 The
challenges to the security and stability in the AsiaPacific have been clear and seem primed to continue
and perhaps advance. China’s erosion of international
economic norms is more hidden. China seems to support free trade by the United States and others in its
ongoing efforts to exploit this open environment with
state-directed means, widespread theft, intimidation, and coercion of companies and governments in
a wholesale grasp of technology, know-how, capital,
and competitive advantage in a head long drive for
economic development at the expense of others.
Americans will face continuing impediments from
China in dealing with nuclear proliferation by North
Korea and Iran; China was of little help in dealing
with Syria’s use of chemical weapons or Russia’s annexation of Crimea and coercion of Ukraine. Chinese
leaders remain determined to support the Leninist
one-party system in China that treats human rights
selectively and capriciously, with eyes focused on sustaining the Communist state.
Taken together, these issues represent the focus of
the China challenge for the United States in the immediate period ahead. They promise numerous headaches and problems for U.S. policymakers; American
officials may grow somewhat weary in efforts to deal
with various Chinese probes and machinations. However, the previously mentioned assessment shows that
the China challenge is not a fundamental one, at least
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not yet. The United States can have some confidence
that prevailing circumstances and constraints seem to
preclude China seeking confrontation or power shift
in Asia. Some aver that China has adopted a slow and
steady pace as it seeks to spread its influence and undermine that of the United States, especially in the all
important Asia-Pacific region.32 Maybe so, but the record of Chinese advances over the past 25 years shows
such mediocre results and conflicted approaches that
the prospect of Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific
region seems remote. More likely, China will continue
to rise in the shadow of a United States increasingly integrated among a wide range of independent-minded
Asian-Pacific governments viewing the United States
as critically important to their stability, growth, and
independence.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SCENARIOS
FOR U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS
The three scenarios or “alternative futures” that
provide a focus for this book rightly concentrate on
Chinese military power and activity, which represents
an important determinant in U.S.-Chinese relations.
Of course, the U.S.-Chinese relationship has been and
will continue to be influenced by several determinants
on the Chinese and U.S. sides. For example, the 2012
U.S. presidential campaign showed that Chinese economic practices were no longer the positive force of
the past in promoting convergence between Washington and Beijing. They topped the list of American
criticisms of China—a trend likely to continue along
with Beijing’s continued exploitation of the international free market system in ways that disadvantage
the United States.33 Meanwhile, American ideologi-
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cal antipathy regarding China’s Communist system
reached extraordinary height in the decade after the
Tiananmen crackdown—driving an enormous wedge
between the United States and China that explains to a
considerable degree the distrust prevailing in the current relationship over 20 years later.
Against that background, this section addresses
the implications for future U.S.-Chinese relations of
the three scenarios. It does so with the understanding
that the military scenarios reflect elements important
in determining the degree of convergence or divergence between the United States and China, but other
factors not considered in these scenarios also may be
important in influencing the degree of convergence
and divergence in the relationship. Where appropriate, I will note such factors in the discussion.
As seen in the discussion, I find the first alternative
future more clearly defined and more realistic than
the other two. It provides an opportunity for some detailed forecasting. The other two scenarios are plausible. They depart greatly from the current context and
are broadly defined. As such, they allow for general
considerations but less detailed forecasting.
Alternative Future 1: A PLA Focused
on Regional Issues.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) buildup is an
obvious challenge to the United States. As in the recent past, an effective U.S. response can help to keep
tensions manageable.
This scenario seems to imply that China remains
encumbered in its protracted rise in Asia. It shows no
substantial change in China’s overall approach to the
region, including the strong self-righteousness and
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narrow win-win mindset seen in the recent past. As
in the recent past, the U.S.-China tensions over the
Obama administration’s rebalancing policies and
over economic, political, nonproliferation, and other
differences probably will not reach the point of conflict. If Chinese and U.S. leaders remain preoccupied
with other issues at home and abroad, and as expected
interdependence and possibly cooperation grow between the two sides, tensions over differences can be
managed effectively.
If the United States somehow has rebounded from
its recent problems and resumes the kind of highly
competitive activist international role seen at times
after the Cold War, there is a danger of confrontation
and crisis caused by greater U.S. pressure on areas of
difference with China. More likely on the U.S. side is
the kind of engagement policy toward both the AsiaPacific region and China seen in the Obama administration’s rebalancing policy initiatives. The reasons
seem obvious and strong:
•	The region is an area of ever greater strategic
and economic importance for the United States;
•	The United States remains strongly committed
to long-standing U.S. goals of supporting stability and balance of power; sustaining smooth
economic access; and promoting U.S. values in
this increasingly important world area.
Future dynamics in Asia are seen as determined by
five sets of factors:34
1. The changing power relationships among Asia’s
leading countries (e.g., the rise of China and India;
changes in Japan; rising or reviving middle powers—
South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia).
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2. The growing impact of economic globalization
and related international information interchange.
3. The ebb and flow of tensions in the Korean
peninsula, southwestern Asia, and the broader U.S.backed efforts against terrorism and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
4. The rise of Asian multilateralism.
5. The changing extent of U.S. engagement with
and withdrawal from involvement with Asian
matters.
In addition, a survey of leadership debates over
foreign policy among Asian-Pacific leaders35 shows
movement toward perspectives of realism in international relations theory in the United States, China,
Japan, Russia, India, and several middle and smaller
powers including Indonesia, Australia, South Korea,
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore.36 Such perspectives are important in how these leaders view the
changing power dynamics and security issues seen
notably in factors 1, 3, and 5. At bottom, the United
States can best understand Chinese actions by using a
realist perspective.
While vigilant regarding changing circumstances
that could have an impact on their security, sovereignty, and other important interests, the Chinese government leaders also clearly recognize the importance of
economic development, the lynchpin of their political
legitimacy. Thus, they endeavor to use the liberal international economic order in ways that benefit them
and their countries, and in so doing, they subscribe
in various ways and to varying degrees to aspects of
liberalism in international relations theory. As noted
earlier, such Chinese use of liberalism is best seen as
serving the realist approaches of Beijing’s leaders to
build Chinese wealth and power in world affairs.
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Asian-Pacific leaders also show support for aspects of the international relations theory of constructivism. Such support is manifest in their ongoing efforts to build regional and international organizations
and to support international norms as effective means
to manage interstate tensions and differences and to
promote greater interstate cooperation. Domestically,
most Asian-Pacific governments also foster a strong
identity for their nation as an independent actor in
regional and global affairs representing the interests
and qualities of the peoples of their respective countries. Supporting such an identity is an important element in their continued political legitimacy.37 Again,
the Chinese practice is to use stronger identity and
involvement in international organizations in large
measure to support along the lines of realist thinking
regime goals of preservation and developing wealth
and power.
A continuation of the type of U.S. engagement
policy seen in the Obama administration’s rebalancing initiatives fits well with most of these regional
dynamics. The U.S. strengths look even stronger
when compared with China’s recent and likely future
approaches.
Like China and other Asian governments, the
United States also relies heavily on a realist perspective in its involvement in the Asia-Pacific. America
has a proven record of bearing the costs and risks of
sustaining regional stability that is essential for the development and nation-building sought by the regional government leaders. The United States takes these
actions not so much because of liberal or constructivist beliefs, but rather out of a broad sense of American national interest tied to the ever more important
regional order in the Asia-Pacific.
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At present and for the foreseeable future, there is
little perceived danger of offensive U.S. military, economic, or other policy actions amid repeated stress by
American leaders against unilateral change in the status quo. By contrast, China has accompanied its rise
in regional prominence with a conflicted message of
closer economic cooperation on a mutually beneficial
(win-win) basis and often strident Chinese threats
and coercive actions backed by civilian and military
government power against neighbors that disagree
with China, especially on issues of sovereignty and
security. The fact that China’s stridency on these matters has grown with the expansion of coercive civilian and military power alarms many Asian neighbors
who seek reassurance from closer relations with the
United States in a variety of forms, thereby deepening
and strengthening the American integration with the
region.
Meanwhile, Chinese leaders continue focus on a
narrow win-set of Chinese interests. They avoid the
kinds of costs and risks borne by the United States in
support of perceived American interests in the broader regional order that are well recognized by regional
governments, reinforcing the regional governments’
support for closer American involvement in regional
affairs. Asian leaders watch closely for signs of U.S.
military withdrawal or flagging American interest
in sustaining regional stability. The Obama administration has affirmed its commitment to sustain the
robust American security presence involving close
military cooperation with the vast majority of AsianPacific governments built during the post-Cold War
period. This engagement builds on the strong engagement efforts of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
administrations, enjoys bipartisan political support in
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Congress and seems likely to continue for the reasons
noted earlier.
China’s role as a trader, site for investment, and
increasing important foreign investor will continue to
grow in regional affairs. Unlike the United States, China has a great deal of money that could be used to the
benefit of its neighbors. The governments engage in
sometimes protracted talks with Chinese counterparts
to find ways to use the money consistent with China’s
ubiquitous win-win formula. In general, China will
part with its money only if there is assurance that it
will be paid back, and the endeavor will support China’s narrow win-set. China’s location and advancing
infrastructure connecting China to its neighbors are
major positive attributes supporting closer Chinese
relations with neighboring states.
Of course, much of the trade remains dependent
on foreign investment and access to markets in the
United States in particular. The United States almost
certainly will not quickly reverse the large trade deficit that undergirds the export-oriented economies of
the region. Asian leaders are watchful for signs of
American protectionism, but the continued American
economic recovery reinforces support for enhanced
free trade initiatives from the United States.
By contrast, China’s commitment to free trade remains selective and narrow. Beijing’s tendency to go
well beyond international norms in retaliating against
others over trade and other issues has grown with
the advance of China’s economic size and influence.
Its cyber theft of trade and economic information and
property is enormous. Its currency manipulation and
other neo-mercantilist practices are used deliberately
to advance China’s economy without much consideration of how they disadvantage neighboring economies along with the United States. China’s recent
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extraordinary pressure on Japan for the sake of territorial claims risks enormous negative consequences for
the regional economic growth. In contrast, the United
States probably will see its interests best served in endeavoring to calm the tensions and play a role of stabilizer highly valued by most regional governments.
The growing U.S. security, economic, and political relationships with the wide range of Asian-Pacific
governments built by the Clinton, Bush and Obama
administrations have the effect of strengthening these
governments and countries, reinforcing their independence and identity. While many of these governments
continue to disagree with U.S. policies regarding the
Middle East Peace process, electronic spying, and
other issues, American interest in preserving a favorable balance of power in the region is supported by
the prevalence of such stronger independent actors.
By contrast, China’s assertiveness shows its neighbors
that Beijing expects them to accommodate a growing
range of Chinese concerns, even to the point of sacrificing territory.
The range of Chinese demands probably will
broaden with the growth of Chinese military, economic, and other coercive power. Strengthening those
in the region that resist China’s pressure is seen in
Beijing as a hostile act. The recent willingness of the
Obama administration to strengthen security and other ties with Japan, the Philippines, and other countries
facing Chinese coercion and intimidation shows the
kinds of actions that can be taken effectively by the
United States to demonstrate to Beijing the significant
downsides of its assertive “nibbling” of territory also
claimed by China’s neighbors. Overtime, effective U.S.
reassurance and resolve can shape and direct Chinese
assertiveness along less disruptive paths.
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It is important to reiterate here that most AsianPacific governments probably will expect the U.S.
Government to carry out its improvement of relations
in the region in ways that do not seriously exacerbate
China-U.S. tensions and thereby disrupt the AsiaPacific region. The Obama administration has used
the positive incentives of top-level engagement efforts
with China along with the negative incentives of firm
support of allies facing Chinese pressure and has a
variety of other such carrots and sticks in its foreign
policy tool box.
The Obama administration has also advanced
markedly U.S. relations with the various regional organizations valued by Asian governments as part of
their “constructivist” efforts to create norms and build
institutions to ease interstate rivalries and promote cooperative relations. While U.S. orientation tends to follow more realist lines to advance American influence,
the Obama administration seems sincere in pursuing
interchange that is respectful of the regional bodies.
These initiatives enjoy broad bipartisan support in the
Congress and are likely to continue. China also depicts close alignment with these groups, though Chinese more assertive ambitions regarding disputed territories have seen Chinese leaders grossly manipulate
these bodies or resort to coercion and intimidation.
Bottom Line.
This scenario suggests a continuation of trends seen
in recent years in China’s rise in Asia and the broader
American leadership role in the Asian-Pacific region
that have been examined here. I assess that those
circumstances will continue to encumber China and
preoccupy Chinese leaders who will remain cautious
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and unwilling to engage in serious military confrontation with the United States. The circumstances also
are seen to support a stronger American leadership
position increasingly well integrated with regional
governments and organizations.
Wild Cards.
Heading the long list of variables that could disrupt the previously mentioned assessment are the actions of third parties and their impact on U.S.-Chinese
relations. These include new leaders in Taiwan, Japan,
India, and Southeast Asian states who may take actions that could provoke confrontation with China. In
response to repeated challenges posed by leaders in
Taiwan and Japan in the recent past, U.S. and Chinese
maneuvers have sometimes raised tensions but have
avoided confrontation. There is no guarantee that future challenges will be dealt with in this way, but the
ability of the big powers to influence the lesser powers and the desire to avoid disastrous Sino-American
war support a more optimistic than pessimistic outlook on these possible problems. More worrisome and
uncertain is the situation in North Korea. The North
Korean leaders are capable of wide swings in behavior
and the underlying stability of the regime remains in
doubt. The collapse of the North Korea state would
pose an enormous challenge to American and Chinese policymakers seemingly well beyond the scope
and intensity of past crises during the post-Cold War
period.
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Alternative Future 2: A Global Expeditionary PLA.
The implications of this scenario depend greatly
on how and why the PLA shifted to power projection
beyond China’s periphery. There are a wide range of
possibilities ranging from those with very positive
implications for U.S.-Chinese relations to those with
very negative implications for U.S.-Chinese relations.
At one end of the spectrum, the global expeditionary PLA could be the result of a peaceful and mutually
agreeable understanding over Taiwan that was welcomed by such concerned powers as the United States
and Japan. It could be accompanied by effective Chinese reassurance of its neighbors and the United States
that their interests would remain secure. Against that
background, the PLA activism could be seen as part of
greater international cooperation by a confident China ready and willing to work closely with the United
States and others in fostering international peace and
stability. The distrust that has prevailed in Sino-American relations for so long would dissipate with ever
greater U.S.-Chinese coordination on peace building
and stabilization in troubled regions of the world.
At the other end of the spectrum, a globally expeditionary PLA could be the result of successful Chinese
coercion and intimidation of Taiwan, and perhaps
Japan and other neighbors, in the context of weakening American leadership in the Asia-Pacific. In effect,
China will have used coercion, intimidation, and other manifestations of growing power to break through
the encumbrances to China’s sovereignty and security ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. Against that
background, the globally expeditionary PLA would
signal great expansion of Chinese scope and activism
as China endeavors to alter the world order in its fa-
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vor after having successfully consolidated dominance
in the Asia-Pacific, pushing out the United States.
The implications of this outcome for American interests in the Asia-Pacific and the world seem quite
negative, but the outcome for U.S.-Chinese relations
could vary. In particular, America may give way to
Chinese ambitions and seek agreement with Beijing
on divided world leadership that may satisfy China,
perhaps for some time. There presumably will be a variety of international, economic and other areas where
the United States and China could deepen cooperation. A key obstacle would be the need to overcome
long-standing American prejudice against appeasement as a tool of statecraft, but the circumstances
could support an appeasement of rising China. A
more contentious outcome would result if the United
States fell back from China’s periphery but continued
to resist Chinese expansion from off-shore in the AsiaPacific and elsewhere. The success of this approach
would require overcoming international skepticism of
American power that failed to thwart the advance of
coercive Chinese power in the Asia-Pacific.
A development to consider in any scenario of a
globally engaged PLA is how such a new presence,
whether the result of benign or adverse circumstances
for America, will affect U.S. interests. Even under the
optimistic possibility noted here, China’s presence
will compel a reduction of U.S. international security leadership in the face of an expeditionary PLA.
Whether or not U.S. leaders will make the adjustment
smoothly remains uncertain, though the optimistic
possibility shows circumstances that would support
pragmatic adjustment and accommodation in the face
of new power realities.
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Alternative Future 3: A Weakened PLA.
This scenario could arise because of pressure from
the United States. It also could arise mainly because
of domestic and other external factors undermining
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. In both
cases, it is logical to expect more U.S. interference and
pressure, so long as the CCP regime persists. The continuation of the CCP regime matters greatly in future
U.S.-Chinese relations. Broad American antipathy
to China’s authoritarian Communist system has remained strong for decades and is likely to continue to
drive American policy. At the same time, it is not in
American interests that regime change in China comes
with major disruption to regional and global peace
and prosperity. At bottom, in this scenario, continuing
U.S. practices that weakened the PLA and other security bulwarks of the Communist government without
causing governance collapse leading to widespread
chaos seem in line with American objectives. Finding
this proper balance will be difficult.
These scenarios of weakened and preoccupied
Chinese Communist leaders probably mean greater
American involvement in the Asia-Pacific. Chinese
domestic concerns probably will open the way to expanding American engagement, while concerns of
regional governments with China’s uncertain future
will likely prompt ever closer consultations among
them and the United States.
A non-Communist China moving toward political pluralism and democracy probably will be much
better treated by the United States than the current
CCP regime. Such a non-Communist regime in China
probably could expect strong U.S. support to deal
with internal problems and less, if any, U.S. pressure.
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The United States also could be expected to use its enhanced involvement in the Asia-Pacific to work closely with concerned regional powers to stabilize and
support such a non-Communist Chinese government.
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